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Abstract 
Traditional efficiency measures have two significant drawbacks. Firstly, they fail 
to recognise that output is the result of all inputs operating in combination; thus 
output per head is a misleading indicator of intrinsic labour productivity. Secondly, 
they have often been defined in terms of average levels of performance in least 
squares production functions. In practice, average performance norms may 
institutionalise some level of inefficiency. 
The first of these problems may be overcome in a total-factor view of 
efficiency. This implies the extension of traditional ratio measures to include all 
inputs and outputs simultaneously. The second requires the comparison of 
performance with frontier possibilities. Both of these improvements are embodied in 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
Two applications of DEA are undertaken on U. K. public sector data. The first 
of these defines frontier efficiency in local education authorities (LEAs). It develops 
an 8 variable model with 3 outputs (based on exam pass rates) and 5 inputs. Four 
of the inputs are uncontrollable background variables allowing for differences in 
student catchment area; the fifth, teaching expenditure, is under LEA control and 
can be targeted. The results suggest that 44 authorities are best-practice and at the 
remainder spending per pupil could have been reduced by an average of 6.8%. 
These results are replicated on smaller clusters of LEAs to examine the 
sensitivity of DEA to the size of the performance comparison. The clustering 
procedure produces marked effects on targets, peer groups and the efficiency status 
of certain authorities. 
A second case study investigates the performance of a sample of 33 prisons 
with a high remand population. The model separately identifies the effects of 
remand prisoners on costs, and includes separate variables to reflect the levels of 
overcrowding and offences. In 1984/85 the combined budget of these prisons was 
overspent by 4.6% vis a vis best-practice costs. Using an alternative constant 
returns technology this overspend rises to 13.1%. 
Two aspects of DEA targets are explored. A model of Leibenstein's inert area 
suggests reasons for the persistence of inefficiency and hence that targets may be 
unattainable without coercion. Secondly, the literature has justified the 
recommendation of DEA targets in their being Pareto efficient. This interpretation is 
disputed and an alternative DEA-Dominance criterion is proposed as a more 
appropriate basis for targeting. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction. 
To date, there is no comprehensive study of public sector efficiency in the 
U. K. using the frontier methodology. This thesis seeks to fill that gap in providing 
a systematic treatment of the measurement of relative efficiency in education 
authorities and local prisons and remand centres. 
Historically, efficiency studies have adopted least squares procedures which 
embody average notions of efficiency. In practical circumstances the average 
efficiency standard serves to legitimise some degree of inefficient performance. The 
approach taken herein is more exacting and compares efficiency to the highest 
standards which can be found among a set of comparable organisations. In addition, 
the thesis embodies a total-factor view of efficiency. This is a further step forward 
on the traditional ratio approach. Particularly in a multiple output setting, a 
consistent overview of operations is essential. 
The ability to measure frontier efficiency and to form a consistent summary of 
performance is embodied in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA is a 
deterministic linear program which generates weights on inputs and outputs to form 
an extended ratio measure of performance. It was used originally by Farrell (1957) 
but remained in comparative obscurity until American management scientists Charnes 
and Cooper revived the technique with Eduardo Rhodes in (1979,1978). 
Charnes and Cooper (e. g . 1980a, b) have repeatedly argued that DEA is 
especially appropriate to public sector applications. In principle, private sector 
evaluation is less problemmatic, owing to the existence of output and capital market 
indicators (e. g. the market price of outputs can be used to calculate summary 
measures such as total revenue while changes in stock values also reflect 
performance). 
In addition to the academic arguments for the use of DEA, there has been 
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increased Government interest in public performance measurement over the past ten 
years. A series of policies have been implemented including the Fresh Start scheme 
in the prison service and the broader Agency initiative in the Government's last 
white paper on the subject. 1 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 explores the fundamental notion 
of a frontier efficiency comparison in terms of the production or cost function. 
Subsequently it defines the basic fractional model of DEA-efficiency and shows how 
the computational linear program is derived from this. important revisions to the 
original Farrell/Charnes and Cooper program have been published in Banker (1984). 
These revisions permit a more flexible modelling of scale in DEA and are illustrated 
in section 2.5. 
Two areas of the public sector have been chosen for the application of Data 
Envelopment Analysis. An area which has received both popular and academic 
attention is education. Fortunately in (1984) the Department of Education published 
a comprehensive data set on all 96 English local education authorities (LEAs). This 
has proved invaluable to many researhers and has been used to develop a model of 
LEA production in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 uses data from Prison Statistics and the Prison Department Report to 
develop an alternative model of productivity in incarceration. Although the prison 
service receives less popular attention, it has suffered serious complementing 
difficulties during the 1980s leading to accusations that manning in the service is 
unwieldy and overtime driven. 
While there are many applications of DEA examining the efficiency of branch 
operations, none has so far attempted the straightforward aggregation of branch 
efficiencies to give a broader view of departmental performance. This is undertaken 
in Chapter 5 which investigates the implications of branch-level inefficiency for the 
performance of the spending programme as a whole. Chapter 5 also compares the 
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efficiency of prisons under an alternative, and more demanding, assumption of 
constant returns to scale in the reference technology. This alternative technology 
yields a poorer picture of performance owing to the existence of "technological 
nesting" -a concept which will be discussed in due course. 
Chapter 6 takes a broader look at the interpretation of efficiency in DEA. 
Much of the recent development of the subject has been undertaken in the 
Operations Research literature. This has led to the misappropriation of the concept 
of Pareto efficiency. Chapter 6 argues that DEA-efficiency is purely technical (or 
physical) and lacks the additional allocative dimension in Pareto efficiency. 
Before Chapter 8 concludes, Chapter 7 undertakes a sensitivity analysis using 
the LEA data set familiar from Chapter 3. It is argued that in some circumstances 
it is necessary to restrict membership of the performance comparison to ensure 
homogeneity in the sample. The results suggest however that this consideration has 
to be traded off against the need to preserve the discriminating power of DEA. 
Two previously published papers are appended at the back of the thesis. One 
includes an earlier version of the prison model in Chapter 4. The second discusses 
problems in the evaluation of competive tendering for local authority refuse 
collection contracts. 
Footnote 
1. Civil Service management reform: The Next Steps. CM 524, November, 1988. 
London: HMSO. 
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Chapter 2. An introduction to frontier efficiency concepts and Data Envelopment 
Analysis 
2.1. Introduction 
The bulk of this thesis concerns the application of Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) for relative efficiency measurement in the public sector. This Chapter 
attempts to define the terms and concepts which will be required in the 
interpretation of these results. It can be considered a "survey" in the sense that it 
discusses important contributions to the basic Farrell/Charnes and Cooper 
methodology. 
To remain within space constraints, the treatment does not cover the growing 
number of empirical applications of DEA unless these have had a notable impact on 
the development of the subject. Nevertheless, frequent reference is made to relevant 
empirical work in subsequent Chapters. Other survey-type material has also been 
covered in later Chapters. Some of the general problems encountered in public 
sector evaluation are discussed in Chapter 3 while Chapter 4 discusses some of the 
theory of the production correspondence underlying the efficiency comparison. 
Similarly, Chapter 6 covers material on the meaning of efficiency in DEA. 
The discussion in Chapter 2 focuses on the measurement of input efficiency 
and thereby on the input minimisation dual program. Output efficiency and the 
output maximisation program have not been used in the empirical work in later 
Chapters and therefore they are discussed only cursorily in Chapter 2. Note however 
that the efficiency comparison, the target and the peer group are defined in an 
analogous way, mutatis mutandis, in the output dual. 
Chapter 2 is laid out as follows. The next section, 2.2, takes a broad look at 
the need for weights for efficiency measurement in the public sector. Section 2.3 
explores the fundamental notion of a frontier efficiency comparison in terms of the 
14 
production function and of the cost function. Data Envelopment Analysis is 
introduced explicitly in section 2.4 which covers the basic constant returns program 
suggested by Farrell (1957) and Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1981,1979,1978). 
Revised programs a la Banker (1984) permitting more flexible scale assumptions are 
discussed in section 2.5. Section 2.5 also notes the effects of the disposability 
assumption on efficiency. Finally, section 2.5 provides a full taxonomy of efficiency 
scores based on the scale and disposability distinctions. 
2.2. The need for weights in the public sector 
The bulk of this thesis is concerned with the application of Data Envelopment 
Analysis to public sector production in the United Kingdom. This section does not 
discuss DEA directly. Rather, by way of introduction, it underlines the importance 
of weights in public productivity measurementl. It should be emphasised that 
weighting problems are not confined exclusively to the public sector. For example 
large multi-plant or multi-national organisations operating in the private sector 
transfer rather than sell raw materials and semi-finished outputs between divisions. 
Since these transactions do not take place on an open market, their value will have 
to be imputed (i. e. weighted) in some manner. 
For many years national accounts statisticians have avoided the use of measures 
of public output, preferring instead to use measures of input - usually spending or 
employment2. However, problems in the control of public expenditure have led to a 
growing emphasis on the output dimensions of public sector production (Hanusch 
(1982)). 
A typical department like Health or Social Security has many functions and will 
be overseeing scores of distinct policies. In principle, each policy has an output. 
The measurement of these outputs is problematic for they are usually qualitative and 
lack the physical characteristic of "countability"; that is policy outputs do not usually 
accrue in discrete, physical lumps. Service outputs generally involve a 
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toclient-changet', such as the increments to knowledge and ability deriving from 
education (Marris (1985)). These qualitative changes are difficult to quantify in both 
public and private sector services (see Kendrick (1987), Schroeder, Anderson and 
Scudder (1986) and Achabal, Heineke and McIntyre (1985) for example). 
If service outputs can be defined, it is probable that they will be denominated 
in non-homogeneous units. This will make it difficult to form a summary picture of 
departmental performance. For example, it is not clear how the success of screening 
for cervical cancer could be satisfactorily added to the results of a programme 
designed to improve dental hygiene. The combination of outputs to form summary 
measures of departmental performance is desirable from first principles. Ruchlin 
(1977) has noted that output is the result of all inputs operating in combination. A 
partial factor-ratio like output per head therefore gives a misleading indication of 
intrinsic labour productivity. 
This reflects a lack of appropriate weights. In general, traded outputs have 
market prices which can be used to form financial summaries of performance like 
profitability. Public programmes such as health and education are currently 
non-traded. To summarise the performance of these programmes requires some form 
of shadow pricing. In principle, shadow prices can be attached to the various 
components (i. e. the outputs and inputs) of a programme to form a summary, 
total-factor productivity ratio. There are several potential ways to generate these 
weights - from client or expert opinion of services for example. An alternative, 
non-subjective approach to weight formation is Data Envelopment Analysis. 
DEA can be used to form a summary picture of departmental operations by 
generating suitable weights on inputs and outputs. The main prerequisites of this 
approach are satisfactory input and output measures and a "line" (or branch) 
structure within the department. Since DEA is a relative efficiency measure, it 
computes weights through the comparison of performance. That is, its 
implementation requires a line structure where each branch is producing the same 
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set of outputs from the same set of inputs. This sort of structure is common in 
many programmes administered by government departments. Potential candidates for 
DEA evaluation are Job Centres (Department of Employment), hospitals (Health), 
prisons and remand centres (Home Office), welfare benefit offices (Social Security) 
and schools (Education/Environment). Some departments, however, e. g. the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, do not have an appropriate branch structure for DEA 
evaluation. 
2.3. The nature of a frontier efficiency comparison 
This section outlines objections to average efficiency concepts and develops an 
alternative frontier approach. 
Historically, production and cost functions have been estimated using Ordinary 
Least Squares regression (Hammond (1986), Tyler and Lee (1979), Lee and Tyler 
(1978)). For the purposes of efficiency measurement the resulting average function is 
a misleading indicator of efficient production possibilities in both theory and 
practice. In practice, an average performance standard will tend to institutionalise 
inefficiency. This can occur because in reducing what appears to be attainable, 
average standards act as a disincentive to further improvements in performance. 
Furthermore, an average production function is inconsistent with the theoretical 
notion of a boundary function which reflects maximising behaviour. Hammond (1986, 
p. 971) for example has noted that "drawing on the theoretical underpinning of the 
cost curve it can be demonstrated that the classical least squares regression model is 
inappropriate. Under the assumption that factor prices are parametric, costs are 
subject to a technically determined lower bound. Therefore in addressing issues such 
as the efficient scale for the provision of a public service --- it is the lower bound 
on costs, the cost frontier, which is of interest. " It follows from this that an 
average cost curve implies a non-maximising assumption such as "satisficing" 
behaviour. 
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Nature of a frontier 
Frontier performance comparisons flow directly from the definition of the 
production function itself. Broadly speaking, production is a process of physical 
transformation in which inputs are combined to generate output. The production 
function should be interpreted as the purely technical relationship which defines 
efficient transformation possibilities, given the set of feasible techniques (the 
technology). Predicted rates of output corresponding to given rates of factor input 
may then be said to represent solutions to a technical maximisation problem. Thus 
Johnston (1960, p. 4) notes that "the production function can be stated simply as 
the relationship describing the maximum flow of output per unit of time achievable 
for any given rates of flow of input services per unit of time" (emphasis added). 
An equivalent interpretation holds for the cost function. Duality theory establishes 
the relationship between production and costs. For given factor prices, the cost 
function must be interpreted as a frontier function, because it is impossible to 
achieve costs lower than the minimum input requirements implied by the production 
frontier. 
The word "frontier" is applied in either case because the function sets a bound 
on the range of possible observations. Thus, production may take place below the 
frontier, but at no points above it; analogously, costs can be observed above the 
cost frontier but not below it. The amounts by which an organisation lies below its 
production frontier or the amount by which it lies above its cost frontier, can be 
regarded as measures of relative efficiency. 
The first empirical treatment of the production function as a frontier is in 
Farrell (1957) and Farrell and Fieldhouse (1962). Consequently, frontier efficiency 
comparisons have become synonymous with "Farrell efficiency measurement". The 
Farrell methodology has seen significant revisions in recent years. Nevertheless this 
approach remains the foundation of modern frontier analysis. 
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Farrell began by dichotornising Overall (or Pareto) efficiency (OE) into 2 
multiplicative components: 
OE -= TE. AE 
where TE is technical and AE is allocative efficiency. Each of these can be defined 
in terms of a production frontier as the ratio of potential and actual performance. 
Figure 2.3.1 
Farrell efficiency measurement 
X21Y 
p 
Consider for example an organisation consuming two inputs, X1 and X2, 
producing an output y. It has a production function y=f (Xj, X2) which Farrell 
assumed exhibits constant returns to scale. Accordingly, the production function may 
be written I --:: f (XI/Y, X2/Y) SO that the frontier technology can be characterised 
by the unit isoquant 11' in figure 2.3.1. In this figure, an organisation. is producing 
unit-output at point C. Its technical efficiency (TE) is the ratio of potential to 
actual input consumption. This is the radial measure OB/OC which in this case is 
less than unity. 
Potential or "maximal" performance is defined along the frontier. As observed 
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performance worsens, the distance of an observation from the frontier increases so 
that the technical efficiency ratio falls toward zero. Likewise, as performance 
improves, the efficiency ratio rises in value to unity. In general then: 
0<TE<1 
Farrell also included an allocative efficiency ratio within his frontier framework. 
Like technical efficiency, the allocative component is a radial measure which lies 
between zero and unity. At a point such as B in figure 2.3.1 AE = OA/OB where 
PP' is the isocost line defined by the ratio of factor prices. Allocative efficiency is 
significant in that it emphasises that boundary production per se is not sufficient to 
minimise costs. Full efficiency (i. e. OE = 1.0) requires simultaneous technical and 
allocative efficiency, viz. AE = TE = 1.0 which obtains at D in figure 2.3.1. 
To fix ideas, it is useful to show how the technical efficiency ratio in figure 
2.3.1 can be defined directly in terms of the production or cost function. If 
inefficiency is possible, the production function may be written as an inequality: 
yi <f (Xi; B) 
where yi is observed output at establishment i, and Xi is a vector of inputs and B 
a vector of parameters which describe the transformation process. f(. ) is the 
production function and has the interpretation of a frontier, or Ymax. At inefficient 
operations, potential output (Ymax) will exceed observed performance (yi). Hence, 
technical inefficiency implies yi - Ymax is negative. The difference between observed 
and potential performance can be treated as a residual in the production function 
which is equivalent to the technical efficiency ratio. If these residuals are denoted Ei 
then in terms of the production function in (2.3.1), the technical efficiency ratio 
can be written: 
ci= yi /f (2ýi; B) 
To preserve the frontier interpretation of f(. ) the ci are always non-positive. This 
ensures that observed output cannot exceed potential and that the distribution of the 
residuals is one-sided. The addition of the efficiency residuals "balances" the 
production function in (2.3.1 ): 
yi =f (Xi ; B) - ci, (i <0 for all i. 
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The technical efficiency ratios, ci, can be estimated econometrically (see e. g. 
Richmond (1974)). This requires the choice of a specific one-sided distribution for 
technical efficiency, negative half-normal or negative exponential distributions being 
the most common assumptions (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977)). Unlike 
conventional OLS residuals, the efficiency distribution must be one-sided in order to 
ensure actual output cannot exceed potential, i. e. that yi ý' Ymax is not possible. 
Hence all the efficiency residuals in the production function are non-positive and 
truncated at zero such that deviations are only possible below the production 
frontier. 
Figure 2.3.2 
Inefficiency and the production frontier 
Output 
y 
ý rA CXI)( 
ýL 
> 
This should be clear from figure 2.33-. Unit i is producing output yi which for 
input OX is less than frontier output Ymax- The difference between actual and 
potential output, (i, is negative and hence production at unit i is relatively 
inefficient. Notice that efficient production implies observed and frontier attainments 
coincide and that the efficiency residual equals zero. 
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An analogous interpretation can be given to inefficiency in the cost function 
(Hammond (1986)). If excess costs are possible then the cost function may be 
written as an inequality: 
(2.3.2) ci , -- g (Ki ; 
where ci represents average cost at establishment i, Ki are determinants of costs and 
ce a vector of parameters. g(. ) has a frontier interpretation denoting minimal costs, 
cmin. The efficiency ratio is defined by the residuals, Oi, in the cost function. That 
is: 
Oi = g(. ) / Ci 
which is the equivalent to the ratio of potential to observed costs. Where there is 
inefficiency, costs are greater than the potential and the efficiency ratio is less than 
unity. This means that the efficiency residual, Oi, is positive. This should be 
apparent from figure 2.3.3 where observed costs at unit i, ci, are greater than the 
minimum costs on the appropriate part of the boundary. Since boundary costs are 
the minimum feasible, observed costs cannot fall below minmurn costs, i. e. ci >, 
cmin. This is essential to preserve the frontier interpretation of the cost function 
and implies that the residuals in the cost function are non-negative: 
ci =g(? ýi ; 2) + oi, and oi >, 0 for all i. 
The Oi can be estimated by choosing an explicit distributional form for cost 
inefficiency and estimating a statistical frontier. For reasons of statistical tractability, 
positive half-normal or positive exponential distributions are the most common 
distributional assumptions in statistical cost studies (see Schmidt (1986)). 
The details of the estimation of efficiency in statistical cost studies will not be 
pursued here. Rather, the next section introduces the estimation of frontier 
efficiency ratios using Data Envelopment Analysis. DEA does not explicitly identify 
the efficiency residual. However, the concept of a ratio comparison of potential and 
actual performance remains at the heart of the analysis. 
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Figure 2.3.3 
Inefficiency and the cost function 
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2.4. The measurement of efficiency in Data Envelopment Analysis 
Introduction 
Section 2.3 outlined the nature of frontier efficiency comparisons. This section 
examines estimation of the frontier using Data Envelopment Analysis. Initially, it is 
necessary to distinguish the terminology of alternative frontier methods. However a 
full treatment of statistical and other approaches is not included. 3 Following this, 
section 2.4 explores the interpretation of DEA as a fractional program. 
Before proceeding it is important to notice that the word toprogram" ýxrill be 
used to describe a mathematical program for optimisation. On the other hand, the 
alternative spelling "programme" denotes a government budget on health, education 
etc. This distinction holds throughout the thesis and is especially relevant in Chapter 
5. 
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A second important distinction is the meaning of the term parametric. This can 
be used in three contexts in frontier estimation: 
(1) "Non -parametric programming" 
This is another term for Data Envelopmant Analysis as developed by Farrell (1957) 
and later Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1979,1978). DEA is a deterministic linear 
program used to construct a frontier technology. It is non-parametric in the sense 
of Diewert and Parkan (1983, p. 131). That is, it does not assume that the 
underlying technology "belongs to a certain class of functions of a specific functional 
form which depend on a finite number of parameters, such as the well-known 
Cobb-Douglas functional form". Note that DEA is also "non -statistical" because it 
makes no explicit assumption on the probability distribution of "errors" (i. e. the 
efficiency residuals) in the production function (Sengupta (1987a)). 
"Parametric programming" 
Like (1), this approach uses a deterministic linear program to estimate a frontier 
technology. Its main difference vis-a-vis (1) is that the parametric technology is 
smooth while its non-parametric counterpart is piecewise linear. Parametric programs 
have had a limited number of applications, for example in Forsund and Hjalmarsson 
(1979), Forsund and Jansen (1977) and Aigner and Chu (1968). A useful exposition 
of the parametric program is contained in Chapter 9 of Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell 
(1985). 
"Parametric statistical estimation" 
In contrast to both of the programming approaches, statistical techniques may be 
used to estimate a parametric representation of technology. There are a large 
number of statistical frontier applications in the literature - see Hughes (1988), 
Dawson and Lingard (1988), Dawson (1987), Huang and Bagi (1984), Bagi and 
Huang (1983) and Aigner, Amemiya and Poirier (1976) for example. The statistical 
methodology involves the explicit identification of the underlying functional form and 
of the distribution of technical efficiency. Proponents of the programming approach 
have argued that estimation of an explicit functional form imposes unwarranted 
structure on the technology (Sengupta (1987a), Banker and Maindiratta (1986)). 
Similarly the choice of a distribution for the efficiency residuals is usually arbitrary, 
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guided mainly by its computational tractability. Schmidt and Lin (1984) have shown 
that statistical efficiency comparisons are not invariant to the choice of distribution. 
Nevertheless the statistical approach has the advantage that deviations from the 
frontier can be separated into noise and efficiency components (Jondrow et al 
(1982)). The programming approaches, by contrast, attribute the whole of deviations 
from the frontier to differences in efficiency. Notably, however some work is now 
being undertaken to limit the effects of noise in DEA, e. g. Banker (1988). 
Similarly, Sengupta (1988,1987a, c) is exploring ideas originally proposed by Timmer 
(1971) in the use of chance -constrained programs where the constraints hold 
probabilistically. 
The fractional DEA program 
Having distinguished the non-parametric approach from alternative methods, the 
remainder of section 2.4 is devoted to a more narrowly focused discussion of the 
program underlying DEA efficiency measurement. It should become clear that the 
literature on DEA is a collection of programs - both "fractional" and linear. The 
fractional program is the parent of the linear program and so it must be discussed 
first. Essentially, the fractional program can be thought of as the conceptual DEA 
model, while the linear program is that used in actual computation of the efficiency 
ratio. 
Probably the best way to introduce the fractional program is to recall the idea 
of a total-factor productivity ratio. This is a means of summarising performance by 
weighting inputs and outputs in a single ratio. Assume that an organisation produces 
outputs Yi, i -= 1,..., t from inputs Xk, k=1,..., m . Then given a set of 
appropriate weights (Vi, i '= 1, ---, t; Wk = 1,..., m) on these variables, it is possible 
to form the total factor productivity ratio: 
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viyi 
(2.4.1) 
m 
ý WkXk 
k=l 
The numerator of the ratio can be thought of as a "virtual output" since the 
weights reduce the t output levels into a unique scalar number. Analogously, the 
denominator is a "virtual input" so that the whole ratio reduces to a scalar measure 
of total-factor productivity. 
In the private sector, market prices may be used as weights on inputs and 
outputs. However in the non-trading sector, prices on outputs are absent and a 
total-factor view of efficiency requires an alternative source of weights. Under 
certain circumstances these can be generated in Data Envelopment Analysis. 
Specifically, DEA requires that outputs be delivered through a branch system where 
each branch uses the same set of inputs to produce the same set of outputs. A 
summary efficiency ratio like (2.4.1) can then be formed for each branch and 
weights computed for that branch relative to performance at other branches. 4 
Consider then the performance of a set of Z departmental branches each using 
with the same set of inputs and outputs. The total-factor efficiency of each branch 
is the solution to a fractional program. Hence for any branch p, efficiency can be 
measured as the maximum of the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs 
subject to constraints reflecting the performance of the other branches. DEA treats 
the observed inputs (Xk) and outputs (Yi) in this ratio as constants and chooses 
values of the input and output weights to maximise the total-factor efficiency of p 
relative to the performance of its peers. That is: 
viyip 
(2.4.2) MAX 
Vi, Wk m 
ý WkXkp 
k=l 
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subject to Z "less-than-unity" constraints 
m 
Viylc/ý WkXkc 
k=l 
lp, 
and Vi, Wk ý' 0, for all i and k. 
This formulation of the fractional program is due to Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1979,1978). The program is computed separately for each branch, 
generating Z sets of optimal weights. The weights in the objective function are 
chosen to maximise the value of the branch's efficiency ratio subject to the 
"less-than-unity" constraints. These constraints ensure that the optimal weights for 
branch p in the objective function do not imply an efficiency score greater than 
unity either for itself or for any of the other branches. 
The efficiency "score" generated by the program is consistent with a frontier 
interpretation of performance. A score of unity implies that observed and potential 
performance coincide. In this case a branch is said to be "best-practice". Where 
observed performance is lower than potential a branch receives less-than-unity 
efficiency. This implies that its performance is poorer than that of some of its peer 
organisations and so it is relatively inefficient. 
The linear DEA program: primal formulation 
The fractional program is not used for actual computation of the efficiency 
scores because it has intractable non-linear and non-convex properties (Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978). Rather, Charnes and Cooper have advocated the use of 
a transformation to convert the fractional program into an ordinary linear program. 
The transformation is quite simple and derives from Charnes and Cooper (1973, 
1962). The resulting linear program may be constructed to allow either "output 
maximisation" or "input minimisation". The former Computes the output efficiency 
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ratio of a branch, and the latter its input efficiency ratio. In line with all linear 
programs, each has two components -a primal and a dual. 
The linear program (L. P. ) for the pth branch is obtained by setting the 
denominator in the objective function of the fractional program equal to unity and 
hence: 
t 
(2.4.3) MAX 
1 
viyip 
Vi, Wk iý 
subject to 
tm 
Viyic ý WkXkc, c 
i=l k=l 
m 
ý WkXkp 
k=l 
and Vi, Wk ý' 0, for all i and k. 
9pp... YZ 
The program (2.4.3) is linear. It constrains the weighted sum of inputs to be unity 
and maximises the weighted sum of outputs at the pth branch choosing appropriate 
values of Vi and Wk. The less-than-unity constraints of the fractional program are 
embodied in the L. P. since the weighted sum of inputs cannot exceed the weighted 
sum of outputs. The efficiency score cannot exceed unity as a consequence. 
An analogous formulation of the L. P. is obtained by minimising the weighted 
inputs for branch p, setting its weighted outputs equal to unity, viz.: 
m 
(2.4.4) MIN ý WkXkp 
Wk, Vi k=l 
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subject to 
m 
ý WkXkc Viyic, 
k=l 
viyip 
and Vi, Wk ý' 0, for all 1 and k. 
lp, 
Notice that the input and output weights (Wk and Vi respectively) in the primal are 
strictly positive when in conventional L. P. s they are non-negative. The strict 
positivity requirement on the weights was introduced by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1979) as a correction to their first presentation of the model with 
non-negative weights in (1978). Thus Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1979) restricted 
the input and output weights such that: 
Wk ý' 'E )k=1,..., m 
and 
Vi 
Where f is an infinitesimal or non-Archimedean constant usually of the order 10-5 
or 10-6. Lewin and Morey (1981) termed the positivity restrictions as "lower-bound 
constraints" on the weights. They were introduced into the primal because under 
certain circumstances the (1978) model implied unity-efficiency ratings in the 
fractional program for branches with non-zero slack variables such that further 
improvements in performance remained feasible5. 
The DEA linear program: dual formulation 
(2.4.3) and (2.4.4) are the primal linear programs. Computation of the 
efficiency score is done on the "DEA-side" of the program (Charnes and Cooper 
(1984)); that is, computation uses the dual of (2.4.3) or (2.4.4). The dual of (2.4.3) 
constructs a piecewise linear approximation to the true frontier by minimising the 
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quantities of the m inputs required to meet stated levels of the t outputs. That is: 
mt 
(2.4.3*) MIN hp ý Sk +ý SO 
xc k=l i=l 
subject to 
Xkp , hp - Sk ý 
yip + Si = 
and 
z 
ý Xkc)lc, k 
C=l 
z 
ý Yicxc, i 
C=l 
xc "-, 01 Cý 11 ... lp, ... Z (weights on 
branches) 
Sk 0, k=1,..., m (input slacks) 
Si >, 0, i=1,..., t (output slacks) 
with hp unconstrained; and c is an infinestimal (or non -Arch i medean) constant 
analogous to that used in the primal (Charnes and Cooper (1984)). 
Although the dual program is not as tidy as the primal its interpretation remains 
simple. The pth branch is relatively efficient if and only if the efficiency ratio, hp, 
equals unity and the slack variables are all zero. That is, if and only if: 
(2.4.5) hý =1 with S*k = S*i = 0, for all k and i I 
where the asterisk denotes optimal values of the variables in the dual program. 
Where the efficiency conditions in (2.4.5) are fulfilled, the branch in question must 
be operating at the end-point of a negatively-sloped facet of the frontier isoquant. 
Branches in these circumstances are said to be "dominant" or "best -practice" 
vis-a-vis inefficient producers. Consequently the efficiency conditions (2.4.5) can be 
thought of as a definition of "best-practice" performance. 
Notice that the shadow price interpretation of the choice variables is confined 
to the primal since the dual calculates weights (Xc) on branches rather than on 
inputs and outputs. Additionally, the dual weights are non-negative. 
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In computation, the dual program is more tractable than the primal. In the 
primal the constraints are indexed on all Z branches. By contrast, in the dual the 
constraints are indexed on inputs and outputs and sum over branches. The number 
of inputs and outputs is never likely to exceed the number of branches. Phillips, 
Ravindran and Solberg (1976) have shown that the computational efficiency of the 
simplex method falls with increases in the size of the constraint set. Hence the dual 
program with only (m + n) constraints on inputs and outputs is computed in 
preference to its (equivalent) primal with Z constraints. 
For completeness, note that the output maximisation dual of (2.4.4) is: 
(2.4.4*) MAX fp+ 
xc 
subject to 
mt 
ý Sk +ý SO 
k=l i=l 
fpy 
IP + Si = 
Xkp 
and 
XC >, 
Sk ý-> 
si > 
- Sk ý 
z 
ýx cyic, i C=l 
z 
ý XcXkc, k 1,..., m 
C=l 
lp, 
k=1,..., m 
i=1,..., 
with fp unconstrained. 
Again the dual is the program used in the computation of the efficiency ratio, 
although in this case it determines the output efficiency of a branch p for a given 
set of inputs. 
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Diagrammatic interpretation of the dual program 
Subject to minor adjustments for returns to scale (which will be discussed in 
the next section) the dual program (2.4.3*) for input minimisation is that used in 
the LEA and prison case studies later in the thesis. It is appropriate therefore to 
offer at this point a diagrammatic interpretation of the dual. 
The estimated dual technology is not smooth but constructed out of a series of 
intersecting linear facets. Each of these facets represents a constraint in the optimal 
solution to the dual. Collectively they intersect to form a convex production set 
which is closed and bounded from above. The frontier for efficiency comparisons is 
the lower convex hull of the possibility set, illustrated in figure 2.4.1. 
Before explaining figure 2.4.1 it is useful to note the following definition of 
technical efficiency in terms of which the dual technology can be interpreted: 
Input technical effLciencý6 
A branch is technically efficient in its use of inputs if no other branch, or linear 
combination of branches, is producing equal amounts of outputs for less of at least 
one input. 
This definition is equivalent to the formal efficiency conditions (2.4.5) from the 
dual; to recap, a branch p is efficient if and only if the efficiency ratio is unity 
and all of the slack variables are zero: 
h=1 
and 
S* = S*j = 0, for all k and i. kI 
where (*) denotes optimal values of the variables. 
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Figure 2.4.1 
The dual technology: A diagrammatic representation 
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Figure 2.4.1 illustrates a hypothetical frontier technology based on 5 branches 
producing a single output, Y, from 2 inputs, X1 and X2. Branches 1,2 and 3, 
lying on the frontier, are "best-practice"; this implies that no other branch or linear 
combination of branches can be identified which is producing the same level of 
output for less of either or both inputs. These branches have unity efficiency ratios 
and zero slacks in the solution to the dual. Consider for example, the solution of 
the dual for branch 2: 
1* 
and the constraints are: 
input 1 X12. h 0 2 X12-ý12 
input 2 X22. h* -0ý X22-ý12 2 
and on output: 
Y12 +0ý Y12 
The left-hand side of the constraints defines the "target", which in this case is 
clearly equal to actual performance on the right-hand side of the constraints because 
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best-practice implies X*2 = 1. The peer group drops out of the RHS of the 
constraints and for an efficient branch is none other than that branch itself since X*2 
and X*=0, c#2. c 
Branches 4 and 5 are inefficient relative to frontier performance. That is, for 
the same level of output it is possible to find a branch, or a linear combination of 
branches, which are using less of at least one of the inputs. Consider branch 5, for 
example, with an efficiency ratio OA/OB which is less than unity. This reflects the 
fact that a linear combination of branches 2 and 3 is producing at least as much 
output as 5 with less of X1 and X2. The efficiency ratio can be used to suggest a 
target on the frontier for branch 5 which will improve its current performance such 
that it is not dominated by best-practice, viz.: 
(OA/OB). OB = OA 
In principle, existing consumption of inputs defined at the vector OB can be 
adjusted by the efficiency scalar to give a target vector OA . The target implies 
that input consumption at branch 5 can be cut to X1 ' and X2' in figure 2.4.1 while 
maintaining its current level of output. It is widely recommended in the literature 
(e. g. Bowlin (1986,1987), Lewin and Morey (1981)) that the attainment of these 
targets is assisted by examination of peer performance. In terms of figure 2.4.1 the 
peer group for branch 5 is branches 2 and 3. Since these branches are producing at 
least the same output for less input they are felt to represent examples of better 
managerial and operational procedures which may be borrowed by the inefficient 
branch to improve its performance. The peers are defined by those branches that 
have non-zero weights in the optimal solution in the dual. For unit 5 the solution is: 
OA/OB 5 
and the constraints are: 
input 1 X15. h* -0ý X12-ý1*2 -ý' X13-ý*3 
input 2 X25. h* -0ý X22-ý1*2 + X23-ý1*3 5 
and on output: 
Y15 +0ý Y12-ý, *3 + Y13-ý1*3 
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Target performance for 5, Xi5. h5 i=1,2, is clearly equal to a linear combination 
of performance at branches 2 and 3 where A, A>0 and the weights on the 23 
other branches are all zero: X* = 0, c*2,3. C 
Notice that there are constraints on inputs and outputs in the dual. The input 
constraints define a radial (or equi -proportionate) contraction in inputs given by the 
efficiency ratio, h *' with additional reductions given by non-zero input slack p 
variables, S*i, i= In the input minimisation dual, the output constraints do 
not include a radial adjustment to outputs and are only of importance insofar as 
any of the optimal output slacks S*, k are non-zero. The solution for k 
branch 5 has all input and output of the slacks equal to zero. However branch 4 
has a non-zero slack on input X1. The efficiency ratio for 4 is OC/OD which 
defines an initial radial contraction in both inputs. However at point C, branch 3 is 
producing the same output for less of X1 and the same amount Of X2. Hence 4 is 
not fully efficient until it reduces its consumption of X1 by the horizontal distance 
C to E. This distance is given by a non-zero slack S1 in the final solution of the 
dual for branch 4, viz.: 
OC/OD 
and the input constraints are: 
input 1 X14. hý - S*j ý X13-)1*3 
i nput 2 X24. hl -0ý X23-ý1*3 
and on outputs: 
Y14 +0ý Y13-)ý*3 
The target for branch 4 is a radial contraction in both inputs given by h* plus the 4 
additional reduction in Xl, given by S*j. Its peer group is branch 3 alone since its 
target coincides exactly with performance observed at this best-practice branch. Thus 
x*=1 and X*=0 fo rc#3. 3c 
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Figure 2.4.2 
Output surface in the dual program 
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In some circumstances the input minimisation program may also suggest 
adjustments to output where the optimal values of the output slack variables are 
non-zero. These adjustments occur at the equivalent of horizontal or vertical facets 
of the output surface. In figure 2.4.1 the output surface would be a vertical 
extension of the input space. However it is only with a minimum of 2 outputs that 
non-zero output slacks are possible. Thus consider the output surface in figure 
2.4.2. Like its input counterpart, it is piecewise linear, each facet reflecting the 
presence of an output constraint in the dual. Assume that the solution to the dual 
for branch 4 is identical to that given above other than that there are now two 
constraints on outputs, viz.: 
output 1 Y14 + S*l ý Y13-ý1*3 
output 2 Y24 +0ý Y13-ý1*3 
The slack value on output Y2 is zero, i. e. S* = 0. But that 2 on Yj is positive, S*1 
> 0. This can be identified in terms of the output frontier in figure 2.4.2. Branch 
4 is producing the same amount of Y2 as branch 3 but less of Y1. The slack on 
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Yj therefore represents the amount by which 4 must increase Yj to come up to 
the standards set by 3; this is the horizontal distance AB Sl) between branches 
3 and 4. 
It is apparent that there are two aspects to the target in the (input 
minimisation) dual program. The constraints define a radial (= equi-proportionate) 
reduction in inputs plus any further reductions in inputs suggested by non-zero input 
slacks. In addition however the presence of non-zero output slacks may require 
adjustments to outputs. 
Throughout this thesis performance is evaluated using the input minimisation 
program because it was felt that the output maximisation version is inappropriate. 
This is because Government efficiency policy in the Financial Management Initiative 
was initially couched in terms of input rather than output improvements. 
Furthermore several authors have argued that in the face of output measurement 
problems in the public sector, evaluation should focus on the measurable aspects of 
production (Mersha(1989), Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1988), Khumbakar (1988) and 
Mellander and Ysander (1987)). In practice this has meant efficiency studies have 
emphasised the input dimensions of efficiency. Sengupta (1987a, b and c) has argued 
that in education, for example, measurement errors on outputs are larger than on 
inputs. That is costs in financial terms are more tractable to measurement than 
increments to knowledge and ability through test scores, etc. Complementary 
arguments have also been proposed suggesting outputs are in general more prone to 
stochastic influences than inputs (Sengupta, (ibid. ). 
In many circumstances, outputs are exogenous. Take the example of prisons. 
Output in terms of prisoner days is not chosen by the prison governor. Rather, it 
reflects court sentencing policy, statute and the propensity to crime in the 
population at large. Consequently it would be meaningless to suggest that output be 
raised to increase efficiency because, inter alia, this would necessitate a change to a 
harsher sentencing policy - something quite beyond the control of prison 
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management. In environments where output is controllable, the same reasoning may 
apply. For it is fair to ask how much inefficient producers can reasonably be 
expected to achieve. I have taken the approach that simultaneous input and output 
adjustments would be over-exacting. Therefore the targets defined for prisons and 
for local education authorities in later chapters are for adjustments to inputs alone. 
Additional changes to outputs which might be suggested in the slacks are ignored. 
The targeting criterion adopted is therefore of adjustment to inputs for given output7. 
2.5. Retums to scale 
Section 2.5 examines some recent extensions to the original DEA program of 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1979,1978). These concern the addition of constraints 
to the program to permit a greater diversity of scale possiblities in the estimated 
production surface. 
Despite the revival of the programming approach by Charnes and Cooper in 
the late seventies, most economists continued to use statistical procedures for frontier 
estimation. Grosskopf (1986) has argued that this was to be expected because the 
original Farrell/Charnes-Cooper program made over -restric ti ve scale (and disposablity) 
assumptions. Viz. Forsund et al (1980) stated that: "While his [Farrell's] measures 
are valid for the restrictive technologies he considered, they do not generalise easily 
to technologies that are not linearly homogenous or to technologies in which strong 
disposability and strict quasiconvexity are inappropriate". However recent 
developments, particularly in Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985,1983), Banker 
(1984), Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) and Banker, Charnes, Cooper and 
Schinnar (1981), have extended the original Farrell program to allow for a wide 
range of more general reference technologies. It is these revisions that are the 
subject of section 2.5. 
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The analysis of returns to scale in DEA 
It is now appropriate to examine the analysis of scale in DEA. Early users of 
the non-parametric approach were based on a linear program which embodied 
constant returns to scale and strong disposability - these included Farrell (1957), 
Seitz (1971,1970) and the first papers by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1981, 
1979,1978). Many economists viewed these assumptions as over-restrictive so that 
alternative statistical procedures were generally adopted in place of DEA. However, 
recent work has enabled the relaxation of the constant returns assumption giving the 
programming approach wider applicability. At the same time, Rolf Fare and his 
colleagues have developed programs which permit weak rather than strong 
disposability of inputs and outputs - see especially Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell 
(1985, Chapter 2). These revised programs with alternative scale and disposability 
implications, have generated new interest in DEA and have been used throughout 
later chapters. 
The most important revisions to the original Farrel I/Charnes-Cooper program 
can be found in Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985,1983), Banker (1984), Banker, 
Charnes and Cooper (1984) and Banker, Charnes, Cooper and Schinnar (1981). It is 
probably fair to say that the most important name among these is Banker who has 
made a consistently significant contribution to the development to the subject. 
Accordingly, the analysis of scale now to be developed broadly follows that in 
Banker (1984). 
Construction of a constant returns to scale (CRS) frontier 
As is so often the case, it is easiest to proceed via a stylised. example of 
production. Assume that output is the result of a single input, as in figure 2.5.1. 
Marked points in this diagram represent observed input-output combinations. The 
original Farrel I/Cha rnes-Cooper program constructs a constant returns frontier by 
identifying that branch which maximises the ratio of output to input. This ratio can 
39 
be interpreted as the maximum average productivity and denotes the scale efficient 
branch since it is consistent with a position of constant returns to scale. 
In figure 2.5.1 branch 2 maximises average productivity. A ray drawn from the 
origin to any of the remaining branches 1,3,4 or 5 would have a lower slope and 
would not maximise average productivity, i. e. (Y21X2) > (yc/Xc), c#2. A 
constant returns frontier is therefore an unbounded ray beginning at the origin and 
passing through a point of maximum average productivity as at branch 2. This is 
the frontier constructed by Farrell (1957), Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1979,1978) 
and in the dual programs (2.4.3*) and (2.4.4*) explored earlier in section 2.4.8 
It is instructive to examine the solution to the CRS dual corresponding to the 
ray OCRS in figure 2.5.1. Dropping subscripts on inputs and outputs, the stylised 
solution to the dual (2.4.3*) for branch 2 would be: 
= 
and 
X2h*2 ý X2)1*2 
Y2 Y2)ý2 
*=0, c# where )ý2 =1 and ý12 
Since branch 2 maximises average productivity it is scale efficient and has a unit 
weight in the constraints, i. e X*=1. The remaining branches 1,3,4 and 5 have -2 
lower average productivity ratios. Hence they are dominated by branch 2 and cannot 
appear in its peer group. In order to calculate the input-efficiency ratios of these 
branches the performance of branch 2 has to be extrapolated in the appropriate 
direction using an assumption of "Ray Unboundness" (Banker, Charnes and Cooper 
(1984)). This generates the ray OCRS in figure 2.5.1. Since branch 2 is scale 
efficient the ray has a constant returns interpretation. Computationally it is 
constructed by varying the weights on the scale efficient branch (on the RHS of the 
constraints) in the solution to the dual. 
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Figure 2.5.1 
Average productivity and returns to scale 
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Consider a dual solution for branch 4 which is consistent with figure 2.5.1 
(where input and output subscripts have been suppressed): 
EF/EG 
and X4. h*4 ý 
X2ý12^ 
Y4 ý Y2ý\*2 
where A>1 and X* = 0, for c#2. That is, the target vector for branch 4, 2c 
(X2ý, 2*, Y2ý1*2), is a re-scaling (or vector extension) of performance at the dominant 
branch by the factor X*2- 
Next consider the solution for a branch such as 1 with lower inputs and 
outputs than the scale efficient branch: 
HI/Hi 
and Xlhl . 
X2X2^ 
Yl ý Y2ý12 
where <1 and X* = 0, for c : ý6 2. 2c 
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The target vector for branch 1 on the RHS of the constraints is again a re-scaling 
of performance at the dominant branch. However, for input-output levels lower than 
scale efficient levels the optimal weight X* is less than unity. 2 
It is apparent from these examples that by varying the value of the weight(s) 
on the scale efficient branch(es) - that is by varying 
A in figure 2.5.1, it is 2 
possi e to construct a frontier consistent with a constant returns to scale 
technology. Notice that at the origin A=0 and that for higher levels of inputs 2 
and outputs X* 24+ 
Banker (1984) pointed out that a useful "test" for returns to scale can be 
derived from the CRS dual. In particular, branches such as 1 with lower inputs and 
outputs than the reference branch will have a target which is a scaling down of 
best-practice performance. Analogously with higher inputs and outputs than at the 
reference branch, targets are a scaling up of best-practice performance. That is, the 
weight on best-practice (e. g. X* in figure 2.5.3) describes the returns to scale: 2 
X* <1 => IRS (increasing returns) bp 
x* bp CRS (constant returns) 
X* > DRS (decreasing returns) bp 
where bp denotes the scale efficient or best-practice branch. 
Notice that in the simple Ix1 case in figure 2.5.3 only one branch is scale 
efficient. However, for multiple inputs and outputs several branches may be scale 
efficient on at least one variable (c. f. Nunamaker (1985)) such that the Banker scale 
indicator would be the sum of the optimal weights on each of those branches: 
z 
ý Xc <1 IRS 
C=l 
z 
I Xc CRS 
C=l 
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and 
z 
ý Xc > DRS 
C=l 
where some of the X* =0 for inefficient branches. c 
The Banker indicator is used to explore the scale characteristics of local prisons and 
remand centres in Chapter 5. 
Construction of a non-constant returns technology 
Having explored the construction of the constant returns technology it is now 
possible to examine the Banker (1984) adjustment to the dual which permits the 
estimation of technologies which allow returns to scale to vary over the production 
surface. 
It has been shown that the position of the frontier is embodied in the weights 
(X*, c=1,..., Z) in the constraints from the dual program. An unbounded CRS ray C 
can be generated by unlimited selections of values of the weights Xc . It should be 
clear that if the program restricts the values which the X* may acquire, this will c 
have a significant effect on the shape and position of the frontier. In particular, the 
frontier will have a "varying returns to scale" (VRS) interpretation incorporating 
decreasing, constant and increasing returns if the weights are constrained to sum to 
unity. The addition of the constraint ýX* =1 immediately excludes construction Of c 
the unbounded CRS ray because the unlimited vector extension of scale efficient 
performance is no longer possible. 
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Figure 2.5.2 
The varying returns to scale technology 
output 
y 
F 
A stylised example of a varying returns frontier is contained in figure 2.5.2. 
Since increasing and decreasing returns are feasible, the frontier may include scale 
inefficient operations; i. e. branches such as 1 (with IRS) and 3 and 4 (with DRS) 
which nevertheless are technically efficient for given scale. The result is a piecewise 
linear frontier ABCDE. The returns to scale vary from facet to facet, each of 
which represents the solution to a constraint in the dual. For combinations of input 
and output lower than the scale efficient branch, e. g. along the facet BC, there are 
increasing returns; facets reflecting higher levels of production have decreasing 
returns to scale. Notice also that the scale efficient branch is included in both the 
VRS and the CRS frontiers and indeed represents the point of intersection of the 
two. 
The full revised program of Banker (1984) is required to generate the VRS 
frontier. The full input minimisation program, permitting locally increasing, constant 
and decreasing returns to scale is then: 
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IIA 
m 
(2.5.1) MIN hp ý Sk SO 
xc k=l 
subject to 
z 
Xkphp - Sk ýý Xkcýlc, k 
C=l 
z 
Yip - Si =ý Yicxc, i 
C=l 
z 
ý xc 
C-1 
and 
XC ý-- 0, c="..., P,..., z (weights on branches) 
Sk 0, k= 1,..., m (input slacks) 
Si 0, i= 1,..., t (output slacks) 
The revised program is identical to that in section 2.4 other than for the addition 
of the constraint that the weights on branches sum to unity. This new constraint 
ensures that the frontier is composed of multiple convex linear combinations of 
best-practice where dominance is now more weakly defined to include regions of 
increasing and decreasing returns. Indeed any convex linear combinations of observed 
inputs and outputs is a feasible production plan. 
Consider the solution of the dual for branch 5 in figure 2.5.2 (and suppressing 
subscripts on inputs and outputs for convenience): 
FH/FI 
and X5h* ý X3)1*3 + X44 5 
Y5 ý Y3ý%3 + Y4ý11 
1= X3 + ý4 
(and X* =A=*= 1 
Since (X3, Y3)' and N, YO are observed input-output vectors, then by 
assumption the target vector is also feasible for any values of the weights which 
sum to unity; hence the target for branch 5 is a convex combination represented by 
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point H on the facet DE in figure 2.5.2. Notice that branch 5 is neither technically 
or scale efficient compared to the extrapolation of average productivity from branch 
2. If the CRS program were computed for branches 3 and 4 the optimal solution 
would suggest decreasing returns to scale because in each case ýX* > c 
Grosskopf (1986) and Fare, Grosskopf and Njinkeu (1988) have explored the 
effects on efficiency of altering the definition of the reference technology. In 
general, a CRS efficiency comparison gives a poorer picture of performance since an 
organisation has to be both technically and scale efficient to qualify for a unity 
efficiency ratio. Under a varying returns technology dominance is weaker in the 
sense that scale inefficient production may qualify as best-practice if it is technically 
efficient. The effects of technological nesting will be fully discussed in Chapter 5. 
For the time being, however, it is sufficient to note: 
TEi, crs < TEi, vrs ; 
i. e. for the same production unit i, technical efficiency under constant returns is 
lower than under varying returns (other than where the two technologies coincide 
when the efficiency scores will be equal). In general then the CRS efficiency can be 
thought of as a "lower bound" and the VRS as the "upper bound" measure of 
efficiency. In some papers, (e. g. Rangan et al (1988)), VRS efficiency is termed 
pure technical efficiency to distinguish it from CRS efficiency which subsumes 
technical and scale components in performance. 
However this does not exhaust the potential array of reference technologies 
which may be computed using DEA. In addition to CRS and VRS there is a third 
non-increasing returns (NIRS) program. The MRS boundary is a composite of the 
CRS and VRS alternatives. In figure 2.5.2 it would be OCDE where clearly the 
facet OC has constant returns, and those facets for output levels above branch 2 
have decreasing returns. It should be obvious that the inclusion of the constraint 
ýXc <1 in the dual (in place of ýXc = 1) will be sufficient to generate the MRS 
technology. Hence for efficiency comparisons over the range OC, ýX* <1 in the C 
MRS program and for similar comparisons with the facets CD and DE ýX* = 1. c 
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Implementation of MRS programs can be found in Jesson, Mayston and Smith 
(1987) and in Smith and Mayston (1987). Notice that the MRS technology could be 
constructed from the VRS program if an observation consisting entirely of zeroes is 
included in the data set. 
Other uses of the piecewise reference technologies -a short digression 
For nearly 20 years there has been a small number of contributions to a 
literature which seeks to establish whether real production data has been generated 
by well-behaved production or cost-functions. In principle, there are circumstances 
under which it could be proved that the input set is consistent with cost-minimising 
behaviour. Afriat (1972) and Hanoch and Rothschild (1972) showed that from the 
construction of appropriately defined linear programs it is possible to "test" for a 
behavioural assumption of cost minimisation. These L. P. s compute bounds on the 
input set which are essentially identical to the frontier technology constructed using 
DEA. Recent work has been done by Banker and Maindiratta (1988), Diewert and 
Parkan (1983) and also by Varian (1985,1984) who has constructed L. P. s to test 
for utility maximisation in consumption data. 
Disposability of inputs and outputs 
A further important characteristic of the DEA possibility set is "disposability" 
which can refer to inputs or outputs and be either "weak" or "strong". Quite 
simply, disposability says that inefficiency is possible so that non-boundary 
production is possible. This is in contrast to traditional neoclassical analysis of 
production wherein all the relevant first and second order conditions are fulfilled 
ensuring frontier attainments. 
Formally speaking, disposability can be defined in the manner of Banker, 
Charnes and Cooper (1984) who use the alternative term "Inefficiency Postulate": 
Given a production possibility set P then: 
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(a) Disposability of inputs obtains if for (X, Y) c -P 
and X' >, X then (X', Y) c -P; 
and 
(b) Disposability of outputs obtains if for (X, Y) fP and Y' <Y then (X, Y') 6 P. 
That is, if an input (output) vector X (Y) is contained in P then a larger (smaller) 
input (output) vector is also contained in P. If the initial vector (X, Y) cP can be 
thought of as a frontier vector then this definition clearly permits inefficiency in the 
form of excess inputs or insufficient output. If the observed input-output 
combinations (Y. C, Yc), c=1,..., 5 in figure 2.5.2 are feasible then so is: 
(Xl + Pl X2 + P2 --- 
X5 + P5 Yl - 
071 Y2 - CT2 --- 
Y5 - 0-5)' 
where pc, o-c >- 0 for all c. It follows that the whole of the feasible production set 
is generated by the twin assumptions of convexity and disposability. In figure 2.5.2 
for example the vertical facet AB is feasible because there is output disposability 
i. e. Yj - o-1 for al >0 is also feasible. 
Figure 2.5.3 
Weak and strong disposability of inputs 
nkut 
2 
> 
Disposability can be thought of in terms of marginal productiVity. In particular, 
disposability of inputs is "strong" (or "free") if marginal productivity can be equal 
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to zero. Figure 2.5.3 illustrates 2 stylised piecewise isoquants computed using 
DEA. 
The frontier ABCD is said to exhibit strong disposability since marginal productivity 
remains non-negative throughout its length. Along the negatively-sloped facet BC 
both inputs have positive marginal products. However along horizontal or vertical 
facets e. g. AB or CD marginal productivity of the relevant input is zero. In a 
traditional neoclassical environment facets such as AB or CD are excluded by the 
ridge lines which demarcate positive from non-positive marginal productivity. 
However the disposability assumption permits extension of the isoquant to form 
horizontal or vertical facets. 
Negative marginal productivity is called weak disposability or congestion (see 
Fare and Grosskopf (1983a)). It describes circumstances in which input levels are 
being increased and output is actually falling. Thus the technology EBCD is said to 
exhibit weak disposability since in at least one facet (EB in this case) marginal 
productivity is negative. 
The disposability assumption is important because it will affect the magnitude of 
the efficiency score. For production at H in figure 2.5.3 the technical efficiency 
ratio (WTE) for the weakly disposable technology is: 
WTE = OG/OH; 
its strongly disposable counterpart being: 
STE = OF/OH 
where in general (Grosskopf (1986)): 
WTE >, STE. 
Clearly, the efficiency score depends on the disposability assumption and in general 
efficiency under a weakly disposable technology will be higher. The same holds for 
disposability of outputs and is illustrated in figure 2.5.4. 
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Figure 2.5.4 
Weak and strong disposability of outputs. 
output 
Y2 
A 
> 
The weakly disposable technology is ABCE. For production at a point such as 
G the output efficiency ratio is OG/OH. The strongly disposable technology, ABCD, 
defines a lower efficiency ratio OG/OJ. The same efficiency relationship as under 
input disposability is evident. Hence, a weakly disposable output frontier defines a 
higher efficiency score than its strongly disposable counterpart. 
Further discussion of the effects of disposability is beyond the scope of this 
Chapter, but see Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1987) and Fare and Grosskopf 
(1983b). It is important to make clear, however, that all of the estimated 
technologies reported in this thesis exhibit strong disposal of inputs and outputs. 
A final taxonomy of efficiency scores based on scale and disposability distinctions 
Having discussed both scale and disposability it is worth surnmarising their 
combined effect on the efficiency score. Such a taxonomy was first presented in 
Grossskopf (1986). 9 
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0 Output YJ 
Recall figure 2.5.2 which combined CRS and VRS technologies. It should be 
immediately obvious that the CRS technology dominates the varying returns 
technology. That is, for given levels of inefficient performance the CRS technology 
defines a lower efficiency score. The technical efficiency of unit 5 under VRS is 
(FH/FI) while the CRS efficiency score is (FG/FI) where the distance 
d(F, G) <d (F, H); d being the distance function. In general then the following 
relationship holds between the two technologies: 
TEi, crs < TEi, vrs 
TEi denoting the technical efficiency of the same branch i. 
The non-increasing returns (NIRS) technology may also may included in the 
taxonomy by noting that above scale-efficient output: 
TEi, nirs = TEi, vrs 
and below scale-efficient output: 
TEi, nirs = TEi, crs- 
In figure 2.5.2 this means that for outputs above Y* the NIRS technology overlaps 
the VRS along facets CD and DE; while below Y* the MRS technology overlaps a 
distance OC along the CRS ray. 
In general this implies that the 3 possible DEA reference technologies, CRS, 
VRS and NIRS, have efficiency scores which can be ordered: 
TEi, crs < TEi, nirs < TEi, vrs 
Other things equal, the VRS technology gives the highest efficiency score while its 
CRS counterpart gives the most exacting measure of performance. 
The efficiency score can be further classified if the disposability assumption is 
made explicit. It was noted eatlier that a strongly disposable technology dominates 
the weakly disposable alternative in at least one facet and so the efficiency scores 
have the relationship: 
STEi < WTEi 
S denoting the strong and W the weak disposal technical efficiency for branch i. 
51 
Grosskopf (1986) noted that a full taxonomy of efficiency scores incorporating 
scale and disposability assumptions is, using familiar notation: 
(2.5.2) TEvrs, w ý, TEnirs, w >, TEcrs, w 
IV IV Iv 
TEvrs, s >, TEnirs, s ,,, TEcrs, s 
For given performance the highest feasible efficiency score in DEA would result 
from a varying returns technology with a weak disposability of inputs and outputs, 
i. e. TEvrs, w. Analogously the lowest efficiency score in this context would be 
defined by TEcrs, s; that is, a constant returns technology with strong disposability of 
inputs and outputs. The relationships between other possibilities for the efficiency 
score follow trivially from the discussion of scale and disposability. It may simply be 
added however that dominance among various efficiency scores has been expressed 
with weak inequalities. This is because the technologies may overlap in at least one 
facet and in this region the efficiency score will be equal. On other facets however 
dominance may be strict. 
Before closing, it is appropriate to add which of the efficiency scores in the 
full taxonomy in (2.5.2) apply in later Chapters. Chapters 3 and 7 compute a 
varying returns technology with strong disposability on a local education authority 
data set. Likewise, Chapter 4 uses data on local prisons and remand centres 
assuming that the reference technology has VRS and strong disposability. To 
compare the effects of an alternative reference technology on efficiency levels, 
Chapter 5 computes a constant returns technology with strong disposability. The 
replication of the LEA results in Chapter 7 on a clustered basis uses VRS with 
strong disposability. 
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Footnotes 
1. The broader issues confronting output and performance measurement in the 
public sector are discussed in greater detail in Jackson (1987), Pliatzky (1986), 
Dunlop (1985), Fisk (1984), Havernan (ed. ) (1984,1982), Hjerppe (1982,1980) and 
Carley (1980). 
2. See United Kingdom national accounts: Sources and methods. Studies in official 
statistics, no. 37. London: HMSO, 1985; and Levitt and Joyce (1986). 
3. There are several excellent survey articles which cover alternative frontier 
procedures: Lovell and Schmidt (1988), Schmidt (1986), Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell 
(1985, chapter 9), Kopp (1981) and Forsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980). 
4. Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1979,1978) introduced the term "decision -making 
unit" (or DMU) which is now widely used in the literature. This chapter generally 
uses the term branch, but "establishment" and "organisation" are also used to 
denote a production unit. Terminology aside, the important point for DEA 
evaluation is that each unit is sufficiently similar to make efficiency comparisons 
meaningful. 
5. The importance of strictly positive weights in the primal problem is discussed at 
greater length in Boyd and Fare (1984) and Charnes and Cooper (1984). 
6. The meaning and definition of efficiency in DEA will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 7. There is further discussion of the feasibility and 
implementation of targets in Chapters 4,5 and 7. 
8. Where (2.4.3*) calculates the input efficiency ratio and (2.4.4*) the output 
efficiency ratio in terms of the constant returns boundary. 
9. Chapter 5 makes use of the Grosskopf taxonomy in interpreting the differences 
between prison efficiency under alternative CRS and VRS technologies. 
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Chapter 3. Total factor productivity measurement in English local education 
authorities: A non-parametric approachl 
3.1. Introduction 
"There are few practical problems in which the economist has a more direct interest 
than those relating to the principles [of] the expense of the education of children. " 
(Marshall (1920). ) 
As much as in the private sector, the public sector decision-maker requires a 
methodology to identify the efficient set of choices in production. Typically, this 
choice is to be made without the assistance of market prices for outputs in a 
multiple input/multiple output environment. 
In this connection, Chapter 3 presents summary efficiency measures for 
maintained secondary school education using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The 
results are a contribution to the educational production function literature which, to 
date, is econometrically oriented (see e. g. DES (1983,1984), and Hanushek (1986) 
for a survey). 
DEA uses non-parametric linear programming techniques deriving originally 
from Farrell (1957). The standard alternative approach is parametric, and either 
deterministic or stochastic, where efficiency is measured relative to a frontier 
production or cost function estimated statistically. In general, the parametric 
approach to production behaviour2 has been adopted because of a belief that DEA 
makes over -restrictive assumptions on the production technology. For example 
Forsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980) have argued that "While his [Farrell's] measures 
are valid for the restrictive technologies he considered, they do not generalise easily 
to technologies that are not linearly homogenous or to technologies in which strong 
disposability and strict quasiconvexity are inappropriate. " This claim is true of the 
linear program used in the earlier empirical DEA literature (eg Lewin and Morey 
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(1981)) which typically imposed constant returns to scale and strong disposability of 
inputs. But new analytical developments, the most important of which are Banker 
(1984) and Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985) have generalised the linear 
programming model underlying the non-parametric approach allowing for a wide 
range Of very general reference technologies. 
Using the revised DEA program of Banker (1984), this Chapter provides new 
estimates of productive efficiency in British education. The use of the 
non-parametric approach is limited to a small number of examples predominantly on 
US data (e. g. Bessent and Bessent (1980), Bessent, Bessent, Kennington and Reagan 
(1984), Sengupta and Sfeir (1986)). Application of DEA to UK education data and 
to public finance contexts in general has barely begun. 3 Chapter 3 attempts to fill 
this gap, estimating the efficiency of educational production (the fourth largest 
programme in UK public expenditure4) to provide an illustrative set of performance 
statistics for the public sector. It should be noted that the treatment in this Chapter 
is introductory, especially in reference to the Pareto interpretation of DEA and in 
the role of the peer group. These topics will be dealt with more critically and at 
greater length in later Chapters - see Chapters 4 and 7 on the peer group and 
Chapter 6 on Pareto efficiency in DEA. 
In outline Chapter 3 develops as follows. Section 3.2 summarises the main 
difficulties encountered in attempting to measure productivity in the public sector. It 
surveys the various alternatives which are available and redefines the basic fractional 
model of Data Envelopment Analysis. The bulk of the Chapter is contained in 
section 3.3 which introduces a model of educational production in the local 
education authority (LEA). Efficiency measures are reported for all 96 English 
LEAs. Section 3.4 takes up a suggestion in Smith and Mayston (1987) that the 
number of citations for best-practice can be interpreted as a form of robustness 
statistic. Some conclusions are suggested in section 3.5 on the appropriateness of 
DEA to current policy for public sector efficiency measurement. 
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3.2. Measurement in the public sector 
Production in the public sector is difficult to evaluate, both in terms of its 
simple level and its efficiency. A large spending department or programme will 
typically produce multiple outputs. It is very often the case that these will be 
qualitative and will not have the physical characteristic of "countability". That is, 
unlike production of car tyres or match boxes, it may not be possible to observe 
distinct units of output in many public programmes. Service outputs in general 
typically involve an alteration in human abilities or satisfaction -a "client -change", 
like increments to knowledge or changes in appearance which are difficult to 
measure meaningfully on ordinary cardinal number scales (Marris (1985), Jarratt 
(1985)). 
Where sensible measures of output can be defined, these will most probably be 
denominated in non-homogenous units. The combination of outputs for aggregate 
indicators then requires the selection of weights. Private sector organisations will use 
prices observed in product markets to calculate measures such as total revenue. 
Through their access to the Stock Market, private organisations also have recourse 
to capital market indicators of performance like dividend, price-earnings ratio, etc. 
Public production therefore precludes access to two of the most common sources of 
performance indicators. 
The lack of market-price weights leaves a number of possibilities for the 
choice of weights to calculate aggregate indicators: 
a. expert opinion; 
b. client opinion; 
C. ordinary least squares regression analysis; 
econometric frontier analysis; 
C. linear program ming/data. envelopment analysis. 
(a) through (e) represent different methodologies for choosing a valuation system for 
non-marketed outputs. In some circumstances, the subjective weights of experts 
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(such as policyrnakers and practitioners) or of clients themselves should be chosen 
(Macrae (1985)). However it is very often the case that policymakers are unwilling 
or unable to reveal policy-output priorities (Smith and Mayston (1987)). Systematic 
and robust surveys of client opinion on the level, quality and distribution of public 
output are not readily available in the UK context. For example, in an investigation 
of competitive tendering by local authorities, Ganley and Grahl (1988) found that 
indicators of service quality such as complaints were monitored irregularly and with 
questionable accuracy. 
In the absence of client or expert weights, the modeller or decision-maker may 
attempt to specify an a priori model of the relevant production process and choose 
an appropriate estimator of its technological coefficients. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis is simple to implement on a 
variety of software such as TSP or LIMDEP and frequently used in the literature 
(e. g. DES (1983,1984)). Proponents of the programming approach like Banker and 
Maindiratta (1986) have argued that in choosing a functional form (e. g. 
Cobb-Douglas, CES, translog etc. ) strong a priori assumptions are imposed on the 
production technology. Moreover, the average production function which results from 
OLS is not a boundary function. Therefore it is inconsistent with the economic 
theory of production, which is an important weakness when making efficiency 
comparisons. Forsund and Hjalmarsson (1979) argued that "estimates of the 
best-practice frontier ... [are] a natural reference or 
basis for efficiency measures" 
(emphasis added). That is, Ordinary Least Squares is an inappropriate basis for 
efficiency comparisons because the "average" production function sets a performance 
norm which tends to institutionalise inefficiency (Hammond (1986)). 
In recognition of the defects of OLS, a group of U. S. econometricians, namely 
Dennis Aigner, C. A. K. Lovell and Peter Schmidt, began the development of true 
frontier comparisons. Early developments can be found in Aigner and Chu (1968) 
and Richmond (1974). This early work relied on the existence of one-sided residuals 
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in the production or cost function which could be treated as measures of technical 
efficiency. However these early models were, like DEA, determinstic and did not 
permit conventional hypothesis testing for variable selection. Later models were able 
to account for noise by the incorporation of a composite residual. This had two 
parts: A one-sided residual to measure efficiency and a conventional symmetrical 
residual to account for noise (see Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen 
and Broek (1977)). Unfortunately, the composite residual confounded noise and 
efficiency because there was no known procedure to separate its noise and efficiency 
components ex post. Subsequently however Jondrow et al (1982) devised a 
transformation to extract the efficiency component of the composite residual. The 
transformation decomposes the residual into a symmetrical (normal) component and 
a one-sided efficiency component. Jondrow et al derive explicit formulae for the 
decomposition in the case of half-normal and exponential distributions. This 
represents a significant step forward for the econometric approach since it is able to 
measure efficiency and at the same time to account for noise. 
Nevertheless important methodological problems remain in econometric efficiency 
comparisons. The most pressing of these is the choice of distribution for the 
one-sided efficiency residual. A whole host of distributional forms are feasible - 
half-normal, exponential, gamma and beta being the most commonly used. A 
fortiori the resulting efficiency measures are not invariant to the choice of 
efficiency distribution. A study of the effects of some alternative assumptions can be 
found in Schmidt and Lin (1984); while more complete surveys of the econometric 
approach than space permits here are Forsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980) and 
Schmidt (1986). 
Historically, traditional ratio analysis has been devalued by the partial and 
equivocal picture of productive performance it can give (Todd (1985), Smith and 
Mayston (1987)). Specifically, for a single-output production process y= 
f(X,,..., Xm) there will be (YIXO, k=1,..., m partial factor productivity ratios. For 
a decision-making unit (DMU)5 jointly producing t outputs yi = fi(x, .... xm) i= 
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1 I..., t there are (Yi/Xk), that is, txm, partial factor productivity indicators. Taken 
as a whole, there are no a priori arguments which could guarantee that these will 
form a consistent summary of performance. 
Based on work by Farrell (1957), Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) (1978, 
1979) extended traditional ratio analysis to the case of multiple inputs and multiple 
outputs. This is the non-parametric approach to efficiency comparisons6. CCR 
postulated a summary productivity ratio which can be written in the form of a 
fractional program. The total-factor efficiency of a DMU p in a larger cross section 
of Z units is then: 
viyip 
MAX 
VI, Wk M 
ý WkXkp 
k=l 
subject to Z constraints 
m 
Viyic/ý WkXkc 
'k=l 
1,..., P,..., Z DMUs. 
and Vi, Wk ý' 0, for all i and k. 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) treats the observed inputs (Xk) and outputs 
(Yi) in this ratio as constants and chooses optimal values of the variable weights to 
maximise the efficiency of DMU p relative to the performance of the others in the 
cross section. The optimal weights chosen for each DMU therefore represent a 
value-system which provides the most optimistic possible rating of its performance 
relative to peer organisations (Lewin and Morey (1981), Nunamaker (1985)). 
For a cross section of Z DMUs, DEA generates Z sets of weights such that 
59 
the ratio in (3.2.1) collapses into a summary, scalar measure of productive efficiency 
for each DMU. The constraints in the program ensure that the efficiency index has 
an intuitive interpretation in the closed interval [0,1 ]. If the index is unity, a 
DMU is relatively efficient or best-practice. A value less than unity indicates a 
DMU is inefficient relative to some of its peers. 
The DEA ratio in (3.2.1) is tractable given suitable measures of outputs and 
inputs. These themselves will depend to some extent on correct specification of the 
underlying production process. In the case of econometric boundary estimates like 
Richmond (1974) and of traditional ratio analysis (as in Packer (1983)), there is no 
test of significance of the resulting efficiency estimates. This is also true of the 
variable selection in the DEA ratio in (3.2.1). 
Nonetheless, given suitable output measures, the non-parametric approach is 
commendable. In a great many situations, outcomes will be politically and publicly 
sensitive. Non-subjective ("data -based") DEA weights can be substituted where 
policyrnakers' own weights are undecided, unrevealed or disputed7. Unlike the 
econometric approach DEA does not impose an arbitrary functional form on the 
production technology. Rather the technique makes weaker assumptions on the 
production possibility set8. Burley (1980) has indicated in addition that DEA "does 
not require additive separability of factors in the production function, or the stability 
of own or cross price elasticities and avoids some statistical estimation problems 
arising from multicollinearity in n factor data". In addition nearly all econometric 
efficiency comparisons have been limited to a single output or cost variable (Schmidt 
(1986)). This is especially inappropriate in a public sector context where programmes 
and organisations are usually of a very diverse character jointly producing many 
outputs. Assuming that appropriate measures of inputs and outputs exist, these are 
readily incorporated into the generalised DEA-efficiency ratio. 
In contrast to DEA, traditional ratio methods like historical unit costs do not 
embody an optimising principle. This criticism also applies to the least squares 
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approach which proceeds via a single optimisation across all DMUs, which amounts 
to averaging across all observations (Bowlin (1987)). An interesting study of 
efficiency in North Carolina hospitals by Banker, Conrad and Strauss (1986) has 
confronted non-parametric DEA estimates with a translog version of the production 
function. The translog results suggested that constant returns prevailed in the 
hospital sample, whereas the DEA procedure indicated that both increasing and 
decreasing returns to scale may be observed in different segments of the production 
correspondence, in turn suggesting that the translog model may be "averaging" 
diametrically opposed behaviour. In employing a series of optimisations, one for 
each DMU, DEA is consistent with orthodox neoclassical theory. Charnes and 
Cooper (1985) argue that, as a consequence, DEA provides a better fit to each 
observation and a better basis for identifying and estimating the sources of 
inefficiency in production. 
3.3. The efficiency of educational production in English local education authorities 9 
The DEA extension to traditional ratio analysis outlined in section 3.2 is now 
developed in the context of cross-section data on the 96 English local education 
authorities (LEAs). The results are presented as a set of indicative public sector 
statistics consistent with the aims of current government efficiency policy. 
Standard references containing educational performance data give an extremely 
weak and equivocal indication of LEA efficiency. The annual public expenditure 
White Paper, for example, contains partial-factor indicators such as the pupil: teacher 
ratio (PTR) and simple measures of pupil throughputl 
0. The PTR is especially 
misleading as a measure of contact between children and staff because it is 
calculated on the total number of teachers employed, whether in schools, on 
secondment, or on training courses, etc. The resulting figures are not a measure of 
pupil: teacher ratios actually in effect in schools". Other sources contain a confusing 
range of indicators. Audit Commission (1986a), for example, suggests about 60 
indicators for secondary education but assigns no weights to these nor suggests any 
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other means to forming an overall picture to schools' performance. Indeed there is 
no official source for summary performance statistics such as will be developed in 
this Chapter. 
Specification of the model 
The empirical model of LEA production developed in this Chapter contains three 
outcome variables and five input variables. Of the latter, four are socio-economic 
data which are uncontrollable from the LEA's point of view. It is very widely 
recognised that attainment at school reflects both school and non-school inputs 
(Duncan, Featherman and Duncan (1972), Perl (1973), DES (1983,1984), Armitage 
and Sabot (1987)). 
The definitions of these variables are contained in table 3.3.1. Each variable 
has been chosen to reflect important characteristics of educational production as 
indicated in recent government policy and the literature more generally. A recent 
public expenditure White Paper stated (in a manner very similar to its recent 
predecessors): "The Government's principal aim for schools continues to be to 
improve standards of achievement for all pupils across the range of all school 
activities, securing the best possible return from the substantial investment of 
resources" and also "to improve the management of schools" (Cm 56, p. 197). 
Table 3.3.1 contains 3 outcome variables, (a) through (c), based on 
examination results in the old '0'-Ievel/CSE syllabus from samples of maintained 
secondary schools. The results have been averaged from performance over three 
academic years (1980/81 to 1982/83) in an attempt to reduce the effect of once-off 
variations due to exceptional cohorts of pupils. The use of examination results as an 
indicator of school output is pervasive in the literature - see for example Bessent 
and Bessent (1980) and Bessent, Bessent, Kennington and Reagan (1982) on US 
schools; Jesson, Mayston and Smith (1987) and Jesson and Mayston (1989) on UK 
data. This has the implication that educational efficiency is usually couched in terms 
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of intermediate rather than final outputs; Bovaird (1981) contains a very useful 
discussion of the distinction between intermediate and final outputs. 
Table 3.3.1 
Variable set definitions for the LEA model 
Outcome Variables 
The percentage of maintained school-leavers in each LEA 
achieving: 
a. at least 5 higher grade passes at '0' level/CSE; 
b. 6 or more graded results at '0' level/CSE; 
c. (100 - no graded results at '0' level/CSE). 
Input variables 
Discretionary: 
d. secondary school teaching expenditure per pupil; 
Non-discretionary: 
The percentage of children: 
e. living in households whose head is a non-manual worker, 
excluding junior non-manual workers and non-manual 
supervisors; 
f. (100 - percentage of children living in households 
lacking the exclusive use of one or more of the 
standard amenities or living in a household at a 
density of occupation greater than 1.5 persons per 
room; 
g. ( 100 - percentage of children born outside the UK, 
Ireland, USA and the Old Commonwealth or in households 
whose heads were born outside the UK, Ireland, USA and 
the Old Commonwealth; 
h. persons per hectare 
Notes: The outcome variables a., b. and c. are the averages 
for the academic years 1980/81, d. is an average of 
expenditure over the same period expressed in November 
1982 prices. 
Source: DES (1984). 
Outcome (a) reflects an authority's success in the education of higher ability 
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pupils. It is an indicator widely used by Her Majesty's Inspectorate, the Department 
of Education and Science, and others, e. g. Gray and Jesson (1987) and Smith and 
Mayston (1987) in LEA comparisons. Performance at W-level has been excluded 
because of problems in the interpretation of data. Jesson, Mayston and Smith (1987 
pp. 263-264) argue that "differences in reported W-level pass rates between different 
authorities may at the moment simply reflect differences in their institutional 
arrangements, whether sixth forms, tertiary colleges or technical colleges, under 
which W-level teaching takes place, rather than differences in ... effectiveness". 
Analogously, outcome (b) is an indicator of the number of pupils reaching an 
average level of attainment in secondary schools. Finally, outcome (c) has been 
transformed to be the broadest indicator of any form of graded attainment, i. e. the 
output of at least one graded result at the '0'-Ievel CSE examination. 
It is conventional (in the National Accounts for example) to think of output as 
value added - in this case the increment to knowledge and cognitive ability of the 
pupil whilst at school. Examination results at '0'-Ievel and CSE measure the 
logross" output of the LEA. Historically, the widespread standardised testing of 
cohorts on initial admission and then departure has not been undertaken in the UK 
(or overseas). Only pilot studies of this nature can be found, e. g. Mortimore and 
team (1985) on junior school education. However the reforms initiated by the 1980 
Education Act allow for the standardised testing of pupils at different stages of their 
school career. As this data becomes available, assessment of value added in 
schooling may become a reality. This is consistent with the general thrust of the 
1980 Act which sought to bring a shift from professional to public accountability in 
education. A necessity in so doing has been the generation of improved information 
on which the public (especially the tax payer and parents) can judge performance 
(Jesson, Mayston and Smith (1987)). 
Five inputs have been incorporated into the model. The most commonly used 
of these in studies of LEA performance (e. g. Mayston and Smith (1987)) is teaching 
expenditure per pupil. (Where applicable London weighting has been netted off. ) It 
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is a variable which is under the authority's control and reflects the quality of LEA 
management to some degree. Hence it is this variable for which targets may be set 
to improve performance in relatively inefficient authorities. Notice that to try and 
eliminate exceptional variations in costs, the teaching spend variable has been 
averaged over the academic years 1980/81 to 1982/83. 
The remaining input variables incorporated into the model are 
"non -discretionary"; that is, they reflect background factors in the LEA's catchment 
area which are beyond its own control. Variables (e), (f) and (g) summarise the 
family background of pupils and incorporate the educational impact of family 
income, occupational status and ethnic origin. More specifically, (e) is designed to 
reflect the numbers of pupils coming from families defined as belonging to higher 
socio-economic groups. (f) on the other hand is an indicator of children coming 
from poorer families and (g) from ethnic backgrounds. Variables like (f) and (g) are 
usually thought to have a negative impact on attainment on schools (Bessent, 
Bessent, Elam and Long (1984)). Consequently, (f) and (g) have been transformed 
such that increments to these variables can be thought of as educational benefits. 
The inversion of background variables such that increases in inputs are directly 
related to increases in outputs is common in the literature. This procedure is 
followed in Charnes, Clark, Cooper and Golany (1985), Smith and Mayston (1987) 
and is recommended in Golany and Roll (1989). The treatment and effects of 
background variables in DEA models more generally are discussed in Banker and 
Morey (1986a, b) and Ray (1988). 
One further variable, persons per hectare, is included in the model. This is an 
indicator of the demographic characteristics of the education authority. In principle, 
population density may have an influence on both attainment and costs. Up to some 
point there are likely to be economies of scale derived from setting larger schools 
in more densely populated areas: This would remove the need, for example, for 
larger numbers of smaller schools and the associated transport costs of carrying 
children to school. Attainments, in addition to costs, may be influenced by 
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population density. Broadly speaking, there should be a (weak) positive relationship 
'between achievement at school and persons per hectare. Children who live further 
from their school and from their teachers (in remote areas) may be at a relative 
disadvantage. Other things equal, proximity to school and other children will raise 
the ability of pupils to interact with each other and with the learning resources 
provided by the school. Nevertheless it is acknowledged that after a point high 
population density may produce negative interactions and lower attainment in 
children, although the model does not incorporate this effect. 
Results on education authority efficiency using DEA 
Results on the input efficiency of authorities based on these data are contained 
in table 3.3.2. These have been estimated using the revised DEA program of 
Banker (1984). This program permits returns to scale to vary over the production 
surface - see Chapter 2. By contrast, earlier educational applications of DEA on 
US data imposed constant returns to scale - see for example Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1981) and Bessent, Bessent, Charnes, Cooper and Thorogood (1983). 
Existing applications on British LEA data, viz. Smith and Mayston (1987) and 
Jesson, Mayston and Smith (1987) have used a non-increasing returns (NIRS) 
program - on which see Chapter 2. The approach taken here is more flexible in 
incorporating varying returns to scale; that is, the production surface may take on 
increasing, constant and decreasing returns as appropriate. 
The input-minimisation version of the DEA program has been adopted in place 
of its output maximisation counterpart. This reflects an initial emphasis in 
Government efficiency policy on the input dimensions of policies and arguments in 
the literature suggesting that the input side of efficiency is more amenable to 
scrutiny in the public sector where outputs are often disputed (Mellander and 
Ysander (1987)). In addition those analyses of LEA performance which already exist 
have tended to focus on output efficiency (Gray and Jesson (1987) and Jesson, 
Mayston and Smith (1987)). 
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Table 3.3.2. 
Summary measures of LEA productivity with a varying returns to 
scale assumption. 
LEA input efficiency peer group 
1. Barking 0.961 25,44$ 
3. Bexley 0.971 50,59,86)95 
5. Bromley 0.911 48P78,95 
6. Croydon 0.939 2,15,50P59 
8. Enfield 0.997 2,7,15,50,59 
9. Haringey 0.992 4$16,48 
11. Havering 0.891 10026,82$86,96 
13. Hounslow 0.961 2,7$22,50 
14. Kingston 0.965 2,19,48 
17. Redridge 0.940 2,7,50,59 
18. Richmond 0.853 2,15,19,48,95 
20. Waltham F 0.853 7,16,22,48 
21. ILEA 0.788 4,16,48 
24. Dudley 0.979 19,23,50,64,86 
27. Walsall 0.895 28.48,46,50 
31. St Helens 0.929 46,60,54 
32. Sefton 0.953 19,50,64,86 
33. Wirral 0.934 19,50,64,86 
34. Bolton 0.910 48,50,78,95 
35. Bury 0.904 19,50,95 
36. Manchester 0.872 25,30,44,64 
37. Oldham 0.986 44,48 
38. Rochdale 0.834 46,48,78 
39. Salford 0.881 44,46,48 
40. Stockport 0.951 48,78,95 
41. Tameside 0.952 46,48,50 
42. Trafford 0.933 50,78,86,95 
43. Wigan 0.901 46,50,64,86 
47. Sheffield 0.909 26,28,46,50,59 
51. Leeds 0.987 48,50,78,95 
53. Cateshead 0.935 46,48,52 
54. Newcastle U-Tyne 0.856 22,78,86 
58. Avon 0.922 59,78,86,95 
63. Cheshire 0.925 48,78,86,95 
67. Derbyshire 0.994 45,46,50,82,86 
68. Devon 0.958 48,86,92,96 
69. Dorset 0.985 50,59,86,95 
70. Durham 0.982 28,44,48,96 
71. E Sussex 0.958 48,78,86,95 
72. Essex 0.963 48,78,95 
73. Cloucestershire 0.969 61,81,86,95,96 
74. Hampshire 0.963 50,59,86,95 
75. Here and Worcs 0.973 48,78,86,90,95 
76. Hertfordshire 0.903 2,19,48,95 
79. Kent 0.969 50,78,86,95 
80. Lancashire 0.992 65,82 
83. Norfolk 0.947 48,86 
85. Northamptonshire 0.973 48,86,90,96 
87. Nottinghamshire 0.937 44,46,48,86,96 
88. Oxfordshire 0.999 86,88,95,96 
89. Shropshire 0.929 81,86)90,96 
91. Staffordshire 0.926 44,48,78,86 
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Table 3.3.2, continued 
Mean inefficiency score 0.936 
Notes: (1) Since the efficiency score of efficient 
best-practice LEAs is unity and its peer group is 
simply itself, such LEAs are excluded from table 
3.3.2. However, column 2 contains efficient LEAs 
when they have been chosen as peer LEAs. 
(2) Appendix 1 contains a full list of LEA names to 
assist in the identification of the peer 
authorities. 
Source: Author's calculations 
Of 96 LEAs in the cross section, 44 have a score of unity and thus are 
relatively efficient in their management of teaching expenditure. The remainder, 52 
in all, are relatively input inefficient to varying degrees attaining an efficiency score 
less than unity. In the literature it is common practice to calculate the mean 
efficiency score as a representative level of performance (see e. g. Cubbin, 
Domberger and Meadowcroft (1987) in a study of local authority refuse collection). 
The approach taken in reporting results throughout this thesis is to quote the mean 
inefficiency score; that is, the mean of non-unit efficiencies. The inclusion of 
best-practice tends to overstate levels of performance since the mean including 
best-practice is greater than that excluding it. Thus the mean efficiency score 
including all 96 LEAs is 0.966; excluding best-practice it is 0.936, as in table 3.3.2. 
This distinction is important from the point of view of adjusting funding at 
inefficient authorities. For if mean efficiency is calculated to include best-practice 
the representative target will suggest too small an adjustment in costs at the typical 
inefficient authority. Only the mean inefficiency gives an accurate definition of a 
representative target. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that to get the broadest 
possible view of efficiency, i. e. of performance at all LEAs, the mean efficiency 
based on the whole sample may remain appropriate - particularly in the calculation 
of total available savings, rather than those at inefficient authorities alone. 
The efficiency scores in table 3.3.2 are defined relative to the standards set by 
the best-practice LEAs in this cross section. These LEAs are not necessarily 
efficient in absolute sense - rather no LEA belonging to this cross section performs 
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better. In the stylised terms of figure 3.3.1, these LEAs form the efficient isoquailt 
(or reference technology) against which relatively inefficient production is compared. 
The DEA efficiency index is thus the ratio of best-practice performance to actual 
performance. 
In figure 3.3.1,5 hypothetical LEAs are producing, for the sake of argument, 
one unit of output using different quantities of two inputs, Xj and X2. The 
efficiency ratio for each LEA is a radial measure. LEA 3, for example, is 
inefficient relative to the best-practice LEAs 2 and 4 because the ratio of 
best-practice to actual input is less than unity. That is, its relative efficiency score 
OG/OH < 1. 
Figure 3.3.1 
The DEA isoquant and the relative efficiency score 
nput 
X2 
X' 
2 
Given the comparison is of like-with-like and that linear combinations of best 
practice are feasible, an efficient target OG* can be defined for the relatively 
inefficient LEA as: 
oc (OC/OH). OH 
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/\j input xj 
where the contents of the brackets is the scalar efficiency score and OH is the 
vector reflecting the LEA's current usage of inputs. The efficiency score implies an 
equi-proportionate contraction in each input of: 
(3.3.2) (1 - OG/OH) 
to Xý', j=1,2, in figure 3.3.1. i 
The adjustments to LEA funding implied by the efficiency score are 
surnmarised in table 3.3.3. LEA 43, for example, has an efficiency score of 0.901. 
On the basis of the formula for efficient production in (3.3.1) this implies a lower 
target level of teaching expenditure, viz.: 
OG* = (. 901) 687 = L619. 
E619 is the target spend per pupil which would put LEA 43 on the best-practice 
isoquant. Essentially, DEA is predicting that LEA 43 can support existing levels of 
attainment with a reduction of (1 - . 901 )=9.9 per cent in its current teaching 
expenditure. The distribution of savings is not spread evenly through the 
cross-section. LEA 21, for example, is overspending by one-fifth, given the levels 
of its outcome variablesl 2. Others, however, (eg 8 or 9) would only have to 
improve performances marginally to be ranked along with the best-practice LEAs. 
An average across all inefficient producers in the sample suggests a typical reduction 
in costs approaching seven per cent. 13 It is worth noting in passing that the average 
target is consistent with the mean inefficiency score of 0.936 quoted earlier in table 
3.3.2. This also implies a typical reduction in teaching costs of nearly 7 per cent. 
However the mean efficiency score including best-practice, 0.966, suggests that 
funding might be adjusted by under 3.5 per cent which is clearly an understatement 
of the average potential for savings at inefficient authorities, but which is an 
accurate indicator of total available savings. 
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Table 3.3.3 
Targets and savings in teaching expenditure per pupil for LEAs 
with DEA relative efficiency less than unity 
LEA Actual 
performance 
E per pupil 
Target 
performance 
Z per pupil 
Savings 
L per pupil 
Savings 
per cent 
1. Barking 663 637 26 3.92 
3. Bexley 613 596 17 2.77 
5. Bromley 650 592 58 8.92 
6. Croydon 664 624 40 6.02 
8. Enfield 641 639 2 0.31 
9. Haringey 761 755 6 0.79 
11. Havering 681 607 74 10.87 
12. Hounslow 686 659 27 3.94 
14. Kingston 644 621 23 3.57 
17. Redbridge 668 628 40 5.99 
18. Richmond 707 603 104 14.71 
20. Waltham-F 768 662 106 13.80 
21. ILEA 833 657 176 21.13 
24. Dudley 618 605 13 2.10 
27. Walsall 667 597 70 10.49 
31. St Helens 654 607 47 7.19 
32. Sefton 638 608 30 4.70 
33. Wirral 637 595 42 6.59 
34. Bolton 641 582 59 9.20 
35. Bury 652 589 63 9.66 
36. Manchester 749 653 96 12.82 
37. Oldham 589 581 8 1.36 
38. Rochdale 686 572 114 16.62 
39. Salford 684 603 81 11.84 
40. Stockport 617 587 30 4.86 
41. Tameside 620 589 31 5.00 
42. Trafford 632 590 42 6.65 
43. Wigan 687 619 68 9.90 
47. Sheffield 669 608 61 9.12 
51. Leeds 588 580 8 1.36 
53. Gateshead 638 593 45 7.05 
54. Newcastle-U-T 739 634 105 14.21 
58. Avon 638 588 50 7.84 
63. Cheshire 632 584 48 7.59 
67. Derbyshire 605 601 4 0.66 
68. Devon 616 585 31 5.03 
69. Dorset 604 595 9 1.49 
70. Durham 625 608 17 2.72 
71. E Sussex 617 591 26 4.21 
72. Essex 602 579 23 3.82 
73. Gloucestershire 622 603 19 3.05 
74. Hampshire 618 595 23 3.72 
75. Here and Worcs 602 586 16 2.66 
76. Hertfordshire 664 599 65 9.79 
79. Kent 605 586 19 3.14 
80. Lancashire 641 609 32 4.99 
83. Norfolk 623 601 22 3.53 
85. Northamptonsh 609 592 17 2.79 
87. Nottinghamsh 637 597 40 6.28 
88. Oxfordshire 614 609 5 0.81 
89. Shropshire 639 594 45 7.04 
91. Staffordshire 635 588 47 7.40 
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Table 3.3.3, continued 
Average of 
inefficient LEAs 651 607 44 6.76 
Notes: Target performance is given by the efficiency score 
and (where applicable) adjustments in input-slack 
variables. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
The reductions in spending in table 3.3.3 are recommended on Pareto welfare 
grounds14. That is, an LEA is efficient if it cannot be shown that some other LEA 
or combination of LEAs can produce the same amount of output with less of some 
output and no more any other (Koopmans (1951), Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1981), Lewin and Morey (1981)). 
In figure 3.3.1 the best-practice LEAs 1,2,4 and 5 are clearly Pareto 
efficient on this definition. However, LEA 3 violates the Pareto efficiency conditions 
in comparison with LEA 4, since for given output, 4 is using less Of X2 and no 
more of X, than 3. The target defined in (3.3.2) is therefore advocated in the 
literature as defining a production plan which is Pareto efficient and which 
eliminates unnecessary consumption of resources at the inefficient LEA. 
As has been noted in Chapter 2, the radial contraction path defined in 
is not in all circumstances a rigorous enough definition for Pareto efficiency. 
Specifically, production on the isoquant but at the end of horizontal or vertical 
facets is not Pareto efficient. In figure 3.3.2 for given output and X2, LEA3 is 
Pareto inefficient by the horizontal distance from B to A. Thus it is possible to 
show that some other LEA, in this case LEA 2, uses the same quantity of X2, but 
less of X, to produce the same amount of output as LEA 3. The distance B to A 
is given by a non-zero slack variable (Sj) in the optimal solution of the DEA 
program. Accordingly, the formula for an efficient target in (3.3.1) can be rewritten 
(using figure 3.3.2) as: 
(3.3.3) OA (OB/OC). OC - Sk 
where S* (k = 1,..., m) is the optimal value of the relevant input slack variable. k 
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Notice that the efficiency score is a scalar, being the ratio of the distances d(O, B) 
to d(O, C) - where d is the usual Euclidean distance function. Similarly, the S* k k 
= 1,..., m are non-negative scalar quantities representing reductions in inputs. OC, 
however, is a vector of observed performance at LEA 3, viz. OC ý-- (Xl 3 X23)'- 
Figure 3.3.2. 
Slack variables and Pareto efficiency 
nput 
X2 
The feasibility of the target in (3.3.3) is given by an assumption that the 
production possibility set is convex. In particular any convex linear combination of 
observed inputs at best-practice LEAs is feasible. 
Convexity ensures that the data is "enveloped" or packaged through the 
extreme (best-practice) LEAs in a piecewise manner. In practice, the result is a 
piecewise-Ii near approximation to the true production technology, as in figure 
Points along each facet of the isoquant are linear combinations of observed 
best-practice and on this basis are deemed feasible targets. Where the optimal 
values of the slack variables are equal to zero, the route to these targets is a radial 
contraction path (cf LEA 3 in figure 3.3.1). 
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I nput X1 
More specific qualitive information on precisely how targets can be obtained is 
derived by analogy from the peer groups identified in table 3.3.2. For each LEA a 
comparable set of peers is selected by DEA. For relatively efficient LEAs this will 
contain none other than the LEA itself. But inefficient LEAs will have a distinct 
reference group of best-practice LEAs. 
In table 3.3.2, LEA 43, for instance, has LEAs 46,50,64 and 86 as "peers", 
which in linear combination define its target performance. In principle, LEA 43 can 
use these authorities as blueprints to improve performance since, other things being 
equal, they are likely to be implementing better managerial procedures - see 
Epstein and Henderson (1989) or Dyson et al (1987). 
3.4. A preliminary evaluation of the peer group 
This section examines the question of the use of best-practice results as peers 
for the improvement of inefficient production. It has been argued by several authors 
(e. g. Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), Lewin and Morey (1981), Bowlin (1986), 
Thanassoulis, Dyson and Foster (1987)) that an inefficient organisation (or its 
auditors) should make comparisons with best-practice in order to extract and 
transfer relatively better managerial procedures to improve its productive 
performance. From the results in section 3.3 the inefficient LEA would inspect the 
best-practice peer group identified for it in table 3.3.2. 
Smith and Mayston (1987) suggest "an important supplementary measure in 
assessing the robustness of this result is the number of inefficient authorities for 
which the [best-practice] authority forms the efficient frontier. " They continue that 
"if this number is high the authority is genuinely efficient with respect to a large 
number of authorities " (emphasis added). On this basis the most useful examples of 
best-practice are likely to be found in heavily cited instances of best practice. These 
can be extracted from table 3.4.1. LEA 43, for example, would find that LEAs 50 
and 86 in its peer group have been cited over 20 times. On the other hand LEA 
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54 could be argued to be a poorer peer in being cited only 7 times. Thus the 
informational contents of the peer group can be read in the light of what amounts 
to a citations index for best-practice in table 3.4.1. 
Table 3.4.1 
Citations for best-practice LEAs 
LEA Citations in peer groups 
2. Barnet 8 
4. Brent 3 
7. Eal ing 5 
10. Harrow 2 
15. Merton 4 
16. Newham 4 
19. Sutton 8 
22. Birmingham 4 
23. Coventry 2 
25. Sandwell 3 
26. Solihull 3 
28. Wolverhampton 4 
30. Liverpool 2 
44. Barnsley 8 
45. Doncaster 2 
46. Rotherham 11 
48. Bradford 27 
50. Kirklees 22 
52. Wakefield 2 
59. Bedfordshire 9 
61. Buckinghamshire 2 
64. Cleveland 7 
65. Cornwall 2 
78. Isle of Wight 15 
81. Leicestershire 3 
82. Lincolnshire 4 
86. Northumberland 26 
90. Somerset 4 
92. Suffolk 2 
95. W Sussex 20 
96. Wiltshire 8 
Notes: Table 3.4.1 contains those efficient LEAs which appear 
in peer groups (not including their own) of 
inefficient LEAs. Several LEAs (numbers 12,29,49, 
55,56,57,60,62,66,77,84,93, and 94) do not 
appear in either table 3.3.2 or table 3.4.1. These 
have input efficiencies equal to unity but appear in 
only one peer group, their own. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
The Smith-Mayston interpretation of best-practice can be discussed in the light 
of figure 3.4.1 and table 3.4.2. Figure 3.4.1 contains a hypothetical DEA isoquant 
for 2 inputs (with output given) where LEA performance has been deliberately 
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bunched in the south west of the feasible set of production decisions. LEAs 1,2, 
and 3 are best-practice with efficiency scores equal to unity. Targets for the 
resources X2 and Xj are defined for LEAs 4,5,6,7 and 8 which are inefficient 
relative to 1,2 and 3. It is clear from figure 3.4.1 (which is summarised in table 
3.4.2) that the reference or peer LEAs for most of the inefficient producers (other 
than LEA 5) are LEAs 2 and 3. For example, the target for LEA 4 is weighted 
average of 2 and 3. 
Figure 3.4.1 
Interpretation of best-practice LEA citations 
nput 
X2 
But LEA 5 has unusual input proportions such that its target is an 
interpolation of LEA 1 and 2. Clearly best-practice authorities such as LEA 1 
which have relatively unusual input proportions will lie on the extreme parts of the 
isoquant. They will be cited infrequently (ignoring a trivial citation in their own 
peer group) since, with unusual input proportions, there is a lower probability of 
finding comparable inefficient LEAs. 
It should be evident that each best-practice authority does not have an equal 
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probability of citation unless inefficient LEAs are spread evenly through the feasible 
production space. This may not be the case. This possibility has been illustrated in 
figure 3.4.1 and table 3.4.2 where performance is bunched in such a way that some 
instances of best-practice will be cited less frequently than others. It follows that a 
high number of citations implies comparability with a larger number of inefficient 
LEAs. 
In general, the larger the number of citations for a DMU, the larger the 
'Isample" of observations in the neighbourhood of that DMU. On the basis of the 
traditional sampling theory, the larger is the sample in a particular neighbourhood, 
the closer is the sample frontier likely to approximate the true frontier. However, it 
is not at all clear a priori what would constitute an approximately "high" number 
of citations and therefore at what point a dominant observation accurately conveys 
the attainments and practices which are possible on the true (unknown) frontier. 
Table 3.4.2 
Hypothetical peer groups and citations for LEAs in figure 3.4.1 
LEA Peer group Citations in 
peer groups 
i* 1 1 
2* 2 5 
3* 3 4 
4 2,3 0 
5 1,2 0 
6 2,3 0 
7 213 0 
8 2,3 0 
Notes: (1) As in table 3.4.1 trivial citations in 
own-reference sets are excluded. 
(2) (*) denotes a best-practice authority in figure 
3.4.1. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
The existence of multiple non-homogenous inputs and outputs is a basic 
difficulty in the construction of total-factor productivity measures. In the trading 
sector market price weights can be used to yield measures such as total revenue. 
The additional problem of the non-trading sector (both public and not-for-profit) is 
the absence of market price weights: "the [input and output] indicators are given on 
different scales and we have no a priori set of weights with which to judge their 
relative importance, or functions with which to transform the indicators into common 
measures of utility" (Smith and Mayston 1987)). This supports the belief in, for 
example, Miller (1987) that there is a requirement for enhanced performance 
measurement to ensure greater accountability from public sector entities where 
performance cannot be fully tested by standard profitability criteria. In response, 
several authors, for example Thanassoulis, Dyson and Foster (1987) have advocated 
the DEA approach in the public sector. Since, in the absence of other weighting 
schemes, it identifies an objective set of ("data -based") weights making minimal 
assumptions on the production technology vis-a-vis an econometric approachl 5. 
Thus using data on the 96 English local education authorities Chapter 3 has 
demonstrated the potential contribution of Data Envelopment Analysis to the extant 
set of public sector performance statistics. After reviewing the relevant measurement 
problems in section 3.2, scalar measures of productive efficiency for each authority 
were presented in section 3.3 using DEA. These measures may be used to set 
targets for relatively inefficient LEA producers which, in principle, may utilise the 
peer group identified by DEA as a guide to achieving their targeted improvements 
in resource consumption. 16 Independent findings by the Audit Commission (1986 b) 
and Barrow (1988) appear to confirm the extent of inefficiency identified in these 
results. 
In section 3.4 the first attempt in the published literature to develop a 
DEA-sensitivity "statistic" by Smith and Mayston (1987) was evaluated and 
78 
re-interpreted as an indicator of the comparability of (rather than the intrinsic 
quality of) the best-practice estimates. 
Academic interest in DEA informatiOn has been paralleled during the 1980s by 
the British Government's own initiatives on performance measurement and 
accountability for the public sector. Of most importance has been the Financial 
Management Initiative (FMI), heralded in 1982 in "Efficiency and Effectiveness in 
the Civil Service,, l 7. The aim of the FMI has been "to promote in each department 
an organisation and system in which managers at all levels have a clear view of 
their objectives and means to assess and, wherever possible, measure outputs or 
performance in relation to those objectives" (para 13 Cmnd 8616). In a follow up 
report, the National Audit Office (1986) argues that departments should publish 
annual reports providing intelligible information (perhaps summary indicators) about 
their aims, objectives and performance. 
Accordingly, recent public expenditure White Papers have placed increasing 
emphasis on value for money and efficiency including a total of around 1800 output 
and performance measures. Any selection of these reveals, however, that they are 
mainly traditional ratio measures such as unit costs and throughputs. 18 
More sophisticated summary measures of (total-factor) productivity do not 
appear to be widely used by government departments. This would seem to be 
restraining the potential for public sector accountability and evaluation. In the 
educational context there may be extra scope for the adoption of consistent 
total-factor measures of efficiency like DEA. In the first place, the 1980 Education 
Act has signalled a shift from professional to public accountability of education. This 
is being underwritten by the development of a national curriculum which should 
make inter-authority comparisons more robust. Equally important, the regular, 
standardised testing of pupils may eventually generate measures of value added for 
specific cohorts of school children. 
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With the collection of improved data in prospect, DEA is well placed to take 
advantage of this. In principle, DEA could form part of a set of key aggregate 
indicators summarising educational performance. Jesson, Mayston and Smith (1987) 
have argued that careful analysis of educational productivity using DEA might be 
used to settle funding disputes between the LEAs and central government. An 
additional role for summary performance measures like DEA may come as the 
authorities and the DES attempt to rationalise the surplus capacity which is currently 
being generated by dramatically falling rolls - the number of secondary school pupils 
reached a peak in 1979 and is expected to fall by a much as 40 per cent by 1991 
(Audit Commission (1 986a)). 
Footnotes 
1. An earlier version of this Chapter appeared as a London Business School 
Discussion Paper published by the Centre for Business Strategy in October, 1987. 
2. See Berndt and Khaled (1979), Smith and Lovell (1979), Kopp and Diewert 
(1982). 
3. Smith and Mayston (1987) and Jesson and Mayston (1989) contain the 
preliminary estimates for UK education. 
4. See volume 1, "The Government's Expenditure Plans 1987-88 to 1989-90", Cm 
56, London: HMSO. 
5. A DMU may be thought of in macro-economic or microeconomic terms (Charnes 
and Cooper (1985)). That is, the DEA efficiency ratio exists where a production 
function relationship is evident: in an organisation (as in this case study) or in an 
entire economy; viz, the many studies on large sectors like manufacturing and 
agriculture: Farrell (1957), Burley (1980), Fare, Grabowski and Grosskopf (1985) and 
Rawlins (1985). 
6. Grosskopf and Valdmanis (1987) have used the non-parametric approach to 
examine the efficiency of hospitals operating in California. 
7. DEA is clearly more flexible than an index number approach where the weights 
must be specified a priori. 
8. Bowlin (1986) argues that the functional relationships underlying public 
production may be unusually complex and difficult to specify. DEA whilst not 
imposing functional relationships interpolates variables into a convex set whose 
boundary is piecewise linear. 
9.1 must thank, without implicating, seminar discussants from Statistics Branch at 
the Department of Education and Science for their insightful comments which helped 
finalise the empirical model on which this section is based. 
10. See Chapter 3.12, Department of Education and Science, "The Government's 
Expenditure Plans, 1987-88 to 1989-90", Cm 56, London HMSO. 
11. Yet the PTR is probably the most widely quoted educational performance statistic. 
12. LEA 21 and some others might choose to argue that examination results do not 
adequately reflect the range of outputs which they seek to provide. These outputs 
may not be consistent with the centralised objectives outlined in the annual public 
expenditure White Paper (which have been used to the guide the choice of variable 
set in Chapter 3). They could include progressive outputs like racial and sexual 
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awareness. 
13. On an administrative split between London boroughs (LEAs 1-21), Metropolitan 
boroughs (22-57) and English counties (58-96) the simple proportions of LEAs 
relatively inefficient are, respectively: 61.9 per cent, 52.8 per cent and 51.3 per 
cent. This could be taken as evidence of greater inefficiency in "urban" education 
producers or perhaps the greater difficulty of their task vis-a-vis rural education. 
See Chapter 7. 
14. The adequacy of the Pareto interpretation of DEA targets is discussed at length 
in Chapter 6. 
15. The broad applicability of DEA methodology in the public sector is attested by 
the growing range of empirical work in the literature: Lewin and Morey (1981) on 
military recruitment; Lewin, Morey and Cook (1982) on courts; Banker, Conrad and 
Strauss (1986) on hospitals; Bjurek, Forsund and Hjarlmasson (1986) on social 
security offices; Thanassoulis, Dyson and Foster (1985) on rates collection and 
Ganley and Cubbin (1987) on the prison service. 
16. Further aspects of the peer group and best-practice are discussed in Chapter 4. 
17. Cmnd 8616, London: HMSO. 
18. See, for example, those performance measures selected for Economic Progress 
Report, Number 188, January-February 1987, pp 6-7. 
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Appendix 
To facilitate interpretation of the LEA peer groups in 
table 3.3.2, this appendix matches LEA numbers with LEA names. 
1. Barking 51. Leeds 
2. Barnet 52. Wakefield 
3. Bexley 53. Cateshead 
4. Brent 54. Newcastle 
5. Bromley 55. N Tyneside 
6. Croydon 56. S Tyneside 
7. Ealing 57. Sunderland 
8. Enfield 58. Avon 
9. Haringey 59. Bedfordshire 
10. Harrow 60. Berkshire 
11. Havering 61. Buckinghamshire 
12. Hillingdon 62. Cambridgeshire 
13. Hounslow 63. Cheshire 
14. Kingston 64. Cleveland 
15. Merton 65. Cornwall 
16. Newham 66. Cumbria 
17. Redbridge 67. Derbyshire 
18. Richmond 68. Devon 
19. Sutton 69. Dorset 
20. Waltham Forest 70. Durham 
21. ILEA 71. E Sussex 
22. Birmingham 72. Essex 
23. Coventry 73. Cloucestershire 
24. Dudley 74. Hampshire 
25. Sandwell 75. Hereford 
26. Solihull 76. Hertfordshire 
27. Walsall 77. Humberside 
28. Wolverhampton 78. Isle of Wight 
29. Knowsley 79. Kent 
30. Liverpool 80. Lancashire 
31. St Helens 81. Leicestershire 
32. Sefton 82. Lincolnshire 
33. Wirral 83. Norfolk 
34. Bolton 84. N Yorkshire 
35. Bury 85. Northamptonshire 
36. Manchester 86. Northumberland 
37. Oldham 87. Nottinghamshire 
38. Rochdale 88. Oxfordshire 
39. Salford 89. Shropshire 
40. Stockport 90. Somerset 
41. Tameside 91. Staffordshire 
42. Trafford 92. Suffolk 
43. Wigan 93. Surrey 
44. Barnsley 94. Warwickshire 
45. Doncaster 95. W Sussex 
46. Rotherham 96. Wiltshire 
47. Sheffield 
48. Bradford 
49. Calderdale 
50. Kirklees 
Source: DES(1984). 
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Chapter 4. Total factor productivity measurement in local prisons and remand 
centres: A further application of Data Envelopment Analysis 
4.1. Introductionl 
Chapter 4 examines the relative effeciency of 33 local prisons and remand 
centres in the financial year 1984/85. Although the application of Data 
envelopment analysis to public sector production is increasing there has been no 
examination of prison relative efficiency other than in Ganley and Cubbin (1987). 
This chapter extends the model used in that paper making an important distinction 
between remand and non-remand items. Because some local prisons carry large 
remand populations this alters the interpretation of performance at several 
establishments. For example Ganley and Cubbin (1987) reported that Wormwood 
Scrubs had an input efficiency of 0.66 in 1984/5. The revised results presented in 
this Chapter indicate that this prison is best-practice. This underlines the 
importance of informed variable selection in efficiency modelling with DEA. 
Section 4.2 briefly outlines the analytical background to the performance 
comparisons undertaken later in the Chapter. The nature of the prison, its 
environment and sources of data are discussed in sections 4.3 through 4.6 with a 
review of the relevant literature. The prediction of efficiency from a 
straightforward inspection of the data prior to the formal programming analysis is 
investigated in section 4.7. 
A growing number of DEA applications shrouds the fact that a general 
framework for the implementation of DEA results in the public sector has not been 
suggested. In the context of the Government's Financial Management initiative a 
potential framework for DEA implementation is outlined in section 4.8. 
Using a varying returns to scale assumption in the DEA program, 
relative-efficiency coefficients are presented and interpreted in sections 4.9 and 
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4.10. The nature of the efficiency coefficient is evidenced in the performance at 
Canterbury local prison. A normative development in the literature suggests that 
the peer group contains examples of better performance which the non-best practice 
establishment should emulate. The nature of the peer group is investigated in this 
connection in section 4.11. 
Crude ex ante predictions of efficiency were made from inspection of the 
maximum and minimum values of the data in section 4.7. In section 4.12 these are 
confronted with the DEA-efficiency predictions and appear to be noteably different. 
One of the most significant original contributions in this Chapter arises in 
section 4.13 which explores the writings of Liebenstein on X-efficiency and inert 
production. Traditionally much of Liebenstein's evidence for X-efficiency has been in 
the nature of casual empiricism and as Button (1985) commented: "the major 
problem of the X-inefficiency concept is that it focuses on relationships that are 
essentially unobservable". After formalising the concept of inert production, section 
4.13 goes on to show that, ceteris paribus, the DEA relative efficiency coefficient 
can be interpreted as a quantitative guide to the scale of X-efficiency. This 
represents a significant step forward for the credibility of X-efficiency theory. With 
the application of a quantitative measuring rod the concept becomes subject to 
formal testable hypotheses. The received Popperian view of knowledge acquisition 
as a process of error elimination indicates that the assertion of testable hypotheses is 
essential in scientific endeavour (Popper (1976), Blaug (1980)). Finally, Section 4.14 
summarises the results and conclusions reached in this Chapter. 
4.2. Analytical background to relative efficiency measurement 
An analytical literature on the nature of technical efficiency measures has 
flourished in parallel with the development of empirical estimation procedures. 
Initially Fare and Lovell (1979) set out to define the axiomatic properties that a 
production technology must fulfil and how far the empirical estimates in Farrell 
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(1957) and later work meet these requirements. A small and demanding literature 
has developed around the initial impetus of Fare and Lovell, the main contributions 
being Fare and Lovell (1981), Kopp (1981), Fare, Lovell and Zieschang (1982), 
Zieschang (1984), Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1983,1985) and more recently Bol 
(1986). This section evidences in the briefest of detail the basic concept of a 
production correspondence as developed in this literature. Section 4.2 is not 
however an exhaustive guide to the theory of production and efficiency measurement 
since this can be found elsewhere - for example in the volume by Fare, Grosskopf 
and Lovell (1985). 
The underlying objective of the work initiated by Fare and his associates has 
been to characterise efficiency measures as propositions on sets: sets of input and 
output possibilities. This approach derives originally from the work of the American 
economist Shephard (1953,1970,1974) who developed the body of axioms which a 
production technology must ordinarily be required to satisfy. 
Input and output correspondences 
Productive activitY, whether undertaken in the public or private sector, is 
constrained by the nature of the production process itself. Conceptually, a 
production unit transforms a vector of nonnegative inputs into a vector of 
nonnegative outputs, subject to the constraint imposed by a known, fixed 
technology. This transformation process is modelled analytically by an input 
correspondence which defines the subset of input vectors capable of producing a 
given output vector or, inversely, by an output correspondence specifying the subset 
of output vectors obtainable from a given input vector. Each of these 
correspondences must satisfy a basic set of axioms suggested originally by Shephard 
in order to provide a meaningful basis for a model of productive behaviour. 
Consider a production process transforming inputs x= (Xl, X2,..., Xn) c R7 
into net outputs Y= (Y1, Y2,..., Ym). This process can be modelled by the input 
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correspondence L(y) 9 Rý which denotes the subset of all input vectors xf 
Rý which yield at least output levels y. Analogously P(x) 5; R! P is the output 
correspondence denoting the subset if all output vectors y( Rrf obtainable from 
input levels x. The inverse relationship between L and P is given by: 
2i EfP (x) 
and may be computed or "enumerated" as (Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985)): 
(4.2.2) y: xfL (y) I 
and: 
(4.2.3) L(y) =[ 2i :yc P(x) ]. 
It is easier to see the meaning of the input set L(y) and output set P(2i) 
for the simple case of n=m=2 in figure 4.2.1. In panel (a) the subset of all 
input vectors xE Rý capable of producing at least output y is labelled L(y), 
and consists of the subset of all imput vectors on or above the curve AB. In 
panel (b) the subset of all output vectors yE Rý obtainable from input vector x 
is labelled P(x), and consists of the subset of nonnegative output vectors on or 
below the curve AB. 
It is evident from figure 4.2.1 (a) that the boundary of the input 
correspondence AB is nothing more than a conventional isoquant (and analogously 
AB in panel (b) is the production possibilty frontier for given technology and input 
vector x). In the results below in Section 4.3 the estimated input correspondence is 
merely the four-dimensional counterpart of figure 4.2.1 (a) where n=4 so that 
L(y) 5; R$. Again there is a corresponding output correspondence defined for four 
definitions of prison outputs, and so P(x) 5; R$. 
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Figure 4.2.1. 
Input and output correspondences for m=n=2 
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4.3. Empirical investigation of prison efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis : 
A preliminary review of the literature 
Since the 1960's there has been a steady flow of contributions to a new 
literature on the economics of crime and justice. One of the best known and 
seminal contributions is Becker (1968), and later Carr-Hill and Stern (1979); for a 
survey see Lewis (1987). More recently the literature has started to diversify. One 
of the newest strands of investigation is of the effectiveness of penal institutions, 
viz., the police (Levitt and Joyce (1987)), courts (Lewin, Morey and Cook (1982)) 
and the prisons. 
The background to the development of the modern prison is fascinating. 
One of the best introductions to the subject is Garland (1985) which could be very 
usefully supplemented with a read of Merquior (1985, Chapter 7) and Foucault 
(1977) who analyses the broader philosophical arguments for and against the 
existence of prisons. The focus of this Chapter is the efficiency of prison 
production. This has several analytical and policy-orientated dimensions. For 
example much has been written about the possibilities for privatisation in UK 
prisons (Morgan and King (1987), Stern (1987)) and this debate continues as yet 
unresolved. Privatisation, however, is only one aspect of a debate on prison costs 
and spending. 
Several studies (e. g. Prison Department and PA Management Consultants 
(1986)) of the prison service have diagnosed excessive costs and overtime driven 
complementing in the service. Shaw (1984) has identified the prison service as a 
public sector growth industry vis a vis other public programmes which have been 
subject to resource restrictions in recent Budgets. In the context of the 
Government's Financial Management Initiative (FMI) and the Prison Department's 
"Fresh Start" proposals attention has thereby focused on the allocation of resources 
in the service and their effectiveness in attaining penal objectives. 
88 
Some studies have deliberated on penal final outputs like deterrence 
(McAleer and Veall (1987)) and recidivism (Maltz (1984), Schmidt and Witte (1988), 
Wilson and Hernstein (1985)). Others have investigated efficiency and effectiveness 
at the level of intermediate output2; viz. Dessent (1987) who formalised a model for 
the cost effectiveness of the prison perimeter. Ganley and Cubbin (1987) presented 
the first analysis of prison productivity using frountier techniques. 
This Chapter extends the model in Ganley and Cubbin (1987) with greater 
disaggregation of costs and some redefinition of prison outcomes. Sections 4.5 
through 4.6 discuss prison resources, objectives and data and how these have 
determined the specification of the prison production function underlying the 
analysis. Section 4.7 looks at the possibility of predicting enterprise efficiency "ex 
ante"; that is, using simple descriptive statistics it attempts to identify best-practice 
production prior to the formal programming analysis which makes specific technology 
assumptions and has significantly greater computational requirements. Section 4.8 
looks at the potential role efficiency predictions have in the context of the Financial 
Management Initiative and the Prison Department's "Fresh Start" proposals. This 
includes discussions of the appropriate line-departmental structure and the 
implications for branch and central decision-makers of inefficient production. 
Sections 4.9 through 4.13 contain results on efficiency in 33 representative prison 
establishments using Data Envelopment Analysis using an assumption of varying 
returns to scale in the reference technology. Several important dimensions of the 
results are investigated including the nature of the peer group comparison and their 
congruence with Leibenstein's concept of the inert area in production. 
4.4. Background to the prison environment 
Prisons constitute a labour intensive, continuous process industry providing a 
number of non-traded outputs. The definition of prison outputs is especially 
difficult. At the crudest level, a prison provides a level of incarceration to protect 
law-abiding citizens from potentially dangerous offenders. The level of incarceration 
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can be measured by the number of prisoner days (average inmates x 365). The 
success of incarceration is more subtle. Again at the crudest level this can be 
approximated by the frequency at which prison security is breached - most notably 
in escape. Escape, however, is just one form of behaviour which can be deemed 
unacceptable in a set of undesirable acts which will include a variety of punishable 
offences: for example assault of a prison officer or wilful damage to prison 
property. These forms of behaviour are regulated and punished by prison officers. 
The number of offences so recorded can be used as an indicator of the output of 
discipline and regulation within a prison. However the possibility of differences in 
local policy from one prison to another suggests that some incidents will be 
punished in one but not in another. Consequently the "Offences" variable used 
below is defined as the number of serious offences. This includes incidents of 
escape, assaults on staff and wilful damage to prison property. These are fairly 
clearly defined and exclude less serious incidents. 
A priori it is not clear whether larger numbers of offences represent stricter 
regulation and hence greater work effort or poorer standards of inmate behaviour 
which might be caused by a poorer regime. For the purposes of this study the 
number of offences will be classified as an intermediate output or throughput 
measure of work done; in this sense, offences are a positive output or "benefit". 
The more subtle final output connotations of offences for the rehabilitative work of 
the prison are acknowledged nevertheless. 
No reader of the daily press can have escaped the appalling and worsening 
problems of overcrowding in the prisons. The total prison population currently 
stands at over 50,000 with the estate designed to house about 42,000. Each prison 
has a designated "Certified Normal Accommodation" (CNA). The difference 
between CNA and the average inmate population over the year is usually negative, 
indicating overcrowding. This is included in the model as an undesireable outcome 
of production. From the prison governor's point of view both CNA and the 
number of inmates he holds are given to him. Hence overcrowding is usually 
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unavoidable and is likely to have a profound effect on the attainment of the other 
objectives. The education and rehabilitation of offenders can only be jeopardised in 
cramped conditions. Some commentators subscribe to a "university of crime" 
interpretation of penal institutions3. On this basis, dispersal of prisoners and their 
containment at lower densities is thought to be the most conducive environment for 
rehabilitation. Naturally on this argument overcrowding only serves to worsen the 
proclivity to re-offend. 4 
4.5. Background to the Prison environment: Inputs 
A joint Prison DePartment - PA Management Consultants' Report5 found 
that manning in the service has been unwieldly and over-time driven. The 
Government's recent "Fresh Start,, 6 proposals are designed to "shake up" the service 
establishing a basic working week and satisfactory renumeration without excessive 
overtime. Incarceration and supervision is labour intensive - the more so according 
to the category of inmates concerned7. Accordingly for the purpose of this 
investigation costs have been broken down into manpower and non-manpower costs. 
Non-manpower costs are a catch-all including all costs other than those 
attributeable to labour services. These costs are current (running) costs and do not 
include capital expenditures. Manpower costs include direct labour expenses and will 
reflect the effects of overtime, etc. A first approximation to a case mix indicator 
is had in a disaggregation of both cost variables into their remand and non-remand 
components. Non-remand inmates are the "typical" sentenced prisoner. Remand 
prisoners are awaiting trial and/or sentencing. During this period their incarceration 
is lightened with privileges, e. g. extra visits, own clothes, etc. which add to their 
costs vis a vis sentenced inmates. In addition the courts control when the remand 
prisoner shall appear for trial and sentencing. The prison must provide escorts to 
and from the court at the time determined by the court. This may interfere with 
the rostering which would otherwise be most efficient from the prison's point of 
view. The court work associated with remand prisoners is a further reason for the 
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separation of remand items. This important distinction has also been incorporated 
into the prisoner days outcome variable. 
4.6. Prison objectives and sources of data 
This choice of input and outcomes yields a set of 8 variables. They have 
been chosen from first principles as the best indicators of the underlying production 
process. It is intended that they are broadly congruent with the objectives of 
Government penal policy as framed in the Prison Department Report (Cm 264) and 
Public Expenditure White Paper (Cm 288). These objectives were interpreted by 
Ganley and Cubbin (1987) as: 
1. Secure containment of offenders; 
2. The quality and rehabilitative effect of prison life; and 
Efficient use of resources. 
Although severely criticised in the past (see e. g. Shaw (1984)) prison statistics are 
improving. Data by establishment on offences like escape and assault satisfies (1) 
and has been taken from Prison Statistics, Enyland and Wales, 1984, Tables 9.3 and 
9.4. Cost data has been derived from the annual Report on the work of the 
Prison Department, 1984/85, Appendix 2, Table D and is intended to reflect 
achievement of (3). Currently there is no published data on (2), the state of the 
prison regime. Yet data of this sort is circulated internally to the Service and may 
ultimately be published annually in the Prison Department Report or the Public 
Expenditure White Paper if the recommendations of the Education, Science and Arts 
Committee in a recent report8 are accepted by the Government. The quality of 
life and regime in the prison could be crudely approximated by an indicator such as 
the number of non-statutory hours inmates are allowed out of their cells for free 
association, games, learning etc. As far as the model's congruence with 
Government policy is concerned lack of data on regime quality is perhaps the less 
worrying of data deficiencies since in recent years a good, reforming regime appears 
to have been tacitly downgraded by policy-makers vis a vis the simple incarceration 
objective. (See Prison Education HC 138-1, Session 1986-87. ) 
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The data used in the study below is based on a cross-section of 33 
representative penal establishments. These are predominantly local prisons with 
large remand populations. However seven remand centres9 and one Category B 
closed training prison'l 0 have also been included to broaden the cross-section. 
Broadening the cross-section in this way assumes an acceptable level of homogeneity 
across establishments in order to make their relative efficiency assignments 
meaningful. 
The cost and overcrowding data on these institutions are for the financial year 
1984/85 and are derived from the Prison Department Report, 1984/85. The 
prisoner day and offences outcomes for 1984 do not overlap exactly with data from 
the Report: they are published annually for the calendar year only in Prison 
Statistics, 1984. For purposes of evaluation the incongruent overlap of relevant data 
is disappointing. An important and desireable future step forward in the development 
of prison statistics would be the accurate and timely reporting of all relevant 
performance data on a fully comparable basis. 
4.7. Ex ante efficiency prediction 
It is not uncommon in empirical work in the DEA literature to present 
descriptive statistics on the input-output data prior to formal modelling of the 
production process (see for example Fare, Grosskopf and Logan (1987), Grosskopf 
and Valdmanis (1987) and Rangan et al (1988)). This serves to provide some 
intuition on the plausibility of the derivative DEA-efficiency coefficients. These 
coefficients lack a simple test statistic such as would be output from conventional 
parametric procedures like Ordinary Least Squares. In a similar context Hammond 
(1981) and Besley (1989) have proposed the evaluation of efficiency "ex ante" and 
Olex post" . Thus the efficiency predictions 
in this section are termed "ex ante" in 
the sense that they are derived from descriptive statistics on the data prior to 
formal evaluation of performance with DEA. Analogously the DEA efficiency scores 
can be interpreted as ex post "predictions" of efficiency. 
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Table 4.7.1 contains means, standard deviations, maxima and minima of the 
input-output data set based on the full cross section of 33 establishments. From the 
extreme values in the data it is possible to make crude ex ante efficiency 
predictions. Since Chapter 4 focuses on the input dimensions of prison production 
these predictions are based on the extreme values of the cost data alone. From 
Table 4.7.1 this would imply that Gloucester local prison and Thorpe Arch remand 
centre may be among the best-practice establishments with minimal observed costs. 
Analogously Brixton and Wandsworth locals might be anticpated to be poor 
efficiency candidates with respectively maximum remand and non-remand costs. 
However it should be noted that Brixton did the bulk of London Is remand work 
whilst Wandsworth had no remand prisoners in 1984/85: Their apparently excessive 
spending may be more a function of their inmate mix than of true cost 
inefficiency. Brixton moreover delivers the greatest prisoner throughtput in the 
sample. The DEA results themselves will of course throw more light on this. 
Table 4.7.1 
Summary of Prison Costs(LM) and Outputs, 1984/85 
Manpower Non-Manp. Over- Days Off 
crowd 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Mean 2.24 3.47 
S. Devn 2.08 2.51 
Max 11.85 10.55 
(6) (31) 
Min 0.55 0.34 
(14) (30) 
0.64 1.05 -147 78 137 112 
0.59 0.92 133 58 125 107 
3.24 3.80 -622 237 533 573 
(6) (31) (16) (6) (31) (13) 
0.11 0.10 -3 0 13 16 
(14) (30) (9) (20,3 1) (30 ) (9) 
Notes: 
1. Figures in brackets denote the identity of the prison 
with the maximum or minimum value of the variable concerned- 
see Table 4.9.1 below for prison names. 
2. Outcome variables: (a) Overcrowding is a negative outcome 
of production and hence is defined as the Certified Normal 
Accommodation(CNA) less the actual average prisoner 
population; (b) "Days"is the number of prisoner days, 
a basic throughput variable, defined as 365 x average 
prisoner population, expressed in thousands. Like Manpower 
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table 4.7.1, continued 
and Non-manpower costs it has been split to reflect the 
number of Remand (a) and Non-remand (b) prisoners; (c) "Off" 
is the number of serious punished offences and is a further 
indicator of staff activity (in the regulation of 
inmates' lives). 
Source: Prison Statistics, 1984 and Report of the Work of. 
the Prison DeRartment, 1984/85. 
4.8. A potential framework for the implementation of relative efficiency analysis in 
the public sector 
DEA efficiency coefficients derived from formal programming procedures and 
based on the data summarised in Table 4.7.1 may be used to form part of a 
performance data-flow in managerial and productive evaluation in the public 
sector. The Financial Management Initiative (FMI), as manifested in the 
Multi -departmental review of budgeting (HM Treasury, March 1986), and the 
Home Office's "Fresh Start" proposals appear to place branch organisations (eg 
the prison) into an evaluation hierarchy linked to a central -managerial function, for 
example the Prison Department. Performance along the branches or lines of this 
hierarchy generates data. These can be extracted for the central evaluation 
function. In the highly stylised terms of figure 4.8.1 the line manager is devolved 
financial responsibilty for a budget. The line manager, for example a prison 
governor, discharges this budget in the knowledge that at year-end he is accountable 
to the centre (the Prison Department) for his performance. 
Accordingly, data accrues to the centre at year-end and may be used in an 
efficiency evaluation and screening process. This could include an annual DEA 
evaluation of branch performance carried out by central management who will 
control next year's funding on the basis of these results. Best-practice organisations 
will be recognised in DEA terms by the recommendation that subsequent budgets 
can be fully justified. Poorer performers can be set cost targets derived from the 
efficiency coefficient. Typically these will entail that existing levels of service be 
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maintained at a reduced budget from which last period's inefficient expenditure has 
been deducted. 
Figure 4.8.1 
A stylised view of FMI and the Fresh Start scheme 
Central Management Function, 
eg Prison Department 
les 
performance 
data flow 
delegated budgets 
accountability 
Branches, eg prisons 
4.9. DEA results on prison relative efficiency with a varying returns to scale 
technology: Overview 
Table 4.9.1 contains relative efficiency coefficients using Data Envelopment 
Analysis with a varying returns to scale (VRS) technology assumption embodied in 
the underlying linear program. The results have been estimated for the full cross 
section of 25 local prisons, 7 remand centres and 1 Category B closed training 
prison. 
These prisons operate in an environment constrained by court decisions, crime 
rates and the statute book. Consequently many of the outcomes of prison production 
like prisoner days and overcrowding are wholly or partially beyond the control of 
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the individual prison. In these circumstances the cost rather than the output 
dimensions of efficiency are more germane because it is only costs which are truly 
discretionary (after certain minima, of course) from the prison decision -maker's 
point of view. A fortiori targets for outputs in these circumstances would be 
unattainable. Accordingly the efficiency coefficients contained in Table 2 have been 
estimated using the input-minimisation version of the DEA program (in place of its 
output-maximising counterpart1l) assuming the prison decision-maker strives to 
minimise the cost of producing given levels of output. The analysis of efficiency on 
the input-side rather than the output-side is becoming common in DEA 
applications for a variety of reasons. In the context of constraints on output Dawson 
(1987) used an input-minisation program in the analysis of dairying where output is 
set exogenously through EC quotasl 2. Owing to the difficulties frequently 
encountered measuring public sector outputs several authors (Mellander and Ysander 
(1987), Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1988), Kumbhakar (1988) and Mersha (1989)) 
have recommended that efficiency studies focus as far as possible on the 
measureable aspects of production; that is, on the cost behaviour of organisations 
measured in money terms. 
Thus table 4.9.1 summarises the cost behaviour of prisons relative to a best 
practice cost frontier defined by prisons with unity technical efficiency (TE) scores. 
There are 20 best-practice prisons in table 4.9.1 which form peer groups for 
inefficient prisons along a piecewise linear average cost function (- see figure 
4.10.1 below). Thirteen prisons of the full cross section of 33 have been identified 
as technically inefficient relative to the peer prisons on the cost frontier. At some 
establishments inefficiency is quite marked: Bedford has TE = 0.71 and Leicester TE 
= 0.78. By contrast there are near trivial divergences from best practice in others, 
viz., at Oxford with TE = 0.99. The mean technical inefficiency is 0.88. As a 
representative value for inefficiency this suggests there are substantial excess costs 
through the cross section as a whole. That is, there are average cost reductions of 
around 12 per cent for a representative prison with a non-unity efficiency score. 
ignoring additional slack adjustments, this implies next period's budget (for 1985/86) 
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might have been adjusted downwards by 12 per cent at the representative 
establishment. In terms of figure 4.10.1 (below) this indicates that in the sample 
period (1984/85) costs were noticeably above those attainable at best practice 
establishments along the frontier. 
Table 4.9.1 
DEA-efficiency coefficients under varying returns to scale in local prisons and 
remand centres in 1984/85. 
Prison Cost efficiency Peer group 
1. Ashford 1.0000 1 
2. Bedford 0.7095 15,16 
3. Brockhill 1.0000 3 
4. Birmingham 0.8459 14,16,28,31 
5. Bristol 1.0000 5 
6. Brixton 1.0000 6 
7. Canterbury 0.8581 5,16,28,29,30 
8. Cardiff 0.9782 5,13,16,29 
9. Coldingle 1.0000 9 
1O. Dorchester 1.0000 10 
11. Durham 0.8817 5,16,30,31 
12. Exeter 0.8293 3,5,16,21,28,30,31 
13. Glen Parva 1.0000 13 
14. Cloucester 1.0000 14 
15. Latchmere Hse. 1.0000 15 
16. Leeds 1.0000 16 
17. Leicester 0.7806 14,16,29,30 
18. Lewes 0.9858 1,3,6,16 
19. Lincoln 0.8873 3,16,28,31 
20. Liverpool 1.0000 20 
21. Low Newton 1.0000 21 
22. Manchester 1.0000 22 
23. Norwich 0.8896 13,15,16,31 
24. Oxford 0.9913 10,14,15,16,20 
25. Pentonville 1.0000 25 
26. Pucklechurch 1.0000 26 
27. Reading 0.9514 16,28p3O 
28. Shrewsbury 1.0000 28 
29. Swansea 1.0000 29 
30. Thorpe Arch 1.0000 30 
31. Wandsworth 1.0000 31 
32. Winchester 0.8951 3p5,13,16,30,31 
33. W. Scrubs 1.0000 33 
Mean inefficiency (1/nETEi<l): 0.8834 
S. Dev'n. : 0.0825 
Note: The mean and standard deviation are calculated for 
technical efficiency scores less than unity. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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4.10. Costs at Canterbury 
Canterbury has a representative level of technical inefficiency TE = 0.86, which 
is close to the mean level of 0.88. It is therefore a useful example of the typical 
correction to resource consumption required in this cross section for boundary 
production. In Table 4.10.1 targets have been estimated for each cost item at 
Canterbury. The largest wastage at Canterbury is associated with the manpower 
aspects of the containment of remand prisoners. This is intuitively reasonable given 
the extra work generated by untried and unsentenced prisoners. 
Table 4.10.1 
Costs at Canterbury local prison 
Actual Target Saving 
LM LM % 
Manpower Costs 
(1)Remand 
(2)Non-remand 
Non-manpower Costs 
(1)Remand 
(2)Non-remand 
Total Costs 
1.845 1.463 21 
2.060 1.767 14 
0.418 0.358 14 
0.466 0.376 19 
4.789 3.964 17 
Source: Prison Department Report. 1985/85 and author's cal- 
culations. 
Summing the cost targets suggests a scaling down of total costs at Canterbury 
of approximately 17 per cent. This reduction in total costs includes a radial 
contraction (reflecting the efficiency score) and a slack component. The efficiency 
score at Canterbury is 0.86 which implies an equal 14 per cent scaling down in 
each of the cost variables. It is the presence of non-zero input slacks in particular 
cost items which raises the overall reduction in total costs to 17 per cent. 
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4.11. The peer group comparison 
The nature of the efficient subset of production possibilities has been developed 
rigorously and on an axiomatic basis by Fare and Hunsacker (1986). To date 
however the definition and meaning of a peer establishment in the context of the 
DEA linear program has often been left unclear in the literature. This section 
clarifies the definition of a peer and provides a further assessment of its usefulness 
to inefficient establishments in the light of claims in the literature and the results in 
section 4.9. The definition and meaning of the peer group have also been discussed 
in Chapters 2 and 3. 
It is argued throughout the literature (see e. g. Bowlin and White (1988), 
Bowlin (1987), Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1981,1979,1978))) that attainment of 
the boundary target performance is facilitated by appeal to the peer group 
attainments identified by DEA. The peer establishments have best-practice costs 
and are likely to be producing at broadly similar scale. The target is a weighted 
average of their performance. Given that it is genuinely comparable with the peers 
selected by DEA, the inefficient prison like Canterbury should be able to modify its 
performance to levels defined to them - borrowing the better productive and 
managerial procedures which they are presumably implementing. 
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L. P. definition of the peer group 
These peer units can be defined in terms of the linear program (L. P. ) 
underlying the results in this Chapter. 
The prisons, cross section contained j=1,..., p,..., 33 establishments. If Xip is 
the ith input for a branch p and Ykp its kth output the varying returns dual 
program for input efficiency for a unit p becomes: 
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(1) MIN hp - EI Y-si + Y-sk 1 
xj i=l k=l 
subject to 
33 
(2) hpXkp - sk ý F-)'jXkj 
i=l 
33 
yip + Si = EX -Y- - 
J=l 
33 
J=l 
and 
k=1,2,3,4 
i=1,2,3,4 
Xi ý-, 0, j= (branches) 
Si 0, i=1, ..., 4 (output slacks) 
Sk 0, k=1, 
..., 
4 (input slacks) 
The Xj are the input-output weightsl 3, the si are output slacks and the sk input 
slacks; and where the RHS of the constraints (2) and (3) define the peer group. 
This is apparent on consideration of the implications of h* =1 and h* < 1, PP 
where (*) denotes the optimal value of a variable in the basic solution of the DEA 
program . If the unit p has h* =1 and 
* for all i and k then it is P si = Sk = 0, 
relatively efficient. In this case the definition of the peer group becomes trivial 
since X*p =1 and Xj* = 0, for j#p. Essentially the efficient unit p has no peers i 
(other than itself). However where h* p < 1, X* =0 p and some subset of the 
remaining Xj* (j # p) are non-zero. These non-zero X*j are weights on units 
with h* =1 and constitute the peer group for p. For example Canterbury (unit 7) P 
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has five peer units. These are Bristol, Leeds, Shrewsbury, Swansea and Thorpe 
Arch. In terms of the program this means X*, 5 1 X*6, 2 29 and X*O )1*8, X*3 are all 
non-zero in the optimal solution to the program for Canterbury. The constraints in 
the program for Canterbury are thus: 
(2) 0.86Xk7 - Sk ý ý'5Xk5 + ý1*16XM6 + )118Xk28 + 
+ ý*29XU9 + )1*30Xk3O Ik=1,2,3,4 
(3) Yi7 + si ý )Igyi5 + )'*l6yil6 + )48yiN + 
+ )ý*9YM + ý'*OYM 1,2,3,4 23 
)1*16 + ý118 +ý, *29 + )1*30 
The constraints (2) and (3) define both the peer group for Canterbury and in 
addition the feasible production space; that is (2) and (3) are hyperplanes in the 
production space which together constitute an efficient, eight -dime nsio nal surface 
against which interior production at the prison can be compared to estimate an 
efficiency score (see Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984)). Constraint (4) is the 
"technological constraint"; its absence would imply that the intensity variables 
(Xj, j=1,..., n) are calculated unconstrained in the program which amounts to an 
assumption of constant returns to scale (see Grosskopf (1986), Fare, Grosskopf and 
Lovell (1985) and Chapter 2). The restriction that they should instead sum to unity 
originates in Banker (1984) and allows local variations in scale over the production 
surface. 
The peer group and its interpretation in the literature 
One of the major normative propositions in the literature (see Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978,1979); Lewin and Morey (1981); Lewin, Morey and Cook 
(1982); Bessent, Bessent, Charnes Cooper and Thorogood (1983); Bessent, Bessent, 
Elan and Long (1984); Bowlin (1986) for example) entails that the inefficient 
decision-maker such as Canterbury should be able to compare itself with the units 
identified in the constraints (2,3 and 4) in order to extract examples of better 
managerial and productive behaviour. This could take the form of on-site 
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inspection of peer prison procedures or greater disaggregation of costs at the 
modelling stage. It is likely however that expansion of the input-output variable set 
would lead to a significant reduction in the ability of DEA to identify non-unit 
efficiency scores. Bowlin (1987, p. 133), Parkan (1987) and Nunamaker (1985) have 
shown that for a given number of establishments the a priori expectations after this 
kind of modification would be for an increase in the number of best-practice 
establishments, for: "the more variables considered, the greater the chance some 
inefficient [unit] will dominate on the added dimension and thus become efficient" 
(Nunamaker (1985, p. 54)). In addition Nunamaker demonstrates that the addition of 
variables will produce an upward "trend" in the efficiency scores. The 
discriminating power of DEA is correspondingly reduced since an establishment can 
raise its efficiency rating without increasing effort but rather by expanding the 
variable set used in the programming analysis. In this connection Nunamaker argues 
that, ceteris paribus, the a priori model of the production process should be kept 
as compact as possible in order to maximise the discriminating power of DEA. 
It is not at all clear then that simply dissggregating the input-output 
variables or adding to them would enhance the information provided by the peer 
group for the inefficient establishment. An interesting study by Parkan (1987) 
undertook the comparison of bank branches in Alberta, Canada. The results were 
laid before managers who offered their own criticisms. They declared that: "the 
comparison of a branch which was declared relatively inefficient to a hypothetical 
composite branch, (that is, to a weighted average of the peer group as in 
constraints (2) and (3)) did not allow for convincing arguments as to where the 
inefficiencies lay" (Parkin (1987, p. 242). 
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Table 4.11.1 
Costs at Canterbury and of its relatively efficient peers 
COSTS (LM) CANTBRY BRISTOL LEEDS SHRSWBY SWANSEA T. ARCH 
Manpower 
(1)remand 1.845 1.061 4.453 0.832 1.019 1.936 
(2)non-remand 2.060 4.989 4.230 1.456 2.225 0.344 
Non-manpower 
(1)remand 0.418 0.231 1.196 0.204 0.192 0.543 
(2)non-remand 0.466 1.087 1.136 0.357 0.419 0.096 
Total 4.788 7.368 11.015 2.849 3.854 2.919 
Note: Columns may not sum to totals exactly because of 
rounding. 
Source: Prison Department Report, 1984/85. 
In this connection table 4.11.1 summarises the target variables for Canterbury 
and its peer institutions. At this level of cost aggregation precise indications as to 
potential sources of improvement are not conspicuous, despite contrary claims in the 
literature. Comparing the cost profiles of all six prisons it is not the case that 
Canterbury spends the largests, sums and hence the claim of Thanassoulis et al 
(1987, p. 403) that "comparing an inefficient unit with the efficient units in its 
reference set shows up clearly how the former's performance is weak" (emphasis 
added) is too enthusiastic an interpretation of the peer group without a much more 
detailed investigation of procedures at the individual prisons themselves. 
Greater detail of procedures may be obtained through finer disaggregation of 
costs at the modelling stage but as indicated earlier this may alter the efficiency 
scores and so make the scale of the associated targets ambiguous. In some cases, 
then, inspection of the peer group can only provide limited suggestions as to how 
performance can be improved. More precise lessons may only come through 
on-site inspection of operations at the inefficient prison itself. 
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4.12. Comparison of ex ante and ex post efficiency predictions. 
Prior to the formal programming analysis with DEA in section 4.9, ex ante 
predictions of prison efficiency were made in Table 4.7.1. These predictions were 
based on the levels of costs in the prisons and were summarised in Table 4.7-1. 
Thorpe Arch and Gloucester were singled out on this "ex ante" basis as 
establishments that were likely to prove efficient under DEA. The results in Table 
4.9.1. suggest that these prisons are indeed efficient or "best- practice". Brixton 
and Wandsworth on the other hand also attain best-practice status in DEA which 
contradicts the crude ex ante prediction in section 4.9 that these prisons were likely 
to be inefficient. 
This apparent contradiction can probably be explained by the contribution of 
all input and output variables in the estimation of the DEA cost-efficiency 
coefficient: Heavy costs notwithstanding, Brixton and Wandsworth produce substantial 
prisoner throughputs (prisoner days). That all dimensions of production contribute 
to the efficiency score marks it out as equitable vis a vis traditional productivity 
measures. As Ruchlin (1977) and Todd (1985) have argued, production and output 
are the result of all inputs applied in combination and not the application of inputs 
in isolation as is suggested by the partial-productivity measure like output -per -head. 
The correlation between DEA-efficiency and the data 
The link between DEA-efficiency and the levels of costs at prisons can be 
examined further on the basis of the following hypothesis. For given outcomes, the 
DEA technical -effic ienc y score (TE) is some function of the vector of target 
variables. Using the input-minimisation version of the DEA program outputs are 
taken as given and costs are targeted. Thus if: 
TEinp ý f(C ; Y) 
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where C is a vector of prison costs (the target variables) and Y is a vector of 
(fixed) outcomes; then a reasonable efficiency hypothesis might be: 
6TEj (4.12.2) 
bcj 
inn <0fj= 1'..., 4. 
That is, ceteris paribus, increases in the 4 cost items will be negatively associated 
with movements in the input efficiency score, TEinp. Analogously, other things 
being equal, technical efficiency might be related to higher outputs: 
(4.12.3) 6TEi= 
byi <0 1'..., 4. 
(4.12.2) and (4.12.3) can be translated into the simple linear correlation hypothesis: 
Ho : aij = 
HA : aij <ý' 
where aij (ij = 1,..., 33) is the linear correlation coefficient between the efficiency 
score and the relevant input/output variable. Naturally the negative version of the 
alternative hypothesis is consistent with (4.12.2) and the positive version with (4.12.3). 
Table 4.12.1 summarises calculated values of the aij for two different types 
of efficiency score. Row 1 contains the correlation of input and output variables 
with the efficiency scores reported in section 4.9 which were based on a varying 
returns to scale (VRS) assumption in the production technology. In row 2, 
comparable results are presented assuming a constant returns (CRS) technologyl 3. 
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Table 4.12.1 
Linear correlation matrix for efficiency scores and the 
input-output variables in the prison model. 
VRS CRS 
Target variables: 
Manpower Costs 
(1) Remand . 0497 -. 4583* (2) Non-remand . 0114 . 2107 Non-manpower costs 
(1) Remand . 0751 -. 4255* (2) Non-remand . 0640 . 2290 Outputs: 
Prisoner Days 
(1) Remand . 0609 -. 2248 (2) Non-remand . 0717 . 2902** Offences . 2169 . 2982** Overcrowding . 1092 . 1155 
Notes: 
(1) The critical value of the linear correlation coefficient 
with n-2 = 31 degrees of freedom is ± . 
2961 at the 
5 per cent level. 
(2) denotes a significant variable at the 5 per cent level. 
(3) denotes a variable which is almost significant 
at the 5 per cent level. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
The critical value of the correlation coefficient at the 5 per cent level is ± 
0.296. On this basis, the null hypothesis that there is no linear association between 
VRS efficiency and costs cannot be rejected. 
constant returns to scale efficiency measure 
However this is not the case for the 
Both the remand cost items are 
significantly negatively associated with CRS-efficiency at the 5 per cent level. On 
the output side, non-remand prisoner days and the offences variable are almost 
significant vis a vis CRS efficiency. 14 
Nevertheless the bulk of the correlation coefficients - for both CRS and VRS 
efficiency - are statistically insignificant (at the 5 per cent level). This suggests 
that the "ex post" efficiency prediction by DEA does not follow trivially from the 
level of the (target) variables. In particular, it would appear that high costs per se 
are as likely to be found at best-practice establishments (e. g. Brixton and 
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Wandsworth) as they are elsewhere. 
4.13. Inert production: A new interpretation of DEA efficiency. 
Chapter 2 outlined the importance of a frontier measure of efficiency and 
noted its congruence with economic theory as far as maximising behaviour is 
concerned. DEA provides a means for estimating frountier performance and in this 
sense it is an appropriate tool for efficiency measurement. It is important to clarify 
the overlap between DEA and economic concepts like optimising behaviour. Much 
of the development of DEA has been undertaken in the case-oriented Operations 
Research literature, outside the economics mainstream. Consequently it has 
developed without full justification in economic theory. In particular, no analytical 
rationale has been advanced as to why one organisation gets a higher efficiency 
score than another. However the concept of an "inert area" originally proposed by 
Leibenstein (1969,1975,1980,1987) in his work on X-efficiency can be 
re-interpreted to provide, in economic terms, a firmer picture of the nature and 
variations in efficiency. It is the objective of this section to develop such an 
interpretation of inert production which could be offered as a tentative explanation 
of the causes of the differences in efficiency identified by DEA in Table 4.9.1. 
Definition of the inert area. 
Specifically, economic agents may behave so as to yield non-maximising 
outcomes because different groups within the enterprise have conflicting priorities 
and may have equilibrium effort levels below those which are optimal from the 
whole organisation's point of view. Leibenstein's concept of the inert area addresses 
these possibilities and brings a utility dimension to efficiency measurement in much 
the same way that Debreu (1951) first tried to define inefficiency in utility terms. 
Thus in Leibenstein (1969, p. 607) an inert area is defined as: "a set of effort 
positions whose associated levels of utility are not equal but in which the action 
required to go from a lower to a higher [effort] level involves a utility cost that is 
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not compensated for by in [a] gain utility". Unlike non-human inputs, labour 
suppliers have preferences and may voluntarily alter their performance preferences. 
Subject to certain constraints, these preferences will determine the amount of effort 
attached to units of labour time purchased by the employer which maximises their 
utility. Given that work is not completely meaningless this level of effort will be 
non-zero but may be below that which would otherwise maximise the surplus from 
production. 
It should be clear that use of the Leibenstein line of argument amounts to a 
repudiation of marginal productivity theory. Via the labour contract a fixed amount 
of labour time is purchased per period; effort on the other hand is a variable, so 
output is unpredictable ex ante. From the employer's point of view, a 
straightforward relationship between labour purchases, output and renumeration is lost 
- the key point being that labour effort and purchases of labour time are not the 
same thing. 
Sources of inert production. 
Button (1985) has indicated the sources of inert production. Supervisors or 
"principals" may have a desire to extract higher levels of effort from supervisees 
than the latter are willing to offer. 15 Equally, to obtain increased levels of effort 
implies that supervisors themselves must work harder in policing and regulation. 
This engenders a utility penalty for the supervisor such that he may feel it too 
costly in terms of his own utility to move to a higher effort point. Consequently 
subordinates have an opportunity to labour at at an intensity that may be lower 
than that which is optimal for the performance of the organisation as a whole. 
Several other factors may influence the extent of the inert area. Its scale 
can be expected to be detemined by the "shelter" available to agents to buffer 
demands on their labour. Abscense of competitive pressures in both public and 
private sectors is a major determinant of shelter (c. f. Stevenson (1983)). But for a 
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given competitive background to the enterprise, the key influences are the internal 
organisation, regime and policing arrangements which prevail upon agents: "Full 
motivation, as implied in the maximisation concept, may work as long as we are 
thinking about one-man firms or very small firms with an over-clictator-mangager 
[sic] in charge. But differential motivation becomes especially important once we 
consider large firms" (Leibenstein (1979), emphasis added). Once effort strategies 
vary in this way, the possibility of maximal frountier attachments - whether of costs 
or outputs - diminishes. Maximal attainments are the outcome of a well-behaved 
Rational Economic Man (Leibenstein (1980)). 
Assuming the sources of inert production can be found in most organisations, 
it is not unreasonable to suggest that it is reflected in prison efficiencies reported in 
Table 4.9.1. This in turn would lend support to the Leibenstein(1975) 
reinterpretation of internal enterprise behaviour. That is: (1) The individual agent, 
and not the enterprise itself, is the basic decision unit from an efficiency point of 
view; and (2) There exist differing, unallied priorities among agents within the 
enterprise. (1) and (2) are the result of the fact that labour is able to choose its 
preferred effort-levels, subject to certain constraints. Because these effort-levels 
may not be consistent with the levels of the enterprise as a whole Leibenstein 
coined his term , inert area" as an indicator of wasted labour potential. That is, as 
an indicator of the difference between that level of effort preferred by the 
individual and that preferred by the enterprise. Insofar as variations in performance 
reflect wasted labour potential, the DEA-efficiency score can be thought of as a 
measure of the inert area in production. 
An elementary model of the inert area 
It is useful to formalise a model of the inert area at this point to illustrate 
the idea of wasted labour potential and its connection with the DEA-efficiency 
score. Leibenstein's basic thesis is that the organisation typically requires greater 
effort than will maximise individual utilities. Thus whilst increased labour effort 
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might lower costs onto the cost function, the marginal utility gain of doing so to 
the individual may be trivial or even negative. 
This motivates figure 4.13.1 which depicts a stylized relationship between an 
individual's total utility and labour effort; it is based on Leibenstein (1980). Ceteris 
paribus, a typical agent has a utility function defined on labour effort (L), viz., U 
= U(L). He derives satisfaction from additional effort up to the point (L* , U* in 
Figure 4.13.1. Beyond Lý his total utility decreases monotonically because extra 
effort is tiresome for him and produces a negative marginal utility. 
Leibenstein (1969) suggests that the enterprise can reduce its costs by 
extracting greater effort per unit of labour time purchased. If the organisation 
succeeds in obtaining greater effort levels it can reduce the total units of labour 
time purchased. Thus, ceteris paribus, it may prefer an effort level, say Ll, from 
individuals. The difference between this level of effort, which is optimal from the 
employer's point of view, and that prefered by the employee (L*), is the inert 
area. From figure 4.13.1. this translates into (Ll - L*) >0. In general, any effort 
level beyond L* will not be desired by individuals because it has a negative 
marginal utility and a non-zero inert area, reflecting wasted labour potential. 
In principle, the difference between L* and Ll can be thought to reflect the 
difference between best-practice and inefficient production defined by a (non-unity) 
DEA-efficiency score. Attainment of the DEA target for an inefficient organisation 
then requires the elimination of the inert area by increasing agents' effort levels 
from L* to Ll. By increasing effort levels the organisation can reduce the number 
of employee-hours it requires to produce a given output. This immediately lowers 
the wage bill and total costs. Given the traditional arguments about the flexibility 
of factors of production in the short run - that is, that labour is variable while 
other factors are not - suggests short-run adjustments onto the cost frontier can 
only take place through reductions in the wage bill. These could be achieved either 
by making some of the workforce redundant and asking large increase in effort 
ill 
levels from the remainder. Or, the organisation can keep all its existing employees 
and ask each one for a relatively smaller increase in work intensity. 
Figure 4.13.1 
Utility and effort 
Total 
ut iI ity 
U* 
Ul 
Labour effort per unit of time purchased 
Source: Leibenstein (1980). 
To fix ideas, these arguments may be recast in figure 4.13.2 which illustrates 
a stylised frontier for average costs. Consider for example a hypothetical prison 
producing at point i with average costs OB. Its DEA-efficiency score is OA/013 
and the associated target OA. Costs OB are relatively inefficient and presumably 
reflect agents preferred effort Ivels, as at Lý in figure 4.13.1. In principle, the 
only way the employer may be able to reduce costs in the short run is to employ 
less labour. If the employer can persuade agents to raise effort levels then the 
number of hours of labour purchased to deliver output OY can fall. For a given 
wage rate, this will reduce the wage bill because wasted labour potential is 
eliminated; that is, the reduction in average costs (OB-OA) for best-practice could 
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1ý Lý 
be achieved if labour effort per hour rose to remove the 
Figure 4.13.2. 
The link between DEA-efficiency and inert production 
Avearge 
Costs 
B 
A 
0 Y 
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The main qualification falling on this argument would be that it suggests the 
whole of the improvement in average costs suggested by DEA, (OB - OA), is 
attainable through increases in labour effort. As suggested earlier this relies on the 
likelihood of other factors being fixed in the short run. If this is indeed the case 
then the only facet of operations which may be able to absorb inefficiency will be 
the work intensity of employees. However if other adjustments are possible (e. g. in 
procedures, equipment, etc. ), then some or all of the DEA adjustment to costs may 
be attainable without increases in work intensity. 
The attainabilitY of DEA targets. 
It has become clear that to attain a point of best-practice may require 
individuals to work with an intensity greater than they would prefer. This is 
evident if the inert area is expressed explicitly in utility terms. For effort points 
such as L, and L* in figure 4.13.1 the inert area would then be given by [ U(Lj) 
- U(L*) I<0; that is, as the difference between total utilities at preferred and 
non-preferred effort levels. The expression is negative and indicates that there 
would be a net utility cost to the individual of increased effort. In these 
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circumstances the attainment of boundary performance implies that individuals within 
an organisation would have to accept a lower total utility from their work. 
Presumably such a situation could only be achieved after increased monitoring and 
regulation of work. Of course if individuals desired effort levels are coincident with 
that preferred by the organisation, best-practice production would not mean lower 
utility. Leibenstein's key (1979) point, however, is that such a situation (i. e. L* = 
Lj) is unlikely unless in small owner-managed firms because of reasons of shelter 
and looseness in labour contracts in larger organisations. The possibility that 
achieving higher work intensities could mean lowering individual utilities underlines 
the difficulties that may be encountered in the implementation of targets. 
Individuals may resist voluntary calls to increase their effort such that costly 
increases in monitoring arrangements might become necessary. If the budgets are 
not available to develop stricter monitoring than inefficiency is likely to persist 
because individuals are unlikely to voluntarily increase their effort to a point of 
lower utility. 
Management may however be able to achieve some fraction of targeted savings 
by bribing employees into accepting lower utilities. In principle, management could 
"buy out" their lost utility by offering a higher wage rate which could be offset by 
greater effort on the part of workers. 
DEA, X-efficiency and the inert area 
Liebenstein's concept of an inert area has proven useful in permitting a 
tentative exploration of the inefficiencies identified by DEA in a traditional 
economic framework based on utility theory. Furthermore, this utility based 
interpretation of DEA suggests an economic rationale to explain why the targets by 
IDEA might not be achieved. In particular, efficiency may persist because best 
practice costs may require levels of effort from individuals which would lower their 
utility. A "rational" agent would not ordinarily be expected to volunteer lower 
utility and so if efficiency is not to persist this implies some form of coercion of 
114 
agents might be necessary. 
The framing of DEA in X-efficiency terms as an inert area suggests the first 
sense in which the extent of X-efficiency might be quantified. Button (1985, p. 85) 
has written that "the problem of the X-efficiency concept is that it focuses on 
relationships that are essentially unobservable. Traditional economic methodology, 
involving the establishment of testable hypothesis, is particularly difficult to apply in 
such circumstances. Leibenstein himself tends to rely upon casual empiricism and 
sites a series of ad hoc case studies, examples and impressionistic findings to support 
his stance". These observations may no longer be appropriate. Insofar as 
variations in performance can be attributed to inert production, the X-efficiency 
concept does indeed become tractable to quantitative investigation. 
Section 4.14. Conclusion 
This chapter has implemented the revised DEA program of Banker (1984) on 
a representative cross-section of 33 local prisons and remand centres for the 
financial year 1984/85. The Banker approach represents a step forward on the 
original Farrell/Charnes and Cooper methodology which imposed constant returns to 
scale over the whole production surface. Banker added an additional constraint to 
the original DEA program (that the sum of the intensity variables is exactly unity) 
which permits the returns to scale to vary locally. It has thus been possible to 
estimate the efficient production correspondence for prisons without requiring 
restrictive assumptions on the underlying production technology. This is in contrast 
to classical econometric methods that estimate production correspondences using a 
prespecified parametric functional form which involves implicit assumptions about the 
nature of the underlying production technology. 
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An interesting comparative study of efficiency in North Carolina hospitals by 
Banker, Conrad and Strauss (1986) has confronted non-parametric DEA estimates 
with a translog version of the production function. The translog results suggested 
that constant returns prevailed in the hospital sample, whereas the DEA procedure 
indicated that both increasing and decreasing returns to scale may be observed in 
different segments of the production correspondence, in turn suggesting that the 
translog model may have been "averaging" diametrically opposed behaviour. This 
comparative study provides evidence in favour of the non-parametric approach as 
used in this Chapter since the DEA estimates appear to be able to identify 
production behaviour more accurately. 16 
On this basis thirteen establishments in the sample were diagnosed as 
operating with technical inefficiency. The mean level of the efficiency coefficient 
for inefficient prisons was 0.88 suggesting that these institutions could on average, 
reduce their operating costs by around 12 per cent. In some cases however, 
substantially greater orders of inefficiency were identified: for example at Bedford 
TE = 0.71 and at Leicester TE = 0.78. 
The definition of the peer group which "drops out" of the solution to the 
DEA program was clarified in section 4.11. It is argued that there is no 
straightforward link between the peer group and improvements in performance at 
inefficient establishments, contrary to suggestions in the literature. Standards at peer 
establishments may only be dominant in one dimension (Nunamaker (1985)) and so 
certain cost items at an inefficient establishment may actually be lower than costs 
in the peer group - recall the comparison of Canterbury with its peers in Table 
4.11.1. 
The nature of inefficiency and its relationship with the level of costs was 
examined in section 4.12. A linear correlation analysis suggested that costs 
attributable to remand prisoners are significantly associated with the CRS efficiency 
coefficient. 
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Simple inspection of the extreme values of the costs data does not provide 
enough information ex ante to predict an establishment's efficiency status in the 
DEA program. Gloucester and Thorpe Arch dominated on (respectively) the 
remand and non-remand cost variables in table 4.7.1 and achieved best-practice 
status in the DEA results. This is consistent with Nunamaker (1985) who 
demonstrated that dominance on a single variable is enough to confer full technical 
efficiency in DEA. 
However, ex ante, it is not possible to predict the consequences of 
sub-dominance on efficiency. Brixton and Wandsworth had the highest remand and 
non-remand expenditures (see table 4.7.1). Nonetheless they were identified as 
technically efficient in the DEA program. It follows that sub-dominance in a 
particular variable (that is, excess costs or deficient outputs) implies of itself neither 
efficiency or inefficiency. This can be attributed to the total-factor view embodied 
in the underlying DEA-efficiency ratio. The inefficiency coefficient is effectively a 
weighted average of performance on all variables and so sub-dominance on a single 
variable cannot in its own right determine an establishment's efficiency status. 
Herein lies the advantage of a total-factor approach over the more traditional 
partial view which defines productivity as a ratio of a single output to a single 
input. The use of methods embodying a total-factor view in performance 
measurement is now widely recommended in the literature - see for example the 
volume edited by Cowling and Stevenson (eds. ) (1984), Pickering (1983), Richardson 
and Gordon (1980) Craig and Harris (1973)). 
Harvey Leibenstein's ideas on X-efficiency have for two decades remained on 
the periphery of the analysis of productivity. Experience in any organisation 
suggests the existence of slack and that inputs - in particular labour - may not be 
fully employed. This apparently innocuous proposition has eluded empirical 
estimation leaving X-efficiency theory as little more than an addendum to the 
literature. 
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Section 4.13 formalises X-efficiency in terms of the concept of an inert area 
(an idea also proposed originally by Leibenstein); it argues that, ceteris paribus, the 
efficiency coefficient can be regarded as a quantitative measure of inert production. 
This is a significant step forward in that the concept is now brought within the 
domain of empirically quantifiable hypotheses and may lead to its incorporation into 
empirical research more generally. A development of this nature is all the more 
remarkable given that Leibenstein himself has tended to draw support from casual 
empiricism and ad hoc case studies (see for example Leibenstein (1970,1966)). 
Finally, section 4.13 suggested a utility-based interpretation of technical 
inef ficiency. it was argued that inefficiency may be the result of agents lowering 
their effort levels to maximise individual utilities. If these effort levels are not 
consistent with minimum costs, the organisation will face a motivational problem 
because individuals have no incentive to work harder if this lowers their total 
utilities. Consequently inefficiency may be a persistent phenomenon making DEA 
targets unobtainable without coercion or bribes. 
Footnotes 
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2. For a full discussion of the distinction between intermediate and final outputs 
see Boviard (1981) and Gadrey (1988). 
3. See Dennis Pawley The Guardian, 1/4/1988, page 21. 
4. Figures in The Economist . 
23/1/1988, show that currently 60 per cent of all 
male offenders leaving overcrowded gaols are reconvicted within two years ( for 
young prisoners the figure is 69 per cent). 
5. Study of Prison Officers' Complementinj4 and Shift Systems, vol 1 (Report) and 
vol 2 (Appendices) April 1986. 
6. See Home Office News Release, 31st July 1987, "New working arrangements in 
prisons in England". 
7. Prisoners are categorised A, B, C, D where A is the most serious offender, B less 
so, etc. 
8. Prison Education. Second Report from the Education, Science and Arts 
Committee, HC 138-9, session 1986-87. 
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9. Ashford, Brockhill, Glen Parva, Latchmere House, Low Newton, Pucklechurch 
and Winchester. 
10. Coldingley. 
11. See Chapter 2 on this distinction. 
12. The general problem of exogenously fixed inputs or outputs is discussed in 
Banker and Morey (1986a, b) and Ray (1988). 
13. Also known as "intensity variables". See Fare, Grosskopf and Logan (1985,1987). 
14. Prison efficiency on a constant returns basis is discussed fully in Chapter 5. 
Note that CRS versions of the DEA program usually identify fewer best-practice 
establishments when compared with a VRS version of the program on the same data 
set (see Chapter 5). Consequently there is more variation in the CRS -efficiencies 
since there are more non-unity efficiency scores. This may go some way to explain 
the greater significance of the CRS-efficiency scores in a linear correlation analysis. 
In addition, of course, there may be non-linear relationships between efficiency and 
the target variables which cannot be identified here. 
15. See Rees (1985) for a comprehensive survey on the growing literature on 
principals and agents. 
16. Note that a full treatment of returns to scale is contained in Chapters 2 and 5. 
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Chapter 5. Programme-efficiency implications of Data Envelopment Analysis 
5.1. Introduction 
Since its inception Data Envelopment Analysis has often been used as a 
measure of technical efficiency within larger organisations with a branch structure. 
However in many contexts it is the performance of the larger organisation of which 
the branch is only a part which is of most relevance. A good example occurs in 
the determination of public expenditure. Government departments make a bid each 
year to the Treasury for resources. The reaction of the Treasury to this bid will 
depend on many considerations, not the least of which is the perceived value for 
money of the programmesl operated by the department. In evaluating the efficiency 
of a spending programme, central decision-makers will not usually have the 
resources to consider the detailed performance outcomes of the smaller operating 
units within the programme. Quite simply, as Nelson (1981, p. 1039) has remarked: 
"top management is limited in the number of things it can control or attend to in 
any detail". It follows that the control of production for efficient outcomes requires 
information to summarise branch-level operations to a point which gives a more 
concise, summary picture of the operation of the programme as a whole. 
In 1980 a system known as MINIS (Management Information System for 
Ministers) was set up at the Environment Department to provide top management 
with key data on "low-level" operations within the Department. For similar 
purposes, this Chapter seeks to summarise the branch-level information provided by 
DEA into indicators of the performance of the whole programme. It is argued that 
this summary information on programme performance could play an important dual 
role in public sector decision -making. Firstly, in top management systems like 
MINIS; and secondly in the operation of the annual Public Expenditure Survey 
where the Treasury requires summary performance data to evaluate departmental 
spending bids. 
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Section 5.2 of this Chapter develops a methodology for the aggregation of 
branch-efficiency scores and examines the aggregate efficiency of the prison spending 
programme by way of its illustration. This is extended in section 5.3 which 
examines the imPlications for costs and efficiency of an alternative constant returns 
to scale assumption in the underlying linear program. The causes of differences in 
costs under varying and constant returns are explained in section 5.4. Finally section 
5.5 shows that excess costs in a spending programme can be decomposed into a 
scale and technical efficiency component. To date most of the empirical DEA 
literature has attributed the total variation in excess costs to technical efficiency; it 
is shown that this is misleading and that scale inefficiencies are an important 
determinant of excess costs in prison operations. 
5.2. The cost efficiency of a multi-branch public spending programme: The case of 
local prisons and remand centres 
The problem of programme evaluation 
Farrell's original (1957) empirical contribution investigated the relative 
performance of agriculture across whole states in the United States. In a similar 
way, section 5.2 sets DEA into a more aggregative context to provide information 
on the performance of whole spending programmes. This is a departure for DEA 
which hitherto has been a tool for the measurement of branch efficiency alone. 
Many spending programmes are made up of a complex web of branches 
which deliver final services to the client. The performance of individual branches 
within the programme can be measured using DEA in the manner outlined in 
chapters 3 and 4. Analysis of spending and delivery at the programme-level 
however, is potentially more difficult owing to the diversity of institutions and 
activities which may be involved. Zeleny (1974) concluded that "human ability to 
arrive at an overall evaluation by weighting and combining diverse attributes is not 
very impressive". Other studies like Balachandran and Steuer (1982) indicate that the 
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optimal set of weights required to surnmarise productivity measures is typically 
dependent upon variable measurement scales and the decision -maker @s preference 
function. In the presence of non-marketed outputs with a merit significance 
decision-making for the prisons' spending programme is no less problematic than 
these studies suggest. 
Consequently at the programme-level performance evaluation requires a form 
of "informational reductionism" to condense large volumes of information into 
quantities tractable enough for decision-makers. One means of surnmarising 
information in this context may be Data Envelopment Analysis and, more generally, 
total-factor productivity measures. These are effectively condensed performance 
statements in which productivity is defined in a summary fashion, thereby avoiding 
the complexity and potential ambiguity of partial factor measures. A good example 
of the difficulties posed by traditional measures is a DHSS database on local 
authority performance containing 400 indicators of activity and resource use (see 
DHSS (1983,1985)). The existence of such a large volume of indicators may 
conceivably hinder as much as it assists senior management decision making. Thus 
Mersha (1989, p. 164) argued that "the derivation of a single overall performance 
index will provide a more operational and practical basis for evaluating the relative 
performance of competing agencies" (emphasis added). Like Mersha, Fare, Grosskopf 
and Lovell (1988, p. 79) have argued that efficiency measures may play a broader 
role "in circumstances in which a public agency oversees the operation of a number 
of service providers. Examples are state departments of education overseeing many 
school districts, state departments of justice supervising local courts and the like". 
In principle, DEA provides an overall performance index such as Mersha 
(1989) and others have sought which eschews several common public sector 
measurement difficulties. For example, it does not require the decision-maker to 
express his own weighting scheme for inputs and outputs. 1 Secondly, the DEA 
relative-efficiency coefficient is derived unaffected by units of measurement in the 
underlying data (see Charnes and Cooper (1984) for formal proof of the latter 
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proposition). More significantly however, it summarises performance into a single 
measure and thereby avoids the ambiguity of multiple productivity ratios. 
Modernisation of public sector accounting methodologies 
The importance of DEA to productivity measurement has been quite widely 
recognised for the evaluation of branch-level efficiencies. However, it is clear that 
similar benefits are likely to accrue from the application of DEA at higher levels of 
aggregation. Charnes and Cooper (1 980a, b) recommend DEA in their concept of a 
broader "comprehensive audit" for public programmes in the modernisation of public 
sector accounting and evaluation. Indeed Charnes and Cooper argue that in this 
context DEA fulfils a need and a tradition for servicing third-party requirements for 
information, together with additional professional requirements for objectivity, care 
and validation. This view, that DEA can be seen as a development of the 
public-sector auditing function, is now widely supported by economists in this 
literature. Thus Sherman (1984), Greenberg and Nunamaker (1987), Smith and 
Mayston (1986) and Smith (1988) have developed arguments which support the use 
of DEA in the analysis of broader public sector budgets. 
The Government's new white paper on efficiency policy3 is significant here 
because it advocates change in the structure of public institutions which is consistent 
with the application of DEA at a more aggregate level. Specifically, the white paper 
proposes that the bulk of departments' non-policy making functions be re-organised 
as flexecutive agencies". Agencies are designed to have a large degree of financial 
autonomy, surviving on budgets devolved to them from the parent department. This 
initiative broadens the scope for public sector monitoring and evaluation because 
some degree of central control over budgeting will be lost to the agencies. As the 
white paper puts it: "Agencies will be expected to install robust management 
systems, including proper measures of efficiency, as a basis on which ministers can 
confidently delegate as much responsibility as possible to them. Stretching 
performance targets will be set and monitored regularly. The Government's aim is 
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that controls should be few but effective, and it agrees that, provided demanding 
performance targets are set and monitored, and firm overall controls are maintained, 
it should be possible to reduce the degree of detailed control of agencies" (CM524, 
p. 9). 
It is in this context of the modernisation and development of public sector 
auditing that section 5.2 proposes a new methodology for the aggregation of branch 
performance in a manner which summarises the implications of agency (branch) 
performance for programme-level costs. It will be argued that DEA-derived 
measures of programme performance may be used as accounting rules in the annual 
public -expenditure round where programmes compete for resources out of the 
planning total. 
The structure of multi-branch public spending programmes and a further role for 
DEA 
DEA enables the estimation of technical efficiency for each organisation within 
public-spending programmes with a branch structure. This information is important 
to the line manager of each branch who must be aware of its potential implications 
for funding next period. In the spending of public monies, the line (branch) 
manager is accountable to his sponsoring department4 which may play a judicial role 
analogous to the functioning of the market in the private sector. Thus if a DEA 
evaluation of performance by the sponsoring department is unfavourable this could 
be the basis for budget reductions at branches next period. 
Equally, the sponsoring department is itself responsible to the Treasury in the 
use of public funds. Performance measurement of departmental activity by the 
Treasury should acquire greater importance now that budgets are being increasingly 
devolved to "lower" levels of public sector management. The maintenance of central 
(Treasury) control over spending in this context requires a more aggregative view of 
performance than is provided by branch efficiency scores. Information on individual 
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branch performance is generally too voluminous to be considered in detail at the 
Treasury in the allocation of broad spending totals to sponsoring departments. 
However, the branch structure of many public spending programmes may permit a 
second, broader role for the use of DEA evaluation. In particular, Mersha (1989, p. 
163) has observed that "most public service programmes are designed to achieve 
their objectives through lower level operating units and a programme's performance 
is eventually determined by the efficiency and effectiveness of such operating units". 
Hence, where the performance of a spending programme is ultimately 
constituted by the performance of its sub-branches, it is possible to derive aggregate 
technical efficiency measures for the programme itself - simply by summing over 
branch performance. Such measures overcome excessive detail of branch-level 
performance indicators. Hence they could be used by central funding institutions, 
such as the Treasury, in the allocation of broad spending totals to the sponsoring 
departments managing multi-branch spending programmes. 
The methodology of multi-branch programme performance measurement 
Consider then a multi-branch public expenditure programme. Resources are 
disbursed through its n branches. The programme is simply defined as the sum of 
spending at each branch i: 
Ci 
The Aggregate Technical Efficiency (ATE) of the whole programme can be defined 
by the identity: 
nn 
ATE Y- &/ Y- Ci 
where C*i is the DEA target (or best-practice) cost level for each branch; and Ci is 
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its actual spend. Disaggregated cost items within total costs may also be identified 
and so programme efficiency in each of these separate (m) classes may be defined: 
(5.2.2) ATE =Z Ct j/L. C1, j , jýl,... lm 
where CIj is the target cost level for item j at establishment i and Cij is similarly 
defined for actual spending on j at 
The main difference between the conventional branch efficiency and aggregate 
technical efficiency (ATEj) scores is that the former vary over establishments while 
the latter are indexed on the input or output variables (having summed over 
establishments). Their interpretation however is the same, mutatis mutandis. As the 
efficiency of a branch approaches unity so technical efficiency is eliminated from its 
operations. Equally, as ATEj approaches unity (for j=1,..., m) technical inefficiency 
is eliminated in the m separate cost items within the programme. When ATEj =1 
for all j, the programme is operating at full cost efficiency with best-practice 
performance prevailing in all its constituent branches. 
Programme performance and allocative efficiency 
It should be noted that programme efficiency has been defined as the sum of 
branch-level technical efficiencies. There is however an additional allocative element 
to overall economic efficiency (OE). Hence Farrell (1957) suggested the efficiency 
identity: 
OE -= TE. AE 
that is, overall efficiency is the product of technical efficiency (TE) and allocative. 
efficiency (AE) measures. In figure 5.2.1 technical efficiency is the ratio OB/OC and 
measures the extent of "interior production". Allocative efficiency reflects the 
discrepancy between the cost-minimising factor price-ratios at D and those observed 
at A. Hence AE = OA/OB and OE = OA/OC. Thus overall economic efficiency is 
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lower than technical efficiency. This is because costs at B, C1, are greater than 
those at D, CO, It follows that if technical efficiency is adjusted to take account of 
allocative efficiency, the implied cost adjustments for overall economic efficiency are 
greater than those necessary for technical efficiency alone. 
Figure 5.2.1 
Technical and allocative efficiency ratios 
I nput 2 
0 
The methodology adopted in this chapter for programme evaluation focuses on 
technical efficiency to the exclusion of allocative efficiency because of problems in 
the measurement of public sector prices. These problems include: (1) There may be 
distortions in (non -competitive) factor markets due to monopoly or monopsony 
power - see Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1988). This may mean that the prices 
ruling in markets are not genuine representations of the opportunity costs of inputs 
and hence allocative efficiency cannot be meaningfully defined against prevailing 
factor prices; (2) Particularly in a public sector context, prices may not exist or be 
intractable to definition (Margolis (1971) and Sengupta. (1982)). In this case the 
optimal factor price ratios (pý/pý) and hence of the slope the isocost hyperplane Ij 
will be undefined; (3) Finally, some authors of efficiency studies have suggested that 
losses due to allocative inefficiency are small relative to technical efficiencies. See 
127 
McGuire (1987), Alessi (1983) and Leibenstein (1980), for example. 
In these circumstances, programme performance has been defined in this 
section in terms of technical efficiency (and scale efficiency in section 5.5) alone. It 
is acknowledged that an adjustment for allocative efficiency could increase the size 
of excess costs which might be identified in public spending programmes. 
Estimates of Aggregate Technical Efficiency in the local prison spending programme 
under varying returns to scale 
The prisons' model estimated in Chapter 4 identified four cost variables (m = 
4) at 33 local prisons and remand centres. The Aggregate Technical Efficiency of 
the programme in each of these four items is defined: 
33 33 
ATEj =E C-', ý, j / Y- Ci, j 
i=l i=l 
In this way table 5.2.1 summarises the actual and target spending for manpower and 
non-manpower costs in local prisons in 1984/85. The cost targets derived in Chapter 
4 assumed that the costs technology exhibits varying returns to scale. Table 5.2.1 
also includes the implied total cost efficiency by summing costs and targets over 
(c. f. the initial version of the aggregate efficiency identity (5.2.1)). 
These results suggest about 5 per cent of the aggregate prisons' budget 
addressed by these results is not spent efficiently. Moreover, in terms of the 
potential percentage gains the extent of cost inefficiency appears to be fairly evenly 
distributed across manpower and non-manpower costs. This implies that over the 
programme as a whole there are no substantial slack variable adjustments to be 
made in the cost variables. That is, the existence of vertical or horizontal facets in 
the production surface is uncommon. It should be stated that the savings identified 
in table 5.2.1 may be very much potential long-run gains. Lewis (ed. ) (1986) 
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argued that improving efficiency might require increases in budgets initially to assist 
in re -organ isation, re-equipment, etc.. For example, redundancy payments will swell 
costs in the present before a reduction in employment brings costs down in the 
future. 
There is also the question of the quality of service and efficiency. Higher 
costs may be the result of a better service which will suffer from future budget 
restrictions. In the evaluation of the target itself, it will be useful for 
decision-makers to have well-defined norms and references against which to assess 
quality. If conventional standards of service delivery cannot be attained from existing 
resources, then a budget cut-back in funding is inappropriate. Higher quality of 
outcomes in prisons might be identified in the amount of time devoted to the 
educational rehabilitation of inmates and the number of hours per day allowed for 
association - both of which have implications for manning, costs and quality of 
service. Consequently a straightforward implementation of cost targets amounts to the 
existence of a maintained hypothesis that considerations of quality and adequate 
levels of service are satisfied. 
Therefore cost targets are meaningful in the short run where standards of 
attainment in outcomes are acceptable and constant with respect to the reductions in 
funding implied by the target. In these circumstances, DEA information on 
programme performance may be fed into a policy environment like the annual 
public expenditure planning cycle. This could assist in the bidding process between 
Treasury and line departments, with poorer performing programmes being curtailed 
in favour of more efficient spending. Accordingly reductions in spending at the 
programme level such as suggested in table 5.2.1 can be thought of as potential 
adjustments to the public sector planning totals for departments in the Public 
Expenditure Survey (pES). 5 
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Table 5.2.1 
The programme implications of prison cost inefficiency in 1984/85 under varying 
returns to scale 
Costs Actual Target ATE Saving 
LM LM %% 
Manpower 
(1)remand 69.41 66.30 95.5 4.5 
(2)non-remand 114.38 109.06 95.3 4.7 
Non-manpower 
(3)remand 19.85 18.78 94.6 5.4 
(4)non-remand 34.51 32.96 95.5 4.5 
Total costs 238.15 227.15 95.4 4.6 
Notes: 
Column 1 is the sum of actual spending on item j for 
all i=1,..., 33 prisons, ýCi, j; column 2 is the sum of best- 
practice costs at these prisons for item j and is defined as 
E&j, j, where * denotes best-practice costs; column 3 is the 
Aggregate Technical Efficiency of programme items in 
percentage terms, viz., ATE j= (EC*i, j/ECI-, j) 100; column 
4 is the potential percentage saving which could result 
from best-practice production, that is (1-ATE )10 
Source : Author's calculations and Prison Department Report 
1984/85. 
A number of further caveats must be added at this point. A target for 
programme funding in period t+1 based on performance in time t must be 
adjusted to take account of anticipated future price movements. Given that prices 
have a tendency to rise, a target which has not been adjusted for anticipated 
inflation will unfairly penalise a programme next period. Secondly, the structure of 
some spending departments may not permit evaluation by DEA. For example, 
unitary departments like the Foreign and Commonwealth Office lack a comparable 
branch structure and are not therefore tractable within DEA at the programme 
level. In such cases, programme performance evaluation will have to follow an 
alternative route. 
Finally, the results in table 5.2.1 are based on spending at only 33 local 
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prisons and remand centres while the Prison Department Report for 1984/85 
identifies 118 penal establishments of one sort or another. From these only those 
(33) institutions with a significant remand population have been included. The 
presence of remand prisoners was taken as an indicator of reasonable homogeneity 
among institutions. The inclusion of other types of establishment (e. g. open prisons) 
in a broader analysis of the total programme might give a different picture of 
performance. 
It was felt however that that the sample should be restricted to homogeneous 
establishments with similar functions and objectives. Clearly the comparison of 
performance with a production frontier would be meaningless if the relevant facet is 
a weighted average of a dissimilar production process. Some form of criterion (such 
as a significant remand content) which carefully differentiates between different 
forms of production has - of necessity - been used in most empirical DEA studies. 
For example Tomkins and Green (1988) sought to compare production in 36 
university departments but limited their final sample to 20 because the remaining 16 
were part of economics or management departments. Likewise several other studies 
have restricted the size of the relevant cross section. Sengupta (1987a) in a study of 
high-school education in California selected only 25 out of a feasible sample of 50 
schools in order to preserve homogeneity. 
Whether in actual practice enough comparable units can be identified to make 
"programme" evaluation a reality will depend on the nature of the activity in 
question. It can be said, however, that the input efficiency defined in cost terms 
has a profound advantage over the output efficiency score where programmes are 
widely diffentiated internally. Specifically, the efficiency of subgroups of organisations 
- however small - can be aggregated in relation to the whole programme provided 
efficiency is additive: that is costs (both actual and targeted) measured in monetary 
units can be summed over any number of subgroups in the programme; outputs, by 
contrast, usually may not because in the public sector they are mostly non-traded 
and therefore cannot be valued financially. In this context targets for outputs remain 
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in the original units of measurement which makes aggregation of output efficiency to 
the programme level intractable. Of course in a programme which is made up of 
branches with identical outputs, programme-level aggregation is unproblematic 
because output can be measured in the same units throughout the programme. 
Despite these qualifications, the dissent sometimes aroused during the public 
expenditure round suggests some rationalisation of PES proceedures for multi-branch 
programmes may be in order. Careful use of DEA throughout applicable 
programmes in the PES could facilitate Treasury allocations to sponsoring 
departments on the principle that future spending is based on current performance. 
Departmental bids for funds could be judged on a consistent total factor basis with 
DEA efficiency measurement. By contrast, under existing arrangements, programme 
performance is evaluated through a range of ad hoc criteria which can lead to 
divergent conclusions on future funding. 6 
An alternative measure of aggregate efficiency 
The foregoing discussion has focussed on the measurement of aggregate 
technical efficiency in multi-branch public expenditure programmes through the 
summation of performance in the underlying target variables. An interesting paper 
by Beasley (1988) prompts the suggestion of an alternative definition of efficiency 
for programme evaluation. 
Beasley examines two methods of calculating efficiency scores for all 
establishments using the same set of weights. This is in contrast to the standard 
approach a la Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) who advocate the solution of the 
linear program n times generating a separate set of optimal weights for each 
establishment. Beasley describes what he calls a Global and an Incremental approach 
to the simultaneous solution of the IDEA program for all units. The most interesting 
of these is the Global approach. It involves the solution of the standard DEA 
program choosing weights under a new criterion. That is, the optimal solution to 
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the program is that set of weights which maximises the sum of the efficiencies of 
the individual units. This is a very useful idea which can be generalised to other 
contexts. In particular, the sum of individual technical efficiency scores can be 
interpreted as an alternative (ordinal) measure of aggregate efficiency. Thus for n 
establishments, the Aggregate Technical Efficiency (ATE) becomes: 
n 
(5.2.3) ATE =E TEi i=l 
where TEi is the branch-level technical efficiency score. For n establishments, the 
maximum value of ATE is n. The minimum value of ATE is not so evident. But 
assume the simplest branch structure conceivable, n=2.7 If both branches are 
best-practice then full efficiency exists throughout the spending programme and ATE 
= 2. Where there is technical inefficiency in the sample, i. e. ETEi <2 (i = 1,2) 
one establishment must dominate the other. In the limit as the dominance of one 
establishment increases indefinitely over the other, ETEi->l. For n>2, the same 
result follows, for there must be at least one dominant (i. e. best-practice) 
establishment. As the performance of the non best-Practice units worsens 
indefinitely, their efficiency scores both individually and collectively fall towards zero. 
Hence ATE->l as performance in the programme deteriorates. However it is 
always possible to find at least one dominant unit, so ATE can never fall below 
unity. Then: 
(5.2.4) 1< ATE < 
In most applications of DEA, it is very unlikely that only one unit would be 
dominant. Rather, several are likely to be dominant in one or more input (or 
output) dimensions (see Nunamaker (1985)). Additionally, ATE is never likely to be 
exactly equal to unity except in the irrelevant and trivial case of n=1 (i. e., where 
there is no branch structure). If there are n establishments where unit 1 is 
dominant with best practice costs C1 and n-1 units are relatively inefficient then: 
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(5.2.5) ATE= +-C--I+ 
Cl 
. ...... + -C-1- C2 C3 Cn 
As inefficient costs C 2"***, Cn rise indefinitely, the implied efficiency ratios 
TE 2"* * *I TEn fall towards zero. Only where there exists an extraordinary and 
improbable range in performance (i. e. in spending) would this be observed in actual 
practice. 
On this new basis derived from Beasley (1988), the aggregate technical 
efficiency of the prison spending programme is summarised in table 5.2.2. Two 
variants of the ATE are presented. The first, ATE (CRS), is the sum of efficiency 
scores under a new constant returns to scale assumption (the underlying CRS 
efficiency scores will be reported in full in the next section). Secondly, ATE (VRS), 
has been calculated from the prison efficiencies reported in Chapter 4, based on 
varying returns to scale. Each of these results is an ordinal measure of the 
proximity of the programme as a whole to a situation of best-practice production at 
all prisons. 
Table 5.2.2 
Aggregate Technical Efficiency in the local prison spending programme: The sum of 
efficiency scores under constant and varying returns to scale 
ATE (CRS) 
Sum of efficiency scores 29.4 
Best-practice share in ATE 
- actual 11 
- per cent 37.4 
Non-best practice share in ATE 
- actual 18.4 
- per cent 62.6 
ATE (VRS) 
31.5 
20 
63.5 
11.5 
36.5 
Note: For a sample size of 33 establishments, 1 <ATE 03. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Under CRS, ATE is 29.4 and under VRS ATE is 31.5 out of a possible 
maximum score in each case of 33. As would be expected, the VRS-based measure 
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is higher because of the greater preponderence of unity efficiency scores (that is, of 
best-practice) under VRS. A noteworthy feature of the results is the asymmetric role 
played by the best-practice establishments. Under VRS 20 such units are identified, 
making a contribution of 63.5 per cent to the efficiency rating of the whole 
programme. Only 11 prisons were earmarked best-practice with CRS which 
contribute 37.4 per cent to programme efficiency. This contribution or share in 
aggregate efficiency is very close to that made by non-best practice units (TEi < 
1) under VRS. 
The alternative measure of ATE, inspired by Beasley, indicates a marked 
change in the significance of best-practice performance. A VRS assumption typically 
identifies a greater number of best-practice establishments which then make up the 
bulk of the contribution to aggregate efficiency. Under CRS the best-practice share 
in efficiency is substantially lower. 
The decision -maker's objective in this context will be to improve the 
performance of inefficient units towards unity in order to raise the aggregate 
efficiency of the programme towards its maximum (where ATE = n). In this regard 
a study by Parkan (1987) suggests that a drawback of the VRS results is their 
relative lack of discriminating power among units. Clearly no distinction can be 
made among best-practice on the basis of DEA alone. CRS results by contrast find 
fewer best-practice operations and therefore give a distinct (non-unity) performance 
rating to a greater proportion of the sample. Thus, although the CRS results give a 
rather poorer overall picture of performance they offer a finer ranking and 
identification of efficiency levels which may be of use in decision -making. It follows 
also, that inasfar as the peer group comparison is of any significance this will be 
clarified under CRS because quite simply there are fewer examples of 
"best-practice" to assimilate. 
The importance of the ATE measure prompted by Beasley is its simplicity 
and ease of interpretation for decision -makers. Little (1971, p. 483) argues: "the 
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biggest bottleneck in the managerial use of models is not their development but 
getting them used. I claim that the model builder should try to design his models to 
be given away. In other words, as much as possible, the models should become the 
property of the manager, not the technical people [; ] ...... to be used 
by a 
manager, a model should be simple, robust, easy to control, adaptive, as complete 
as possible and easy to communicate with". These broader dimensions of 
measurement are of great importance for the ultimate success of efficiency modelling 
and policy of any kind. The simple summation of efficiency scores as a measure of 
programme performance is offered with these broader dimensions in mind. The 
resulting measure is reasonably intuitive and in a policy-making context it could 
probably be implemented without being overwhelmed by traditional performance 
measures to which decision-makers are more accustomed. 
5.3. Evaluation of the impact of a new reference technology on branch and 
programme efficiency 
Chapter 4 and the discussion above in section 5.2 assumed that the underlying 
costs' technology in prisons exhibits varying returns to scale (VRS). Many of the 
earlier empirical applications of DEA, by contrast, assumed constant returns to scale 
(CRS) until Banker (1984) developed the first varying returns program. Each of 
these variants of the DEA program has its own distinctive implications for branch 
and programme-level costs. These have been ignored in the empirical literature on 
DEA. Accordingly section 5.3 explores the effects of a constant returns to scale 
assumption on costs and attempts to reconcile differences in the CRS and VRS 
results based on an interpretation of DEA-efficiency first proposed in Grosskopf and 
Valdmanis (1987). 
Background 
Fare, Lovell and Zieschang (1983) and Grosskopf (1986) were the first to 
show that there is no unique measure of efficiency in a frontier context. That is, 
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the efficiency measure is not invariant to the scale and disposability assumptions 
which have been made with regard to the nature of the production processs. 
Essentially this means there exists a number of different reference sets against which 
to measure the efficiency of a given input-output vector, and each reference set 
implies its own efficiency measure. 
Grosskopf (1986) for example, has shown that the efficiency measure is nested 
in the sense that a strongly disposable technology contains its weakly disposable 
counterpart. That is, a weakly disposable technology defines a higher technical 
efficiency than strong disposability (this has been illustrated fully in Chapter 2). 
An additional source of efficiency variation that will be discussed in this section 
are changes in the returns to scale assumption. Farrell's original (1957) contribution 
to the literature set a trend in much of the later work on frontier estimation in 
making the assumption that the underlying reference technology exhibits constant 
returns to scale (CRS). In particular new American work on frontier estimation via 
DEA initially made this assumption - see Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978,1979, 
1981), Bessent and Bessent (1980), Bessent, Bessent, Kennington and Reagan (1982), 
Lewin, Morey and Cook (1982), etc.. Only later contributions exposed the possibility 
of non-constant returns technologies. Of these Banker (1984) and Fare, Grosskopf 
and Lovell (1985) are the most important. However, subsequent empirical 
applications of DEA have tended to adopt either the CRS8 or non-CRS9 programs 
without investigation of which is appropriate and their effects on branch and 
programme-level efficiency. 
The DEA results presented in chapters 3 and 4 on local education authorities 
and prisons are predicated on an underlying assumption of varying returns to scale 
(VRS) and strong disposability in the production process. That is, the "intensity 
variables" (or weights) (Xj) are constrained to sum to unity in the Banker (1984) 
DEA program. Alternative assumptions, in particular constant returns to scale (CRS), 
are feasible and in the DEA program the optimal weights will be unconstrained for 
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a CRS technology. 
New results on prison efficiency based on a constant returns to scale technology 
Technical efficiency coefficients were estimated in chapter 4 assuming the 
reference technology exhibited varying returns to scale and strong disposability of 
inputs and outputs. These coefficients have been re-estimated for the whole sample 
based on an alternative technology assumption of constant returns to scale with 
strong disposability. 
The new results are contained in table 5.3.1. It is immediately noticeable in 
comparison with the coefficients in table 4.9.1 that there are significantly fewer 
best-practice establishments (11 as against 20 previously) and that the non-unit 
efficiency scores are on the whole lower. The mean inefficiency in the new results 
is 0.83 which is almost 5 percentage points lower than the mean varying returns 
score in Table 4.9.1. This suggests that under constant returns the representative 
establishments could be expected to save 17 per cent of its current expenditure 
vis-a-vis the minimal possibilities observed along the CRS frontier. By contrast, a 
representative VRS prison could be asked to save only 12 per cent of its current 
budget. 
In some cases CRS costs have advanced significantly beyond this. Brixton, for 
example, has TE = 0.53, losing its VRS best-practice status, and for Bedford TE = 
0.59 (against 0.71 under VRS). It is noteworthy that these potential gains at Bedford 
and Brixton in cost efficiency are greater than the largest savings suggested by VRS: 
the lowest efficiency score reported in Chapter 4 is at Bedford with TE = 0.71. 
Apparently the CRS results give a poorer picture of prison performance with a 
lower mean inefficiency and fewer best-practice establishments being identified. 
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Table 5.3.1 
DEA efficiency coefficients under constant returns to scale in local prisons and 
remand centres in 1984/85 
Prison Cost efficiency Peer group 
1. Ashford 0.9393 3,5113926,30 
2. Bedford 0.5858 16,21,31 
3. Brockhill 1.0000 3 
4. Birmingham 0.8358 5,16,31 
5. Bristol 1.0000 5 
6. Brixton 0.5303 16,30 
7. Canterbury 0.8493 16,29,30 
8. Cardiff 0.9766 5,13,16,21 
9. Coldingley 1.0000 9 
10. Dorchester 0.7215 5,16,21,31 
11. Durham 0.8817 3,5,16,31 
12. Exeter 0.8037 3,5,16,21,31 
13. Clen Parva 1.0000 13 
14. Cloucester 0.9750 5 
15. Latchmere Hse. 0.8317 5,13,16,21,30,31 
16. Leeds 1.0000 16 
17. Leicester 0.7333 5,16 
18. Lewes 0.8638 3,5,13,16,30 
19. Lincoln 0.8517 3,5,16,21,31 
20. Liverpool 0.9929 31 
21. Low Newton 1.0000 21 
22. Manchester 0.9667 3,5,13,16,31 
23. Norwich 0.8505 3,13,16,31 
24. Oxford 0.7285 16,31 
25. Pentonville 1.0000 25 
26. Pucklechurch 1.0000 26 
27. Reading 0.8284 5,16,29,30 
28. Shrewsbury 0.8777 3,5,16,21,30,31 
29. Swansea 1.0000 29 
30. Thorpe Arch 1.0000 30 
31. Wandsworth 1.0000 31 
32. Winchester 0.8950 3,5,13,16,30,31 
33. W. Scrubs 0.8335 3,5,13pl6,30,31 
Note Mean Inefficiency (1/nEEi, for Ei < 1): 0.8342 
Standard Deviation : 0.1180 
The mean and standard deviation are calculated from 
only those efficiency scores less than unity. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Cost implications of CRS for programme efficiency 
It would seem to follow that a poorer picture of performance at the 
micro-level will impair the behaviour of the prison spending programme as a whole. 
139 
Accordingly, using the aggregate efficiency identity (5.2.2) further results on 
programme efficiency have been collected together in table 5.3.2. Under the VRS 
assumption, the potential aggregate savings in costs were around 5 per cent and 
evenly distributed between manpower and non-manpower items (c. f. table 5.2.1). 
The picture is now quite different, for each item the potential gain from boundary 
production across all prisons is larger. Non-remand savings have doubled to around 
10 per cent whilst savings in remand items have more than tripled to around 18 
per cent. (This implies an overall reduction in total costs of around 13.1 per cent: 
savings which could in principle have been attained were costs best-Practice 
throughout the sample). Clearly the distribution of inefficiency across the various 
cost measures is no longer even, and has swung against the remand items. 
This particular picture is consistent with the more cost intensive nature of 
untried and unsentenced remand prisoners who are entitled to greater care and 
priviledges vis-a-vis ordinary inmates. It also suggests that there may be substantial 
slack adjustments on the remand variables at the micro-level. 
Table 5.3.2 
The programme implications of prison cost inefficiency in 1984/85 under constant 
returns to scale 
Costs Actual 
LM 
Target 
LM 
ATE 
% 
Saving 
% 
Manpower 
(1)remand 69.41 56.75 81.8 18.2 
(2)non-remand 114.38 102.72 89.8 10.2 
Non-manpower 
(1)remand 19.85 16.29 82.1 17.9 
(2)non-remand 34.51 31.29 90.7 9.3 
Total costs 238.15 207.05 86.9 13.1 
Notes see table 5.2.1 
Source Author's calculations and Prison Department 
Report 1984/85. 
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Interpretation of the CRS results: Long-run and short-run measures of efficiency 
Given that the differences between the CRS and VRS results are apparently 
marked, it is important to examine how this might affect the usefulness and 
interpretation of DEA in the allocation of funds within and across public 
programmes. In particular, some reconciliation of the large differences in efficiency 
status between the two sets of results is required. One of the most useful arguments 
in this regard is the interpretation of DEA efficiency found in Grosskopf and 
Valdmanis (1987). Essentially they argue that the CRS technology should be 
interpreted as reflecting long-run preformance possibilities. Analogously, the VRS 
assumptions indicates feasible attainments in the short-run. On this basis the 
long-run CRS adjustments to costs will be greater than those suggested by the VRS 
technology. The CRS targets are effectively adjustments towards long-run equilibria, 
i. e., the minimum point of a U-shaped average cost curve. In the short-run even 
best-practice costs will be greater than those attainable in the long-run and so VRS 
cost adjustments will be smaller than their CRS counterparts. 
The problem of the decision-maker is not then in deciphering two seemingly 
contradictory sets of results on efficiency status, but in the initial choice of 
technology assumption. Once this is motivated, the nature of the "bias" imparted to 
the efficiency measure is explicable a priori. In particular the CRS results can be 
taken as indiactors of the proximity of the prisons to a long-run notion of 
best-practice. It follows that the finding of fewer examples of best-practice (11 out 
of 33 prisons) is to be expected from the CRS results because long-run cost 
attainments are likely to be lower than those set by best-practice in the short-run. 
Analogously, a larger share of the cross section (20 out of 33 prisons) are efficient 
under VRS. This suggests prison establishments, and hence the spending programme 
as a whole, are closer to the less demanding attainments along a short-run VRS 
best-practice boundary. 
This interpretation is of course a neoclassical argument based on the supposed 
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effects of market competition on costs in the short and long run. It is not without 
relevance in a public sector context: Grosskopf and Valdmanis (1987) argued for this 
interpretation when comparing performance in public and private hospital care in 
California. Inefficiency is less likely to be tolerated and, acceptable performance 
performance standards will, if anything, be raised by public sector policy-makers in 
the long-run. The stream of efficiency related White Papers in Britain since the 
Conservatives were returned to power in 1979 suggests the level of 
performance-consciousness has been raised both within and outside government. 
fortiori the latest developments in efficiency policy in CM 52410 include the 
widespread creation of quasi -autonomous governmental agencies with considerable 
financial independence. " The devolution of financial resposibility is to be 
counterbalanced by greater emphasis on efficient performance through increased 
evaluation of line-behaviour. The scope for a neoclassical interpretation of public 
sector cost behaviour as in Grosskopf and Valdmanis (1987) is correspondingly 
increased because greater managerial accountability and scrutiny can be interpreted 
as a proxy for a market discipline on line costs. 
Market ideas and public sector efficiency -a short digression 
It is worth recognising at this point that the use of market-based concepts of 
analysis in the Public sector performance literature is becoming increasingly common. 
The appropriation of private sector ideas comes out of the quest for a single-value 
calculus in public sector performance. Without traded outputs there is no 
revenue-based measure like profit or surplus. Yet Sengupta (1987a), for example, 
has cleverly restyled the DEA ratio. If the optimal values of the input and output 
weights in the DEA program, W*k and V*i respectively, are positive for each k and 
i then these can be interpreted as prices of inputs and outputs defining a 
pseudo-profit function for public sector production. For a cross section of n 
organisations write: 
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tm 
rTj -. F-V*ly,, j - F-W*kXkj 
1-1 k-1 
The function is the absolute rather than the ratio difference between the t 
weighted output and the m weighted inputs in organisation j. Again with a 
neoclassical flavour to the analysis Sengupta proposes a pricing rule based on the 
surplus function: 
brTj t byi 
Ii (5.3.2) -E v*i I W*k ý0 
6Xk, j iýl 6Xk, j 
for k=1,..., m and 
In principle, the decision problem now involves maximisation of (5.3.1) by 
setting the derivatives in (5.3.2) equal to zero and ensuring the second derivatives of 
the maximand are negative. This constitutes maximisation of the surplus accruing to 
public sector production and Sengupta, (1 987a) argues that the size of the 
(non-monetary) surplus generated in (5.3.1) may be used as an indicator of the 
efficacy of public production in organisations whose performance could be ordered 
according to the scale of these pseudo-profits. 
5.4. Excess costs and the nesting of empirical DEA technologies 
Section 5.3 introduced results on prison efficiency based on a constant returns 
to scale assumption in the underlying linear program. It was observed that this led 
to differences in both branch and programme-level efficiencies. This section seeks to 
clarify the causes of these differences by investigating how empirical DEA 
technologies differ under alternative scale assumptions. It develops the work of 
Grosskopf (1986) and Fare, Grosskopf and Njinkeu (1988) who have demonstrated 
that the various definitions of the production boundary (the reference technology) 
can be 'nested'. This implies that the efficiency score associated with each 
technology can also be nested. A consequence of technological nesting is that the 
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excess cost implications of alternative technologies can be predicted in qualitative 
terms prior to empirical implementation of DEA. 
This information is important for decision-makers in a policy making 
context since it clarifies the effect on proposed cost adjustments of alternative scale 
assumptions in the underlying linear program. 
Technological nesting and excess costs: An exposition 
It is easiest to grasp Grosskopf's (1986) argument from figure 5.4.1 which 
contains stylised examples of the three possible empirical variants of boundary which 
can be constructed from DEA. Consider then a branch of a spending programme, 
producing one output from one input on the interior of the production setl 2. 
Output is given at oy from consumption of input OX 2. The efficiency of operations 
at this point can be evaluated relative to any of the three possible reference 
technologies. In terms of figure 5.4.1 these are: 
(1) OD with constant returns to scale (CRS); 
(2) OBC with non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS); and 
(3) XABC with increasing, constant and decreasing (i. e., "varying") returns to scale 
(VRS). 
Each of these technologies can be constructed empirically from DEA which 
implies that there are three definitions of relative technical efficiency (TE) for 
performance at i. That is: 
(1) TEcrs = OXO /OX 2; 
(2) TEvrs = OX1 /OX 2; 
(3) TEnirs --- TEcrs for Y<Y* but 
TEnirs -.,: TEvrs for Y>Y* 
It follows immediately that the technical efficiency of branch i can be ordered 
in terms of three alternative technologies. Viz.: 
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For Y< Y*p TEcrs ý TEnirs < TEvrs ; and 
(5.4.2) For Y> Y*, TEvrs ý TEnirs > TEcrs 
Clearly technical efficiency is greatest when evaluated relative to the closest 
technology. At i in fig 5.4.1 this is the varying returns boundary XABC where both 
the MRS and CRS efficiency scores are equal but lower than TEvrs. This arises 
because the VRS boundary is literally contained or "nested" within ths CRS and 
MRS alternatives. At output levels above Y* the relationship between the efficiency 
scores changes inasmuchas MRS is conincident with VRS (rather than with CRS) 
along the nested facet BC. Clearly, MRS and VRS efficiency must be equal to each 
other but greater than CRS efficiency for output levels greater than Y*. A general 
relationship governing the efficiency score and the scale characteristics of the 
estimated boundary is apparent here. Viz., a (non) nested technology implies the 
(lowest) highest relative technical efficiency score. The qualitative ranking of 
technical efficiency which this implies is surnmarised in equations (5.4.1) and (5.4.2) 
and is of important practical relevance, because the excess cost implications of 
alternative technologies can be ranked in an analogous way. 
This can be established by defining excess costs in the sense suggested by 
Dawson (1987). That is, as the difference between actual costs and interpolated 
best-practice costs. Total (variable) costs are simply the unit price of an input (p) 
multiplied by the number of units purchased (X). Assuming that the price does not 
vary with quantity purchased, then, from figure 5.4.1, excess costs for branch i 
under the CRS and VRS technologies have the relationship: 
(PX2-PXo)crs ýý' (PX2-PX1)VTS 
That is, excess costs are smaller under the nested VRS boundary. At all points 
along the VRS boundary (other than where it coincides with CRS at B), VRS best 
practice costs (BPvrs) are higher than those predicted along its CRS counterpart. In 
general, the relationship BPvrs > BPcrs will be true in all DEA applications 
because a CRS boundary will always dominate (i. e., contain) its VRS counterpart, as 
in figure 5.4.1. 
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Figure 5.4.1 
Nesting of empirical DEA reference technologies 
Output 
.X 
I 
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The programme-efficiency ordering 
> 
The ordering of efficiency of branch operations is equally applicable to the 
measurement of programme-level efficiency. Section 5.2 showed that programme 
efficiency can be defined in terms of branch level technical efficiency scores. Hence 
the Aggregate Technical Efficiency (ATE) of a multi-branch public expenditure 
programme was given by: 
ATE = F-Ci/ECi 
where Ci is the target (i. e. best-practice) cost at branch i, and Ci is the actual 
costs incurred at that branch. Because of the nesting of branch-level technologies, 
best-practice costs have the relationship Cý, > Cý, - Accordingly the 1 ws 1 crs 
programme efficiency score (ATE) can be ordered under alternative technology 
assumptions. For example: 
(5.4.3) ATEvrs > ATEcrs 
The implied excess cost adjustments for the programme have the same 
relationship. Programme-level excess costs (EC) are defined as the difference 
between the outturn for the programme, '1_-Ci, and the best-practice expenditures 
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x Yo ý<j I nput 
X2_ 
implied by the ATE score (compare tables 5.2.1 and 5.3-2): 
EC = Y-Ci - ATE(F-Ci) =- Y-Ci - ECi 
Noting the scale properties of ATE in (5.4.3) implies that excess costs in the 
programme are greater when measured relative to a non-nested CRS technology: 
(5.4.4) ECi - ATEcrs(F-Ci) ý' F-Ci - ATEvrs(F-Ci) 
The relationship between CRS and VRS excess costs in (5.4-4) is consistent 
with the results on programme-level efficiency which were reported in sections 5.2 
and 5.3. Under constant returns to scale, excess costs in prison spending amounted 
to L31.1m. The comparable VRS figure is, at L11.1m, barely over one-third of 
the recommended CRS adjustment in programme costs. The size of the difference 
between excess costs under the two definitions is enough to reinforce the Grosskopf 
and Valdmanis (1987) argument that CRS adjustments to performance are of a 
longer-run nature. 
Moreover, the ability to nest both branch and programme-level efficiency 
estimates from alternative technologies is significant because it demonstrates to the 
decision-maker the "bias" of direction change imparted to the results by the choice 
of one reference technology over another. Indeed nested efficiency concepts 
constitute a form of efficiency spectrum: at the one end the least savings that can 
be expected are established under VRS; at the other end, CRS results indicate to 
the decision-maker the uPper limit on financial and efficiency gains. In this way the 
differences in the VRS and CRS prison efficiency results presented in Chapters 4 
and 5 can be reconciled given that each set of results is based on a distinct 
technology assumption with its own separate implications for cost. 
5.5. Additional sources of variation in excess costs: The identification of scale 
inefficiencies 
The analysis of efficiency and costs in Chapters 3 and 4 and through Chapter 
5 has assumed that the total variation in costs over best-practice levels is 
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attributable to technical inefficiency alone. This is common in applied work in the 
literature, as for example in Sherman and Gold (1985). Recent work has shown, 
however, that the sources of excess costs can be more accurately identified. In 
particular, Rangan, Grabowski, Aly and Pasurka (1988) have developed a 
methodology which distinguishes between excess costs due to technical inefficiency 
and those due to scale inefficiency. Surprisingly, very little attention has been 
devoted to this distinction in the literature. 13 Section 5.5 seeks to apply the 
methodology developed by Rangan et al (1988) to the determination of excess costs 
in the prisons. This enables a further analysis of costs at both the branch and 
programme levels and further clarifies the relative significance and interpretation of 
the VRS and CRS assumptions. 
Scale efficiency measurement 
The Rangan et al (1988) scale efficiency indicator is derived very simply from 
the VRS and CRS efficiency scores. In figure 5.5.1 efficiency for the branch i is 
OX/OX, and its VRS efficiency is OXO/OX1. As was shown in section 5.4 the VRS 
boundary is nested within its CRS counterpart and so - other than where the two 
frontiers coincide- CRS efficiency is always the lower. The "discrepancy" between 
the two measures is defined according to the extent of the gap between the two 
frontiers. This can be expressed as the ratio: 
OX/OXJ = OX 
oxo/oxl OXO 
This is simply the ratio of the CRS and VRS efficiency scores and is proposed by 
Rangan et al as an indicator (S) of scale efficiency; whence for a branch i: 
(5.5.1) Si = CRSi/VRSi . 
In figure 5.5.1 Si is less than one, indicating that production at this point is not 
scale efficient. Moreover, were production displaced onto the VRS boundary at C, Si 
would remain less than unity. At this point Rangan et al have made the distinction 
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between "Pure Technical Efficiency" (PTE) and Scale Efficiency. PTE is actually no 
more than the VRS efficiency score and hence is defined in terms of the nearer 
VRS boundary. For a point such as D, OXO/OX1 < 1. However PTEi = 1, as at C 
in figure 5.5.1, is not sufficient to generate scale efficient production. Because at 
this point the VRS boundary is nested, and the VRS (= PTE) efficiency will always 
be greater than the CRS efficiency and hence the scale ratio in (5.5.1) must be less 
than unity. 
Figure 5.5.1 
The decomposition of CRS efficiency into technical and 
scale components 
Output 
E 
A 
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The "weakness" of production at C (where PTEi = 1) can be examined in 
terms of its average productivity or scale properties (see Banker (1984)). Specifically, 
this point is scale inefficient because average productivity, the ratio of output to 
input 
, 
has not been maximised. That is, for output OA, OA/OXo is less than its 
theoretical maximum OE/OXO which is defined along the CRS frontier. Thus in order 
to attain maximum average productivity for output OA an additional contraction in 
input, OXO-OX, would be necessary to bring production to point B on the CRS 
boundary. This contraction in inputs (further to that, OXI-OXO, to eliminate Pure 
Technical Efficiency) eliminates that wastage attributable to scale inefficiency. 
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The distinction of technical and scale efficiency suggests further insight into 
the policy-maker Is choice between CRS and VRS targets. In the first place it 
explains that CRS targets suggest larger reductions in resource consumption because 
they include an additional scale element in efficiency. By the same token VRS 
targets suggest smaller reductions because VRS best-practice production is defined 
without the elimination of scale inefficiencies. 
The decomposition of excess costs into technical and scale components 
The identification of a distinct measure of scale is useful in the analysis of 
efficiency because it permits the division of excess costs into their separate technical 
and scale components. This is a significant step forward in the analysis of costs. 
Hitherto many papers in the literature have used a CRS assumption and attributed 
variations in performance entirely to differences in technical efficiency (see Sherman 
and Gold (1985), Thomas, Greffe and Grant (1988) for example). It is clear now 
that this is misleading inasmuchas some of the variation in performance may be the 
result of scale inefficiencies. 
In order to decompose total excess costs into their various components it is 
convenient to recall briefly the definition of excess costs (EC). These are the 
difference between actual spending and best practice expenditure. For branch i in 
figure 5.5.1 this definition gives total excess costs as: 
ECi = p. Xj - p. X 
where p is the unit price of X. This is the total excess costs of production for 
branch i at point D. These can be decomposed into those attributable to scale 
inefficiency and to pure technical inefficiency. Excess costs due to pure technical 
efficiency alone are: 
ECi = p. Xj - p. Xo 
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and these can be eliminated with a reduction in spending given by the VRS (or 
PTE) efficiency score. Thus production on the VRS boundary at 
OX0 = OXJ. (OXO/OXJ) 
would remove this element in excess costs. However a further element (p. Yo - p-X) 
in excess costs remains. This is due to scale inefficient production and implies a 
further reduction in excess costs which is defined by the Rangan et al(l 988) scale 
efficiency score. Thus the complete elimination of excess costs would require a 
further proportional reduction in total excess costs of (1 - OX/OXO); or in absolute 
monetary terms of (p. Xo - PA). 
In summary then total excess costs at a branch i (ECi) can be broken down 
into two elements : 
ECi = ECi, vrs + ECi, scale ; 
That is, those attributable to pure technical efficiency, ECi, vrs, and those due to 
scale inefficiencies, ECi, scale- In terms of figure 5.5.1 this gives : 
(P. Xj - P. X) = (P. Xj - PAO) + (P. XO - P. X). 
Table 5.5.1 provides an exhaustive decomposition of excess costs on this basis 
for the whole prison spending programme. The excess costs due to technical and 
scale inefficiencies have been summed over all institutions to yield a summary 
picture of performance. As a share of total excess costs those attributable to scale 
inefficiency are almost two-thirds of the total. However in both of the remand 
items scale inefficiency is noticeably greater; in manpower costs attributable to the 
incarceration of remand prisoners the share of scale inefficiency is three-quarters of 
the total excess costs in this item. By contrast the excess costs in the non-remand 
items are more evenly split between scale and technical inefficiencies. 
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Table 5.5.1 
Excess costs (LM) in the prison spending programme: An exhaustive breakdown 
Total PTE Scale Scale 
(CRS) (VRS) (Rangan) M 
Manpower 
(1)Remand 12.66 3.11 9.55 75 
(2)Non-remand 11.66 5.32 6.34 54 
Non-manpower 
(1)Remand 3.56 1.07 2.49 70 
(2)Non-remand 3.22 1.55 1.67 52 
Total excess costs 31.10 11.05 20.05 64 
Notes: Column 1 is total excess costs defined from the CRS 
boundary and is derived from table 5.3.2. 
Column 2 is excess costs due to pure technical 
efficiency defined from the VRS boundary and is 
derived from table 5.2.1. 
Column 3 is the scale component in excess costs and 
is simply the remainder after PTE excess costs have 
been accounted for. Hence column 3= col. 1 less 
col. 2. 
Column 4 gives the scale component in excess costs 
as a share in total excess costs. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
It is clear from the results in table 5.5.1 that scale inefficiency is a significant 
cause of wastage in the prison spending programme. In this context it could be 
nothing other than an outright misdiagnosis to attribute total excess costs in the 
context of a constant returns to scale assumption to "technical efficiency" alone - 
as has been so common in the applied DEA literature. 
Banker (1984) scale analysis of the prison spending programme 
One of the most important papers in the DEA literature, Banker (1984), is 
useful at this point. Banker showed that the sum of the input-output weights in the 
optimal basis of the CRS version of the DEA program can be used as an indicator 
of the local returns to scale at the current level of operations. This result, together 
with the Rangan et al (1988) scale efficiency indicator form the basis of table 
5.5.2.14 
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The Rangan et al indicator shows by what proportion total costs could be 
reduced af ter the attainment of Pure Technical Efficiency on the VRS boundary and 
indicates that 21 out of 33 prisons are scale inefficient. The mean reduction in total 
costs from a point of Pure Technical Efficiency at scale inefficient prisons would be 
(1 - 0.89) or 11 per cent. However in some cases, most notably Brixton, 
Dorchester and Oxford, the relevant figure is much higher. Brixton deserves special 
comment since the scale indicator suggests that elimination of pure technical 
inefficiency would still allow a further cut of almost a half in the resources that 
remained. 
The Rangan et al scale indicator is useful in suggesting the percentage 
reduction to which total costs would have to be cut from a position of pure 
technical efficiency to achieve scale efficient production. It is also useful for 
policy-making purposes to know whether the local returns to scale at the prevailing 
level of operations are increasing or decreasing. This information is furnished by 
Banker's (1984) scale indicator. Quite simply, if the sum of the input-output weights 
in the CRS program is greater (less) than unity, then the returns to scale at this 
point are diminishing (increasing). 
It is interesting to compare the Banker indicator for Brixton with that of 
Dorchester and Oxford. Brixton's very low scale efficiency is reflected in the Banker 
measure which indicates a very marked diminishing returns to scale. By way of 
contrast both Dorchester and Oxford with low scale efficiencies are experiencing 
marked increasing returns to scale. Overall the Banker indicator suggests 17 prisons 
are experiencing IRS and a further 11 appear to have CRS. The mean scale, 
calculated as an average of all 33 prisons, suggests the typical institution in this 
sample does indeed have a slight tendency to increasing returns. 
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Table 5.5.2 
Scale efficiency and the Banker (1984) identification of local variations in retuns to 
scale in the local prison spending programme 
Prison Scale efficiency Returns to scale 
Rangan et al Banker(1984) 
1. Ashford 0.9393 1.7235 (DRS) 
2. Bedford 0.8257 0.3440 (IRS) 
3. Brockhill 1.0000 1.0000 (CRS) 
4. Birmingham 0.9881 0.8046 (IRS) 
5. Bristol 1.0000 1.0000 (CRS) 
6. Brixton 0.5303 3.0135 (DRS) 
7. Canterbury 0.9897 0.9327 (IRS) 
8. Cardiff 0.9984 0.6655 (IRS) 
9. Coldingley 1.0000 1.0000 (CRS) 
1O. Dorchester 0.7215 0.2257 (IRS) 
ll. Durham 1.0000 0.9952 (IRS) 
12. Exeter 0.9691 0.6613 (IRS) 
13. Clen Parva 1.0000 1.0000 (CRS) 
14. Gloucester 0.9750 0.4322 (IRS) 
15. Latchmere Hse. 0.8317 0.4413 (IRS) 
16. Leeds 1.0000 1.0000 (CRS) 
17. Leicester 0.9394 0.4074 (IRS) 
18. Lewes 0.8762 1.3476 (DRS) 
19. Lincoln 0.9599 0.5621 (IRS) 
20. Liverpool 0.9929 0.8959 (IRS) 
21. Low Newton 1.0000 1.0000 (CRS) 
22. Manchester 0.9667 1.9954 (DRS) 
23. Norwich 0.9560 0.8505 (IRS) 
24. Oxford 0.7349 0.1808 (IRS) 
25. Pentonville 1.0000 1.0000 (CRS) 
26. Pucklechurch 1.0000 1.0000 (CRS) 
27. Reading 0.8707 0.4921 (IRS) 
28. Shrewsbury 0.8777 0.3633 (IRS) 
29. Swansea 1.0000 1.0000 (CRS) 
30. Thorpe Arch 1.0000 1.0000 (CRS) 
31. Wandsworth 1.0000 1.0000 (CRS) 
32. Winchester 0.9999 0.9983 (IRS) 
33. W. Scrubs 0.8335 2.5951 (DRS) 
Mean 0.8941 0.9675 (IRS) 
S. Dev'n (0.1184) (0.6135) 
Summary: The Banker indicator suggests that 
17 prisons have IRS 
11 prisons have CRS 
5 prisons have DRS 
Notes: 1. The scale indicator a la Rangan et al(1988) is the 
ratio of the CRS and VRS efficiency scores and hence 
is derived from Tables 4.9.1 and 5.3.1. 
2. Banker's(1984) scale indicator is the sum of the 
weights on inputs and outputs in the unconstrained 
CRS program. 
3. The mean of the Rangan et al scale indicator is 
calculated for only those (21) prisons for which 
Si<1. 
4. The mean of the Banker measure is calculated on the 
sum of the weights at al 33 prisons. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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This is useful information from the policy-maker's point of view. One third of 
the sample appears to have CRS which suggests that their current level of 
operations can be maintained. Equally, however, the fact that around a half of the 
sample has IRS suggests that the scale of operations at these prisons could be 
increased. In actual practice, adjustments of this kind would probably entail some 
reallocation of resposibilties within the prison programme. Thus operations might be 
curtailed at overcrowded institutions such as Brixton and Wormwood Scrubs, but 
expanded elsewhere - at Dorchester, Oxford and Reading for example where there 
are marked increasing returns to scale. 
VRS and CRS efficiency at Durham 
The searching reader may have noted an apparent discrepancy in the Rangan 
et al scale results when these are set in the context of the CRS efficiency scores 
reported in section 5.3. 
Specifically, the Rangan scale indicator is equal to unity in 12 cases. This 
implies scale efficient production at 12 prisons. However table 5.3.1 indicates that 
only eleven prisons have CRS efficiency scores equal to unity. Hence only 11 
prisons, rather than 12, can be operating at scale efficient levels. 
The apparent discrepancy between the two sets of results can be explained as 
follows and concerns the efficiency status of Durham. The CRS efficiency of 
Durham is 0.882 (see table 5.3.1); its VRS efficiency score is also 0.882 (see table 
4.9.1 in Chapter 4). Thus the scale efficient ratio at Durham is unity. However 
from first principles, scale efficiency can only be associated with CRS =1; thus 
Rangan scale efficiency apparently contradicts CRS = 0.882. 
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Figure 5.5.2 
CRS and VRS efficiency at Durham 
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First of all, note from table 5.5.2 that the Banker scale indicator (the sum of 
the input-output weights) at Durham is 0.995. Strictly speaking, this implies IRS, 
but also that Durham is a mere 0.005% (i. e. 5 thousandths of one per cent) from 
a point of constant returns where the sum of the weights would be exactly unity. 
This implies that Durham's scale of operations is very close to the intersection of 
the CRS and VRS boundaries. Imagine that Durham is producing at point D in 
figure 5.5.2. Its VRS efficiency score, AC/AD, is very close in value to its CRS 
efficiency score, AB/AD, because the gap between the two boundaries at this point 
is very small; that is, technically efficient production along the VRS boundary is 
almost scale efficient. This sugests that although the DEA program has reported 
CRS=DRS=0.882 for Durham the two scores are in fact distinct. This would 
probably be revealed were the scores reported to more than 4 decimal places; if 
this were possible I would expect that the CRS efficiency score would turn out to 
be slightly lower than the VRS score. The Rangan scale efficiency for Durham 
would then be less than unity, leaving 11 prisons with scale efficiencies of unity 
consistent with the CRS picture reported in table 5.3.1. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
Chapter 5 has sought to examine the efficiency of whole spending programmes 
on a consistent total factor basis. Section 5.2 has shown that aggregate efficiency 
identities may be derived as summary indicators of programme performance. These 
indicators are significant in being consistent with the "micro -efficiency" scores 
implied by operations at the level of individual establishments. Several authors, for 
example Charnes and Cooper (1980a, b), have argued for the modernisation of 
public sector evaluation in the face of more complex production environments and 
constrained processing and decision-making abilities. The formulation of summary 
aggregate -effic ie ncy concepts can help to reduce decision-making complexity. 
Moreover they may fulfil a role in a policy setting like the Public Expenditure 
Survey where less effective programmes may be curtailled in favour of greater 
efficiency elsewhere. This broadens the scope for measures such as DEA. 
Using the cost identities formulated in section 5.2 it was estimated that about 5 
per cent of total costs in local prisons could be deducted while maintaining levels of 
service (assuming varying returns to scale). Section 5.3 looked at costs on an 
alternative CRS assumption. Potential non-remand savings doubled to around 10 per 
cent and in remand items more than tripled to approximately 18 per cent. Savings 
in all items rose to a potential figure of 13.1 per cent of total costs under CRS. In 
absolute terms this implied excess costs of Z31.1m under CRS against only L11.1m 
under VRS. It was noted that the distribution of these savings across the various 
cost measures is no longer fairly even as under VRS: In particular, savings in 
remand items appeared greater than before. This is consistent with the more cost 
intensive nature of untried or unsentenced remand inmates who, in principle, are 
entitled to better supervision and extra priviledges vis a vis other prisoners. 
The existence of alternative scale assumptions suggested a potential ambiguity as 
to whether VRS or CRS results are a more accurate reflection of levels of 
inefficiency. In the DEA literature to date there is little advice on the 
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implementation of scale assumptions. Section 5.4 defined the nature of the "bias" 
imparted to DEA results by the choice of one scale assumption over another. It was 
demonstrated that best-practice notions of cost can be nested according to the scale 
assumption and that best-practice CRS costs must be less than their VRS 
counterparts because the VRS production set is nested within the CRS set. This 
implied that the scale of savings (excess costs) under VRS must be less than under 
an alternative like CRS. This was borne out in the performance comparison in 
section 5.3 where potential savings in the programme as a whole under VRS 
reached a little over a third of those predicted from the CRS boundary. 
The implications of the CRS and VRS boundaries were explored further in 
section 5.5. In particular the attainment of best-practice on a VRS boundary 
denotes only pure technical efficiency. Best-practice targets on a CRS boundary 
include in addition a contraction in resources to account for scale inefficiencies. 
The distinction between purely technical and scale inefficiencies enabled the 
breakdown of total excess costs in prison spending. This revealed that nearly 
two-thirds (64%) of total excess costs are accounted for by scale inefficiencies. The 
Banker indicator was used to reveal that of those prisons which are scale inefficient, 
the bulk of these have increasing as against decreasing returns to scale. That is, 17 
prisons were identified operating in regions of increasing returns to scale, 5 with 
decreasing returns and the remaining 11 had constant returns. The prevalence of 
non-constant returns suggests that a general policy of adjusting the scale of 
operations might yield substantial cost benefits to the prison service as a whole. 
Before closing this Chapter it is worth reflecting on the future potential of 
DEA in the public sector. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 noted the developments in the 
Government's recent efficiency white paper (CM 524) which will allow greater 
financial autonomy to spending "agencies". In principle any branch of a spending 
programme such as a prison, a school or a hospital can be thought of as an 
agency. Regular application of DEA could be used to monitor the success of 
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agencies in the control of their own budgets. The results of regular performance 
analyses of this nature could in turn be used as a "test" of the famous 
Averch-Johnson (1962) result that efficiency rises as the degree of government 
regulation of production falls (Hollas and Stansell (1988)). Although Averch and 
Johnson were concerned particularly with the regulation of public utilities it would 
nevertheless be of interest to discover whether less central involvement in the 
spending of funds by agencies does indeed lead to increased efficiency in the longer 
term. 
Footnotes 
1. Readers should note the following distinction which is used throughout this 
thesis. The word "program" refers to the underlying linear program written in 
FORTRAN code which has been used to generate the DEA efficiency scores. 
"Programme", on the other hand, denotes a government budget on, for example, 
prisons or health care. 
2. Note however, that recent research by Golany (1988), Beasley (1989) and 
Beasley and Wong (1989) has shown that the constraints in the DEA program may 
be re-formulated in order to permit a priori restrictions on input and output 
weights: where inputs or outputs have a meritocratic significance their unconstrained 
weighting as in the conventional DEA program may be inappropriate. Moreover, it 
may be useful in some contexts to simulate the effects on performance ratings of 
different value systems, ie., of different weights. 
3. Civil Service Management Reform: The next stel)s, CM 524. London: HMSO, 
November, 1988. 
4. Many public sector organisations have a "sponsoring department". Prisons are 
looked after by the Prison Department at the Home Office; hospitals by the 
Department of Health; job centres by the Department of Employment; local 
authorities by the Department of the Environment and so on. 
5. A synopsis of existing procedures in the Public Expenditure Survey can be 
found in HM Treasury Economic Progress Report, no. 200, February, 1989. 
6. See recent Public Expenditure White Papers on the diverse range of indicators 
which have been chosen to measure programme performance. 
7. Note that n=1 imples a unitary spending programme without a line structure. 
8. Recent applications of the CRS program can be found in Sherman (1984a, b), 
Todd (1985), Bowlin (1986,1987) and Thomas, Greffe and Grant (1988). 
9. Non-CRS programs have been implemented by Fare, Grosskopf and Logan 
(1987) and Grosskopf and Valdmanis (1987). 
10. Civil Service Manapement: The Next StUs. London: HMSO, 1988. 
11. By the end of 1988 three agencies had been created: HM Stationary Office, 
Companies House and the Vehicles Inspectorate. Department of Employment Job 
Centres are planned to convert to agency status in 1989 or 1990. 
12. The simple one input/one output case represented in figure 5.4.1. can be 
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thought of as a two-dimensional section through an n-dimensional production 
possibility set (Banker (1984)). 
13. See Sengupta and Sfeir (1986) for a provisional attempt to incorporate the 
analysis of scale efficiency for a sample of Californian high schools. 
14. Bowlin (1988) has recently used the Banker indicator of scale variations for the 
evaluation of the efficiency of fighter wings in the U. S. Air Force. 
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Chapter 6. The interpretation of efficiency in Data Envelopment Analysis. 
Introduction 
"The standard economic doctrine is that, provided certain conditions are satisfied, 
efficiency (in the sense of Pareto efficiency) will be attained under a system in 
which individual economic agents egoistically maximise their own utility. This is the 
central insight of microeconomic theory. A large part of the literature of economics 
is concerned with the question exactly how stringent the conditions are in order for 
it to hold" - Matthews (1981). 
The objective of Chapter 6 is to examine the meaning of efficiency in Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Typically the DEA literature identifies best-practice 
production with Pareto Efficiency. Chapter 6 discusses objections to this 
interpretation of best-practice. These are derived from two main sources: one is 
empirical and includes studies which suggest that best-practice operations are 
themselves capable of improving performance (McGuire (1987), Danilin et al (1985), 
Ganley and Cubbin (1987)). The other is based on a priori and analytical problems 
which have been raised by Leibenstein (1966,1975,1978), Margolis (1971), Peston 
(1980), Tinbergen (1985), Thrall (1985), Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985) and 
Talley (1988) concerning the nature of efficiency and public sector measurement 
difficulties. 
Chapter 6 sets these problems in the context of the formal conditions for 
technical, allocative and Pareto efficiency. It is demonstrated that in general the 
best-practice reference technology defined in the DEA estimates cannot be reliably 
identified with Pareto efficiency. In response, a new Utility-Dominance concept is 
proposed as a more appropriate justification of normative DEA prescriptions to 
replace the standard usage of the Pareto Criterion in the literature. This result has 
not been suggested previously in the literature and represents a major 
re -interpretation of the validity and justification of DEA targets and efficiency scores. 
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Later, Chapter 7 provides empirical evidence to support a more cautious 
interpretation of DEA efficiency in the replication of the education results in 
Chapter 3 on a "clustered" basis. The number of best-practice LEAs, targets and 
peer groups is seen to vary unpredictably which strengthens the impression of 
ambiguity in DEA Efficiency and provides an additional rationale for abandoning the 
Pareto interpretation of the estimates. 
Chapter 6 develops the conditions for the Pareto Criterion to hold in the 
context of a stylised 2-good economy. It is apparent that these conditions, 
particularly the broader requirements of allocative efficiency, are exacting to the 
extent that it is extremely misleading to label real world decision-making as Pareto 
efficient. Best-practice decision-makers in the education authority, for example, are 
clearly not implementing neoclassical decisions. To suggest otherwise may insulate 
relatively poor best-practice performers from remedial intervention and other 
scrutiny. This would be a serious restraint on the new ethos of evaluation and 
accountability for public sector decision-making enshrined in the Financial 
Management Initiative. 
In his inaugural lecture at Cambridge, Frank Hahn (1973) adopted a 
comparable approach to a different problem. He argued that the sophisticated and 
abstruse techniques (such as the famous fixed point theorems of Brouwerl) required 
to demonstrate the existence of a competitive equilibrium were the focus of research 
precisely to demonstrate just how intractable (and therefore unlikely) are the 
assumptions underpinning the existence of a competive equilibrium. 
In outline, Chapter 6 proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 is taken up with a 
discussion of the definition of best-practice and why this is no guarantee in itself of 
productive excellence. The possibility of poor performance being identified with 
best-practice is justified with a discussion of the many sources from which 
inefficiency may spring. This covers arguments due to Leibenstein (1966), Tinbergen 
(1985), and Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985). 
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Section 6.3 examines the definition of Pareto efficiency and shows that there is 
nothing in principle which can guarantee best-practice and Pareto efficiency will 
coincide - despite arguments in the literature to the contrary. The discussion focuses 
on the importance of allocative efficiency. It notes that technical efficiency is 
defined independent of factor prices and hence excludes the allocative requirements 
of Pareto efficiency. 
The distinction between Pareto and DEA efficiency is formalised in terms of 
dominance concepts in section 6.4. These are used to draw out the utility 
implications of production decisions. From this it is argued in section 6.5 that 
although a DEA target may not be Pareto efficient it can nevertheless be justified 
as a Pareto Improvement. This is an important re -interpretation of the normative 
basis for DEA targeting. 
Some additional difficulties in DEA are discussed in section 6.6 regarding the 
coherence of targets, the problem of noise and the difficulties encountered in trying 
to compare like-with-like. 
6.2. The definition of best-practice 
Many authors in the DEA literature (e. g. Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1981), 
Lewin and Morey (1981), Johnson and Lewin (1984), Charnes and Cooper (1985), 
Charnes, Cooper, Golany, Seiford and Stutz (1985), Nunamaker (1985)) have argued 
that best-practice decision-making units (e. g. LEAs with efficiency score = 1.0) can 
be regarded as Pareto efficient. Lewin and Morey (1981), for example, identify 
Pareto efficiency with best-practice production in a manner characteristic of the 
literature on DEA: "DEA is based upon the economic notion of Pareto Optimality. 
A given Decision Making Unit (DMU) is not efficient if some other DMU, or some 
combination of other DMUs [i. e. the peer group] can produce the same amounts of 
outputs with less of some resource and not more of any other resource; conversely, 
a DMU is said to be Pareto efficient if the above is not possible.,, 2 Furthermore, 
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Lewin and Morey argue that "the relative technical efficiency of any particular 
DMU is calculated by forming the ratio of a weighted sum of outputs to a weighted 
sum of inputs, where the weights for both outputs and inputs are to be selected in 
a manner that calculates the Pareto efficiency of the unit. " 
Limits to the interpretation of best-practice 
Best-practice in a given cross section of decision-making units (whether LEAs, 
local prisons, job centres or whatever) is the best performance found within that 
data set. Since the resulting DEA frontier is an observed or "revealed" frontier it is 
clearly possible to make an analogy with consumer theory; that is, observed 
consumption bundles reveal preferences and thereby in principle the utility function. 
However, in a production context the level of performance revealed as best-practice 
may itself be quite unexceptional. Thrall (1985) has coined the term 
"DEA-efficient" in order to distinguish the best-practice production from true Pareto 
efficiency. Accordingly, he maintains that "in using DEA, one must take account of 
the fact that a DMU can be DEA-efficient without being meritorious. " Analogously 
Greenberg and Nunamaker (1987, p. 340) recognise that best current practice is not 
necessarily fully optimal and argue that "one must be careful not to conclude that 
because an institution is operating on the efficient frontier, its achievement level on 
all measures is necessarily desirable". 
There is evidence in the public sector that there may be a pervasive lack of 
incentives and managerial excellence. In a translog comparison of Scottish hospital 
performance in 1983/84 McGuire (1987, p. 793) argues that transactions costs and 
other characteristics of hospital production make full cost-minimising behaviour 
improbable: "The fact that the hospital sector is non-profit making immediately 
attenuates the system of incentives held to underlie the neoclassical system. As such 
it is probable that cost-minimising production processes in this sector will involve 
the acquisition of information and the monitoring of contracts. That is to say that 
the sector will exhibit positive transactions costs"; thus "a priori consideration of the 
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constraints [on optimising behaviour] in this sector would suggest that the estimated 
function is not the production frontier" (emphasis added). 
Peston (1980) argues that in British education many of the conditions 
necessary for Pareto -efficient choices are unsatisfied because "it is a producer 
dominated system with great monopoly power ... it is a satisficing, not an 
optimising system. " In these circumstances best-practice production should not in 
general be expected to satisfy the "very extreme assumptions needed in order for a 
utility maximising outcome to be reached" (Matthews (1981)) - even granted that 
that outcome remains technologically feasible. The Pareto Criterion compares 
(production) states of the world such that a Pareto -efficient state occurs where it is 
impossible to make one economic agent better off (as judged by himself) without 
simultaneously worsening the utility of another (as judged by himself). But clearly 
with non-optimising educational producers such as identified in Peston (1980), 
best-practice production will contain Pareto-inferior states when simultaneously other 
technically feasible optimal states exist at which unambiguous welfare gains could be 
derived: for example at given levels of educational attainment one agent (e. g. the 
taxpayer) could be made better off whilst no one else (e. g. pupils, teachers or 
parents) is made worse off from an improvement in the cost performance of a 
best-practice (that is, supposedly Pareto efficient) LEA. Research in other areas 
leads to similar conclusions. In Ganley and Cubbin (1987) and in an independent 
field report3 on complementing in the Prison Service, it is argued that even the 
best prison establishments might be targeted substantial reductions in manpower 
costs. Analogously so-called "best -practice" LEAs may themselves be expected to be 
capable of improvements relative to a maximal production boundary. Moreover it is 
this maximal standard which is the true Pareto standard, because for given vintages 
of the technology it cannot be dominated (see figure 6.3.1. below). 
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The possibility of inefficient production decisions 
Complementary arguments to these are to be found in the X-efficiency 
literature, beginning with Leibenstein's seminal (1966) contribution. Leibenstein 
observed that conventional production theory has it that inputs have a fixed 
specification and yield af ixed performance when in actual practice inputs, especially 
labour services, may yield a variable performance. Traditional analysis excludes this 
possibility because it presumes that production units will only take optimal input 
decisions. A priori it cannot be denied that optimal decisions are possible but 
equally it is conceivable that circumstances arise in which managers perform poorly. 
This may be because managers determine their own productivity in addition to that 
of the other inputs of labour and capital services. As a consequence, "firms [or 
more generally DMUs] and economies do not operate on an outer-bound 
production possibility surface consistent with their resources. Rather they actually 
work on a production surface that is well within that outer bound. This means that 
for a variety of reasons people and organisations normally work neither as hard nor 
as effectively as they could ... [and] many people will trade the disutility of greater 
effort, of search, and the control of other people's activities for the utility of 
feeling less pressure and of better interpersonal relations" (Leibenstein (1966, P. 
413)). The evidence which Leibenstein presented was the first stride towards 
acknowledging that technical inefficiency is both possible and widespread. It follows 
that deviations from optimal Pareto production plans may be common enough to 
make the blanket Pareto interpretation of best-practice production in the DEA 
literature especially difficult to sustain. 
Leibenstein's recognition of an inner production boundary for observed producer 
behaviour is consistent with this Chapter's thesis as to the sub-optimal nature of 
best-practice. A modern and important study, Danilin, Materov, Rosefielde and 
Lovell (1985), has drawn the same distinction between notional Pareto and 
best-practice frontiers: "Enterprise efficiency is a concept that expresses the degree 
to which the observed enterprise performance approaches its potential. This potential 
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may be defined operationally in terms of prevailing technology and prices, or 
hypothetically with reference to arrangements under a generally competitive regime. 
Both interpretations are of interest ... (pp. 225-226). " Danilin et al were 
keen to 
stress this distinction because their study of Soviet cotton refining found a 
remarkably small dispersion of efficiency scores below best-practice. This, in itself, 
they argued, could not be taken as evidence of managerial and productive excellence 
as "enterprises may still be inefficient to some unknown degree because the 
best-practice standard used to measure the production frontier may understate true 
engineering production. " That is to say, had the efficiency comparisons been made 
including data from several countries, then domestic best-practice would in all 
probability have appeared poorer because a larger cross section may have revealed 
examples of better performance in enterprises operating in competitive Western 
environments. 
Counterproduction 
Leibenstein (1966, p. 392)) remarked that "a major element of X-efficiency 
is motivation". In a recent volume of his collected papers, Tinbergen (1985, Chapter 
4) has stressed similar considerations in his theory of "counterproduction". This 
arose in his work on the problems of estimating production functions which 
suggested to him the possibility of negative marginal production of inputs; that is, in 
effect, a production decision on a positively sloped segment of the isoquant. 
Tinbergen's own empirical work suggests that blue collar workers in the United 
States have had negative marginal products and thus that deviations from first best 
efficient production are, as Leibenstein has also maintained, common in real world 
production environments. Tinbergen suggests that these deviations arise because of 
deficiencies in organisational structures and design. These deficiencies have a 
negative impact on job satisfaction and productivity in a manner which makes the 
first best Pareto outcome unattainable (Hammond (1987)). 
Tinbergen (1985) has argued for an enrichment of economic science through a 
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form of "territorial expansion" which will increase the realism of economic analysis 
by accounting for modes of behaviour and circumstances which traditional theory has 
ignored. It is in this context that he has proposed the theory of counterproduction 
for sub-optimal production decisions: a phenomenon "which economic theory has 
hardly analysed so far" (ibid. p. 38). A new theory of inefficiency such as 
Tinbergen suggested has been advocated most persuasively by Fare, Grosskopf and 
Lovell (1985). Fare et al have dichotomised Farrell's original notion of efficiency in 
a manner which enlarges the potential sources of inefficiency to account for a 
broader set of sub-optimal production decisions. 
Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985) efficiency decomposition 
Farrell (1957) split efficiency into two components, technical and allocative. 
Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (FGL) (1985) have shown that this is not exhaustive and 
that efficiency can be usefully disaggregated into purely technical, structural, 
allocative and scale components. 
This decomposition is illustrated in figure 6.2.1. Given input prices RR and the 
long-run Pareto reference technology PP, the point of overall efficient production is 
the input choice at F. But suppose that production is possible in the interior of the 
input set, for example at E. Overall (i. e. Pareto) efficiency (OE) is then: 
OE = OA/OF 
The purely technical component (PTE) in overall efficiency due to production on 
the interior of the input set is: 
PTE = OD/OF 
The structural component, otherwise known as congestion (C), is due to production 
on a positively sloped stretch of the isoquant. That is to say, in the non-economic 
region, identified by Tinbergen (1985) as counterproduction, where the marginal 
products of factor services are negative: 
C= OC/OD. 
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Figure 6.2.1 
Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985) efficiency decomposition 
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Deviations from scale efficiency (S) occur because a DMU is not operating at 
the scale of operations consistent with long-run equilibrium, i. e. at a point 
consistent with constant returns to scale. Scale efficiency is thus the discrepancy 
between the true constant returns technology PP and the estimate of the 
intermediate or short-run technology 00: 
S= OB/OC 
Allocative efficiency (A) is price-dependent and defined relative to the input price 
line RR: 
A= OA/OB 
All four of these potential sources of inefficiency can be combined into a 
multiplicative identity to define overall efficiency (OE): 
OE ý PTE. C. S. A 
that is: 
OE = 
OA 
= 
OD OC OB OA 
OF OF * OD * OC * OB 
FGL observe that in the absence of price information, as in the case of non-traded 
outputs in the public sector, a more concise price independent measure of overall 
technical efficiency (OTE) can be defined as 
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OTE = 
OB 
= 
OD OC OB 
OF OF * OD * OC 
The FGL efficiency identity OE differs from the simpler Farrell version in the 
addition of the scale measure and the decomposition of his technical efficiency into 
the PTE and C components. The product of PTE and C gives the original Farrell 
definition of technical efficiency. 
The FGL (1985) decomposition of efficiency is significant in that it represents 
an exhaustive taxonomy of the sources of inefficiency in production. They argue 
that it broadens the scope of testable hypotheses in production theory and injects a 
realism regarding the existence of new forms of sub-optimal managerial decision 
which have been ruled out in traditional neoclassical analysis. 
The broadening arguments proposed by Leibenstein (1966, etc. ), Fare et al 
(1985), Tinbergen (1985), and others, are further indication of the mounting 
evidence for the possibility of inefficient production and an estimate of a 
sub-optimal reference technology - an estimate which cannot therefore be considered 
to fulfil the first best, full information conditions of Pareto efficiency. 
6.3. The defintion of Pareto efficiency and the DEA efficiency score 
The definitions and origins af Pareto efficiency go to the heart of neoclassical 
economics (Debreu (1959), Matthews (1981)). Conventional neoclassical analysis has 
used the differential calculus to develop stylised optimisation problems as the basis 
for decision-making in production (see for example Varian (1978) Chapter 1). If the 
LEA successfully processed the neoclassical optimisation problem it would have 
chosen an optimal input and output mix which is technically and allocatively efficient. 
On the basis of the arguments in Thrall (1985), Peston (1980), Danilin et al 
(1985), Prison Department (1986), Ganley and Cubbin (1987), the minimal costs 
(Cmin) of the neoclassical solution are likely to be less than best-practice costs 
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(Cbp); that is, the LEA could not ordinarily be expected to solve the neoclassical 
decision -problem. Only costs Cmin are Pareto efficient, with no unrealised welfare 
benefits attainable through the transfer of resources either to different LEAs or to 
different (non-education) sectors elsewhere in the economy. 
Section 6.3 shows that best-practice costs may be greater than Pareto-efficient 
costs for two reasons. In the first place the best-practice boundary may be made up 
of poorly performing DMUs. This is explored through figure 6.3.1. If this is the 
case, best-practice does not define a true frontier (which by definition must be 
undominated). As a consequence best-practice targets will not suggest the full 
feasible reduction in costs defined from the Pareto -efficient boundary. 
Secondly, where the best-practice frontier is an accurate estimate of the Pareto 
technology (as in figure 6.3.2) costs may still exceed their minimum because of 
allocative inefficiencies. DEA efficiency is defined in terms of the technology (i. e. 
the isoquant) but ignores allocative inefficiencies defined by the factor prices. Hence 
the existence of deficiencies in best practice and/or allocative inefficiencies will 
ordinarily divorce Pareto and DEA efficiency. This does not, however, deny that 
best practice can be Pareto efficient. Rather it is to suggest that in most 
applications it is unlikely. 
A best-practice "boundary" 
Figure 6.3.1 demonstrates the possibility that in general best-practice efficiency 
scores of unity with costs C1 do not necessarily imply full cost minimisation and 
Pareto efficiency. This is because best practice is defined relative to the best 
performance in the cross section at that time. There is nothing which can guarantee 
ex ante that this is "meritorious" - to use Thrall's (1985) term. 
The best-practice technology BB' is nested in (and thereby dominated by) the 
Pareto technology PP'. The best-practice efficiency score of LEA, is OC/OC =1 
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when clearly costs along C1 are greater than the minimal costs associated with the 
true (and feasible) Pareto technology. In principle, the true efficiency score is 
OA/OC < 1. This implies that a DEA target overstates efficiency and obscures 
some fraction of the savings which could accrue from Pareto efficient production at 
A. Note that production at OA' is infeasible by definition. Consequently, the savings 
defined by DEA can never be over-estimates and may under-estimate the potential 
gains from production for as long as there is a discrepancy between the true and 
estimated boundaries. 
Figure 6.3.1. 
The discrepancy between the best-practice and Pareto reference technologies. 
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Allocative efficiency 
Only where the true production technology overlaps the piecewise DEA estimate 
can the technical efficiency ratio predict an analytically accurate reduction in costs. 
Even in this unlikely case, technical efficiency per se could not be taken to imply 
full cost minimisation. This can be discussed in terms of figure 6.3.2 (below) where 
the cost-minimising input choice is defined from C. At this point, Pareto efficiency 
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(PE) can be dichotornised into technical (TE) and allocative (AE) components 
according to Farrell's original (1957) multiplicative efficiency identity: 
PE = TE. AE 
Technical efficiency is the radical distance of the LEA from the estimated isoquant. 
For LEA1 this distance is zero and it is said to be best-practice with: 
(6.3.2. ) TE = OB/OB = 1. 
Allocative efficiency, on the other hand, is the radial distance between the isocost 
line and the LEA. This defines: 
(6.3.3. ) AE = OA/OB 
for LEAl which is judged not to be allocatively efficient. Thus for LEAl Pareto 
efficiency (PE) is less than unity. It follows that where the best-practice estimate 
overlaps the true technology, a technical -efficiency score of unity cannot be taken 
to guarantee a cost minimum. This is because the technical -efficiency score is 
defined independently of the factor prices. It follows that whilst production at B is 
best-practice with TE = 1.0, costs remain greater than minimum costs. A further 
reduction in costs accounting for allocative inefficiences would be required to 
establish full cost efficiency (as at C). 
In figure 6.3.2 there is a non-zero opportunity cost in production at B 
measured by (Cl - Cmin). This implies that welfare gains are still possible through 
the reallocation of some fraction of the resources used by LEA1 because it is 
allocatively inefficient. It is inaccurate and misleading therefore to label a position 
of technical efficiency as Pareto efficient, as is the tendency in DEA literature, 
because of the strong probability that AE < 1. Pareto efficiency requires in 
addition, the much stronger condition that costs (both financial and real) are 
minimised and hence that AE = TE = 1.0; i. e., that production is both technically 
and allocatively efficient. 
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Figure 6.3.2. 
Technical efficiency, cost minimisation and Pareto efficiency with overlapping 
reference technologies. 
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Public sector measurement problems 
Note in passing that the isocost line in figure 6.3.2 is defined by the LEA cost 
function with input prices conventionally given in competitive factor markets. It is of 
the form Y-WkXk and indicates for a given level of cost the various feasible input 
combinations. As a matter of fact, however, the position of the isocost line may not 
be known or is at least ambiguous in many contexts because of pricing problems in 
the public sector. Very often true resource costs (relative prices) are unknown and 
notional prices must be imputed on the basis of an accounting convention. 
Alternatively, linear programs may be used to generate shadow priceS4 on inputs 
and outputs. Stewart (1978) and Perrakis (1980) have demonstrated a further source 
of ambiguity in markets where there is input price uncertainty. In these (plausible) 
circumstances, management can be expected to use relatively more of lower risk and 
less of higher risk inputs as compared to the cost-minimising outcome under 
certainty. This effect persists even for a risk-neutral manager and is reinforced 
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under risk-averse behaviour. Under these difficulties, true relative prices may remain 
unknown - even ex post. It follows that whilst a Pareto, efficient choice of resources 
is technically feasible, it may never be identified. As hinted by Sen (1975a, b) the 
concept of Pareto efficiency is unobservable. Its use as a decision criterion for DMU 
evaluation is therefore fallacious for practical purposes. 
The importance of allocative efficiency 
The importance of the allocative dimension to the Pareto Criterion has been 
explicitly overlooked in the DEA literature. Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1981) for 
example have maintained that: "DEA approaches and efficiency concepts are at their 
best when applied to situations in which there is an agreed upon set of objectives 
and in which resource diversions to other programs are not at issue ... How any of 
the conserved amounts [from realised DEA targets] might best be redistributed to 
other activities, e. g., to activities of a non-education variety, involves issues of 
pricing and weighting that are not addressed in our formulations. " In a neoclassical 
full-employment economy poorly combined, unemployed or under-used inputs imply 
a non-zero opportunity cost in terms of output foregone. To ignore these allocative 
considerations amounts to a presumption that unemployed resources have no output 
potential elsewhere in the economy or that the allocative dimension is unnecessary 
to support the use of the Pareto Criterion. Neither of these presumptions can be 
maintained as may now be demonstrated. 
Consider a hypothetical 2x2x2 economy which produces education and "other 
goods" using two inputs, Xl and X2. Production of the education good by the LEA 
sector is defined from the origin Oy and analogously for the production of "other 
goods" from Oq in the Edgeworth Box in figure 6.3.3. The lengths of the X1 and 
X2 axes represent the amount of these two factor services available to the economy 
and all points within the box represent feasible allocations of X1 and X2 between 
the two sectors. Isoquants representing the output of education (Y) are drawn 
relative to the origin Oy and those representing the output of other goods 
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relative to Oq. OqOy is a production contract curve5 and the economy will be in 
equilibrium somewhere along it on the assumption that output is produced under 
competitive conditions. Allocations on the contract curve between and including A 
and B are Pareto Superior to points elsewhere like X'. 
Although at X' the LEA sector is technically efficient it is allocatively 
inefficient and restraining the output of other goods by (01 - Qo). By altering its 
input mix to X* with output given at Yo educational costs are minimised and 
resources are released and may be diverted into the production of other goods to 
make up the output deficit (01 - 00). LX* minimises opportunity costs in the 
economy and dominates vectors such as X' on utility grounds. Net utilities at X* 
have risen (indeed are maximised) vis-a-vis X' because education costs are lower 
and the output of "other goods" is higher. 
Figure 6.3.3. 
Production of education and "other goods" in a 2x2x2 Edgeworth Box economy. 
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6.4. A new utility basis for DEA efficiency 
Section 6.3 has distinguished between Pareto efficiency and DEA efficiency. It 
has been shown that the requirements for Pareto efficiency are much stronger than 
the literature has acknowledged. This undermines the conventional justification for 
setting best-practice targets. Section 6.4 develops a more appropriate basis for 
targeting by formalising the utility implications of best-practice. This makes it 
possible to re-justify the DEA target in a manner which does not invoke Pareto 
efficiency. 
Dominance concepts for efficiency measurement 
Debreu (1951) characterised efficiency through its implications for utility in the 
economy. Thus preferred states of the world are those production plans which yield 
greater utility. These plans (or choices) are said to be "dominant". That is, on 
some appropriate criterion like costs or utilities, one state of the world can be 
ranked against another (see e. g. Sen (1975a)). 
All concepts of efficiency can be expressed in terms of a relation of dominance 
and this is a useful way to rank best-practice production against Pareto efficiency6. 
An appropriate criterion on which to do so is utility. In figure 6.3.3 the Pareto 
input mix X* was chosen by excluding feasible but allocatively inefficient choices. 
Formally, this optimal vector may be said to dominate these sub-optimal choices if, 
by choosing e instead of some other, X, none of the utility functions in the 
economy decrease and at least one of them effectively increases. Following Frisch 
(1966) this suggests the following definition of Pareto -efficient choices: 
DEFINITION: Pareto efficiency 
A vector X* = (X*, ., X*- ) is said to be Pareto efficient when - within the 1m 
limits of the feasible production set P- there exists no vector X= (X,,..., XM) 
which would have the property that on passing from X* to X the utility functions 
in the economy, Ul,. --, Uk, do not decrease and at least one of them effectively 
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increases. 
Section 6.2 discussed the limitations of best-practice as an indicator of 
efficiency. These limitations suggest that best-practice production would be dominated 
in utility terms by a production plan satisfying the definition of Pareto efficiency. 
This is illustrated in figure 6.4.1. 
Assume that production is taking place using inputs X" with costs C2. This is 
clearly inefficient vis a vis best-practice at X' where costs are only Cl. However X' 
is itself dominated by the Pareto input bundle Xý where costs are minimised. In 
utility terms X' Yields greater utility than X" since best-practice production releases 
resources (Cl - CO) which can be diverted into greater production elsewhere in the 
economy. 
Figure 6.4.1 
A DEA-dominant target, X'. 
nput 
X2 
However the greatest utility would accrue where the opportunity costs are 
minimised, as at X*- It follows that the technically inefficient Qý") and the 
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DEA-efficient (X') choices are dominated by the Pareto production plan in utility 
terms, viz.: 
U(e) >- U(Lc') >- U(X") 
where U(. ) is the net total utility in the economy resulting from a given selection 
of the choice variables. Specifically, the Pareto plan dominates the DEA-efficient 
plan which is itself preferred to a technically inefficient choice. In terms of the 
formal definition of Pareto efficiency in section 6.3 this means that on moving from 
a technically inefficient vector X" to its best-practice counterpart XI, at least one of 
the utility functions in the economy effectively increases and so X' is preferred to 
x,,. 
Assuming then the backdoth of a full employment neoclassical economy, the 
release of resources from inefficient production raises output and utility in other 
sectors of the economy. On this basis a production plan X, in figure 6.4.1 can be 
termed DEA-Dominant over another plan X" which consumes more resources. It is 
clear however that a further input bundle X* dominates the best-practice alternative. 
X* is therefore Pareto -Dominant. 
6.5. The DEA target as a Pareto Improvement 
The main normative aspect of DEA is the recommendation of a best-practice 
target. If the target is not Pareto efficient but "DEA-dominant", this suggests the 
target requires an alternative justification. This can be provided using the utility 
interpretation of efficiency developed in section 6.4. 
Underlying targeted reductions (increases) in costs (outputs) derived from 
DEA-efficiencY scores is a value judgement on utility formation; that is, ceteris 
paribus, reductions (increases) in costs (outputs) are desirable in the presence of 
inefficiency. If this is the case, targets remain justifiable but on the basis of the 
new DEA-Dominance Criterion. Targets set on this basis, e. g. at XI in figure 6.4.1, 
are not Pareto efficient but will bring DEA-inefficient performance up to the utility 
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standards attainable by best-practice DMUs. The best-practice target OXI defined on 
the reference technology BB' dominates the technically inefficient vector X" in 
utility terms with costs C1 "- C2- XI is itself dominated by X*, defined on the true 
Pareto technology PP'. The Pareto allocation )e minimises opportunity costs yielding 
maximal utility for the economy. Nonetheless any reduction in costs below C2 frees 
resources which can be diverted into the production of output elsewhere. Thereby 
an attainable, "second-best" DEA target lowering costs by (C2 - Cj) and/or raising 
output remains worthwhile in utility terms vis-a-vis the status quo at X": For as 
Sen (1975a) argued "a production plan which is inefficient will yield less social value 
of output than some other [less inefficient] alternative ". The DEA target therefore 
has the status of a Pareto Improvement and does not (in general) confer full Pareto 
efficiency. 
A fortiori the DEA target is observable and may be elucidated in quantitative 
terms. The Pareto technology while feasible exists only qualitatively from the 
operational point of view because of price uncertainty and definitional problems in 
the public sector. Definitional and measurement problems imply a non-full 
information set on prices and quantities which creates a sub-optimal decision 
environment for the DMU manager. In these conditions Tinbergen (1985) has argued 
that a first best, full information outcome is unattainable. It follows that only 
second best policies, such as the DEA target are feasible. Indeed that the 
best-practice technology is observed is evidence that DEA-Dominant targets are 
attainable and tractable to operational definition. 
Utility and efficiency measurement 
Before moving onto fresh arguments in section 6.6 it is worth emphasising the 
significance of utility to efficiency measurement. In his first published paper, Debreu 
(1951) defined a "coefficient of resource utilisation" which is comparable in intention 
to the DEA-efficiency score. Debreuls coefficient was derived in the context of the 
two fundamental theorems of Paretian welfare thoery. Very briefly, his measure of 
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inefficiency in an economy is a measure of deadweight loss which is the quantity of 
resources which could be saved in inefficient production holding existing utility levels 
constant. Debreuls coefficient, p, indicates the monetary value of this deadweight 
loss where 0<p<1. p=1 implies there is no deadweight loss in the economy 
and the associated monetary value of excess use of commodities is zero. In this 
situation allocations are Pareto optimal. Analogously, mutatis mutandis, for p<1. 
That Debreu (1951) explicitly defined the economic-welfare implications of his 
resource coefficient contrasts sharply with the development of the DEA-efficiency 
measure. Much of the work on DEA is to be found in the case-oriented 
operational research literature wherein scant attention has been given to its 
implications for economic theory. This is a serious oversight. DEA is essentially an 
empirical calculus for which there is clearly a necessity to provide analytical 
foundations. In this regard, Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985) initiated research into 
the implications of inefficiency for production theory. Specific utility implications, 
however, have been entirely overlooked in the modern literature. As a consequence, 
this Chapter has suggested a utility dimension to the DEA target - that a DEA 
target remains justified if it leads to a net improvement in welfare. 
6.6. Some remaining difficulties with the DEA target 
(1) The DEA target and noise in production 
Debreu's suggestive (1951) term deadweight loss contains ruminations of a 
logical difficulty in the definition of a DEA target. The target is derived from an 
efficiency score based on an historical cross section at time t. But the associated 
target is set for period t+1. Clearly it has to be asked in what sense can the 
efficiency inforMation relevant to period t be carried forward to t+1? The 
excess-spend in a budget in t is historical and it follows trivially that it is 
impossible to set a target in t+1 for a budget which is already spent. The only 
feasible target is for a future budget, as yet unspent. To set a target for this future 
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budget on the basis of current efficiency information implicitly assumes that the 
efficiency is stable over time; that is, that the efficiency score can be given an 
interpretation similar to a structural, time invariant-parameter estimated in an 
econometric model. 
A priori it is not clear that this is acceptable because the DEA frontier is 
estimated deterministically. In this context apparent variations in performance may in 
fact be once-off, random events. The problem of stochastic behaviour affects all 
areas of applied economic analysis. A well-known example occurs in the estimation 
of the technological coefficients underlying input-output models. Ever since the 
pioneering work of Leontieff in the first half of the century, applied input-output 
analysis has ignored the effects of stochastic behaviour. It is notable however that 
this has not affected the rise of input-output analysis in applied economics. 
Like input-output, DEA is essentially a deterministic methodology which makes 
no explicit assumptions about the distribution of noise. Practitioners have, however, 
made some attempts to limit the impact of noise on estimated levels of inefficiency. 
These have focused around the pooling of cross section data over several years to 
create panel data sets. A more stable picture of performance can be extracted from 
these by performing separate envelopments on successive cross sections and deriving 
the mean efficiency score of a DMU over time. This was the approach taken by 
Fare, Grosskopf and Logan (1987). Thomas, Greffe and Grant (1988) have also 
worked with a panel of data on electricity utilities in Texas between 1979 and 1984. 
It was argued that noise in outcomes might be identified in unexpected change in 
the efficiency ranking of utilities year-on-year. Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient was used in order to establish whether the rankings changed significantly. 
A high value of the coefficient was taken to represent stable efficiency scores which 
reflect underlying levels of performance. Stable estimates of efficiency are then the 
basis of acceptable targets. 
Charnes, Clark, Cooper and Golany (1985) have also used a panel data set on 
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US Air Force tactical -fighter wings to improve efficiency measurement. Their 
procedure, which they call "window analysis", involves pooling successive cross 
sections of data and enveloping the whole of the resulting data simultaneously. If 
there are n cross sections in a panel, each unit is represented n times in the 
estimated possibility space. A unit may appear both on the frontier and within 
according to changes in its performance year by year. The resulting composite 
frontier gives less weight to unusual observations and is therefore more robust to 
stochastic events. 
As a rule of thumb, then, the collection of panel data sets is probably to be 
recommended to replace efficiency estimates from single cross sections. 
An older suggestion is in Timmer (1971). Timmer argued that a Farrell 
boundary can be constructed iteratively. That is, by successively eliminating outlying 
data points and re-estimating the frontier until the resulting efficiency estimates 
stabilise. This is possible in larger data sets, although it means that excluded units 
will have no efficiency score. The Timmer adjustment is arbitrary to the extent that 
it is not clear a priori precisely when the efficiency scores have stablised to a 
sufficient degree to accept that random outcomes have been eliminated. Indeed there 
is nothing to say that underlying and sustainable levels of performance have been 
excluded. Recent developments of the Timmer approach can be found in Sengupta 
(1988,1987b, c, 1982), Sengupta and Sfeir (1988) and Banker (1988). 
On a tentative basis it has been suggested in the literature that costs (or 
inputs) are generally more predictable than outputs, giving cost targets a greater 
credibility than those for outputs. Sengupta (1987, p. 2290) has argued that: "... data 
variations may arise in practical situations ... when the output measures have large 
and uncertain measurement errors which are much more significant than in the 
input measures. For example in school efficiency studies, the input costs, such as 
teachers' salaries, administrative expenses, etc., may have low measurement errors 
whereas the performance test scores of students may contain large errors of 
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measurement of true student quality. " This argument is most compelling where 
measurement errors are large relative to true random fluctuations in the production 
process. 
In summary then, to carry the target forward depends on the stability of the 
efficiency score. This itself turns on the correct specification of the model and the 
limitation of the effects of noise. If adequate adjustment for noise is not possible 
the resulting efficiency scores may be unstable over time. This must cast serious 
doubt on the credibility of DEA targets which are carried forward when there is 
little guarantee of similarity in next period's performance. In general the practitioner 
is forced to make the implicit assumption that variations around the frontier are 
largely due to differences in technical efficiency, there being only trivial amounts of 
noise. 
In those circumstances where the target is considered an accurate predictor of 
efficiency in t+1, public sector production has a normative and merit-derived 
significance which may still prohibit the straightforward application of a target. For 
example there are large areas of public sector production which have lower limits 
on levels of service which are imposed by humanitarian and legal constraints. These 
important practical difficulties cannot be overlooked in the implementation of targets. 
(2) Ambiguities in relative efficiency measures 
The conceptual difficulties in measuring service sector productivity were being 
debated a generation ago by Hall and Winsten (1957) and are not resolved in 
modern writing on the subject, e. g. Kendrick (1987), Aanestad (1987). The existence 
of degrees of dominance, viz. Pareto Dominance and DEA Dominance, is indicative 
of ambiguities which call into question the meaningfulness of relative efficiency 
measures. 
Koutsoyiannis (1979) for example has noted that in the private sector firms 
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often consider operations at 80 per cent of capacity as an acceptable utilisation of 
inputs. Clearly public sector producers which operate in controllable environments 
are likely to have comparable notions of normal utilisation of capacity and 
differences in these across DMUs may be confused with differences in efficiency by 
DEA. That is, DMUs with lower utilisation rates may be identified as inefficient vis 
a vis others with higher rates when the latter themselves are using capacity at less 
than 100 per cent. Given that surplus capacity is inconsistent with the extreme 
optimising behaviour necessary for Pareto production, this reinforces the need for a 
decomposition of efficiency which identifies a separate (notional) frontier consistent 
with Pareto optimal production and a best-practice "frontier" composed of 
best-practice DMUs operating less efficiently with surplus capacity. 
The best-practice "frontier" is constructed on the basis that the cross section is 
of a homogeneous set of DMUs using the same (presumably the latest) vintage of 
technology. A priori it is not clear if all DMUs will utilise the same technology - 
but clearly it is possible they will not. DEA efficiency becomes ambiguous in this 
case: a relatively inefficient DMU could be utilising a technology with maximal 
results but be constrained by the possibilities inherent in this technology such that it 
cannot perform as efficiently as some other DMU or linear combination of DMUs 
which are using a later, improved technology. This sort of efficiency ambiguity 
requires careful scrutiny to restrict a data set to a comparable set of DMUs so 
subsequent DEA comparisons are equitable and meaningful. 
It should be noted that the problems of capacity utilisation and of technology 
vintage are essentially problems of comparing like-with-like. All relative effficiency 
measures (not merely DEA) should be used in a way which ensures legitimate 
comparisons of organisations. 
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6.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined some difficulties in the interpretation of DEA 
efficiency. This has become necessary owing to the uncritical manner in which DEA 
has often been used - especially in the American literature. Silkman (ed. ) (1986) 
made a comparison between the high hopes for DEA in the 1980s and the 
optimism surrounding use of regression analysis in the early 1960s. 
The main normative aspect of DEA is the recommendation of a target where 
technical inefficiency is identified. This target has been justified by the use of the 
Pareto Criterion. The main theme of this chapter has been that there is a wealth 
of empirical and analytical evidence which suggests that in general best-practice is 
not Pareto efficient. Indeed, even if it were, this could not be observed as such. 
Section 6.2 discussed the definition of best-practice in the literature. It argued 
that the many sources of inefficiency which may exist in real production 
environments are likely to compromise best-practice. There is nothing in DEA to 
suggest that best-practice performance is satisfactory in any absolute sense. Studies 
of efficiency have often shown that even the "best" in certain circumstances can 
improve (see Prison Department and PA Management Consultants (1986) on the 
state of operations in the prison service prior to the introduction of the Fresh Start 
scheme). Measures of technical efficiency derived in DEA should therefore be 
thought of as approximate guides to performance. 
Additional "fuzziness" in empirical efficiency measures is caused by the 
definitional problems associated with public sector production. It is only for narrowly 
defined engineering systems (like a robot-based production line) for which the 
maximal performance of the technology can be unambigously defined. In other 
processes like incarceration and education it is more difficult to define the relevant 
inputs and outputs. Public sector processes are often highly dependent upon labour 
inputs. As Leibenstein pointed out, labour effort is variable and delivered 
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voluntarily. Consequently it is difficult to define best-practice since it is hard to 
specify at what point greater work intensity leads to a fall-off in quality. Hence 
Mayston and Smith (1987, p. 183) argued that: "In general, there is no way of 
knowing whether the empirical measure of eficiency ... gives rise to ... the true 
technical efficiency of an organisation; that is the measure of efficiency we would 
obtain if the true production frontier (rather than the linear approximation) were 
known. " 
Lubulwa and Oczkowski (1987) suggested that "as the sample size increases, the 
best-practice converges to the absolute frontier". It is true that the addition of 
DMUs cannot worsen the estimate, but presumably the estimate can only improve 
on the addition of better performance. If incentives and motivation to inputs are 
low throughout an "industry" or programme then full convergence to the notional 
frontier could be by no means assured. 
Section 6.3 examined the definition of Pareto efficiency. It was shown that 
best-practice is a form of technical efficiency defined independently of factor prices. 
Pareto efficiency has a broader "welfare" dimension which also accounts for the 
allocative efficiency of production. Consequently best-practice performance is too 
narrowly defined to be consistent with full Pareto efficiency. It must be stressed that 
this conclusion is not an intrinsic rejection of the Pareto Criterion as such or of 
best-practice DEA targets. There is already a well-known spectrum of objections to 
Pareto welfare arguments ranging from the radical Marxist (Drago (1987)) to the 
"Welfarist" critique of Sen (1987,1979) and more traditional objections regarding 
efficiency and distribution (Little (1957)). These are not the concern of Chapter 6 
which examines the relevance of the Pareto Criterion and its congruence with DEA 
efficiency. 
It is paradoxical that the DEA literature has set out to identify the sources and 
magnitude of inefficiency but should incorporate a neoclassical performance standard 
- that of Pareto efficiency - which actually rules this out (see Fare, Grosskopf and 
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Lovell (1985)). Traditional neoclassical production theory assumes away the problems 
of information and uncertainty so the producer successfully allocates resources in an 
efficient manner: efficient relative to the constraints imposed by the structure of 
production technology and by the structure of input and output markets, and relative 
to whatever behavioural goal, e. g. cost minimisation, is attributable to the producer. 
The technology constraint in the producer's behavioural optimisation problem is 
binding, eliminating technical efficiency. Satisfaction of the first-order conditions 
necessary for optimisation eliminates allocative inefficiency. Thus Fare, Grosskopf 
and Lovell (1985) have argued that "Testable hypotheses about producer behaviour 
then refer to the behaviour of efficient producers only" and advocate the 
development of a modern theory of producer behaviour which explicitly 
acknowledges inefficient production. 
In this respect, sections 6.4 and 6.5 developed a more appropriate 
interpretation of DEA efficiency. This involved the definition of efficiency in utility 
terms. Specifically, a DEA target (which in general is not Pareto efficient) can still 
be regarded as a Pareto Improvement vis a vis technically inefficient production 
within an estimated boundary. The DEA target does not confer the full utility gain 
that could accrue from Pareto production. It nevertheless remains worthwhile in 
yielding a net utility gain over existing inefficient production plans. 
Finally, section 6.6 discussed some additional difficulties common to the 
interpretation of all forms of relative efficiency measure. The problems of noise 
were linked to the ability of DEA to identify a meaningful target for period t+1 
on the basis of data on period t. Various procedures have been suggested in the 
literature to control for noise. They are essentially ad hoc and involve averaging of 
efficiency scores or the pooling of data. Since no formal treatment of noise exists 
in DEA, future research on efficiency will probably benefit most from the use of 
panel data rather than the use of isolated cross sections. This applies particularly to 
the use of DEA in real policy environments. Adjustments in funding based on DEA 
targets should be made only where there is evidence that the efficiency measure 
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reflects underlying levels of performance. If measured efficiency is the result of 
once-off difficulties then the application of the targeting formula to cut resources 
may worsen future performance. 
Footnotes 
1. On which see Debreu (1959). 
2. For consistency with the results on LEA and prison efficiency in Chapters 3,4 
and 7 the input-based definition of Pareto efficiency is cited above. There is an 
analogous output-based definition used in the DEA literature by, among others, 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1981): "A decision-making unit is not [Pareto] 
efficient if it is possible to augment any output without increasing any input and 
without decreasing any other output. " A DMU can be characterised as Pareto 
efficient if this is not possible, they argue. Notice that the input-based version is 
essentially identical to the definition of input technical efficiency used in section 2.5 
of Chapter 2. 
3. Study of Prison Officers' Complementing and Shift Systems, vols 1 (Report) and 
2 (Appendices), Home Office Prison Department and PA Management Consultants, 
April, 1986. 
4. Margolis (1971) discusses the nature and role of shadow prices for incorrect or 
non-existent market values. Sen (1975b) Chapter 11 is also a useful discussion. 
5. The locus of points where the ratio of input prices is equal to the marginal 
products of the inputs. 
6. Performance comparisons using dominance concepts have a substantial history. 
The concept of a dominant reference group was first introduced by Hyman (1942) 
and Merton (1957) and applied to goal formation and attainment in productive 
organisations by March and Simon (1963). See also Sen (1975a) and Johnson and 
Lewin (1984). 
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Chapter 7. Aspects of the discriminating power of Data Envelopment Analysis 
7.1. Introduction 
Chapter 6 examined some important difficulties of interpretation in DEA 
methodology. This chapter undertakes empirical work in an attempt to illustrate 
some of these problems using data from a real production environment. In so doing 
it is able to examine the sensitivity of DEA to the number of units used to 
evaluate performance. 
Unlike most conventional econometric procedures Data Envelopment Analysis is 
not endowed with any formal system of hypothesis testing. This is because DEA is 
a non-statistical technique which makes no explicit assumptions on the distribution of 
variables and residuals. This has left DEA open to criticism. The selection of 
input-output variables is essentially ad hoc. In recognition of these difficulties 
Charnes, Cooper, Lewin, Morey and Rousseau (1985) initiated work on a 
DEA-sensitivity analysis. This involved an examination of the effects on the 
efficiency score of deleting variables. 
Chapter 7 investigates the sensitivity of DEA-efficiency, but with respect to 
changes in the size of the cross section rather than in the number of variables. It 
uses the local education authority data set familiar from Chapter 3 and examines 
the effects on targets and peer groups of changes in the size of the LEA 
comparisons. 
This involves grouping LEAs into administrative clusters and re-estimating 
frontier performance for each cluster. Technically speaking, this amounts to varying 
the number of constraints in the fractional DEA program. There is some precedent 
for this in the literature. In a study of performance in Californian hospitals, 
Grosskopf and Valdmanis (1987) cluster their sample into two parts (one 
publicly-owned and the other privately-owned) to assess the effect of ownership on 
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efficiency status. 
As should become clear, the clustered results are consistent with the arguments 
in Chapter 6 that best-practice is ambiguous in some cases and cannot be 
interpreted as a firm indicator of Pareto efficiency. In addition, the greater 
preponderance of best-practice found in the results provokes a discussion of the 
ability of DEA to identify a complete efficiency ordering together with a meaningful 
target and peer group. 
7.2. The need for clustering of LEA performance 
From table 3.3.2 in Chapter 3 recall that DEA chooses a peer group of 
best-practice LEAs which, in principle, the inefficient LEA uses as a managerial 
blueprint to improve performance (see Smith and Mayston (1987)). It is important 
to decision -makers, however, that the peer group is drawn from a comparable set 
of LEAs because demographic, occupational and social conditions affecting 
performance vary markedly over the whole cross section of LEAs. In the peer 
groups for inefficient London boroughs in table 3.3.2 one or more peer LEAs are 
drawn from outside of the London area. This Chapter examines the effects of 
excluding these "non -indigenous" LEAs from the performance comparison. That is, 
the 96 LEAs in England have been grouped into 3 administrative clusters of: 
(1) 21 Inner and Outer London boroughs; 
(2) 36 Metropolitan boroughs; 
(3) 39 English counties. 
A DEA boundary has been estimated for each of these smaller cross sections 
using the same varying returns to scale assumption adopted in Chapter 3. The 
advantage of such an analysis is, in principle, that it enforces the choice of peer 
LEAs to come from the same "home" cluster as that of the inefficient LEA. 
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There is some precedent for the clustering of performance in the literature. In 
a study of Californian education, Sengupta. and Sfeir (1986) split high-school districts 
into rural and urban classes; similar adjustments were made by Grosskopf and 
Valdmanis (1987) in an evaluation of hospital performance. These clustered analyses 
of performance are based on a "rule of thumb" suggested in Golany and Roll 
(1989, p. 239) that in general "the larger the number of units in the analysed set, 
the lower the homogeneity within the set". Thus Golany and Roll have argued that: 
"another direction in the analysis of efficiency outcomes is partitioning the group of 
DMUs into categories, according to some characteristic which was not entered into 
the model as a factor determining input-output relationships. The purpose of such 
categorisation is twofold: one is to gain a better relative assessment of efficiency, by 
comparing performance within sub-groups of units operating under similar conditions 
(e. g. the same geographical region). The other is a comparison between categories, 
such as in the case where a category signifies a programme which a sub-group of 
DMUs operates" (ibid). 
Two possible objections could be raised to these criteria for the clustering of 
performance. In the first place there may be difficulties in the definition of the 
cluster. Generally speaking, empirical clustering criteria have been rather crude and 
cannot exclude the possibility that a peer drawn from the same cluster may 
nevertheless be quite unlike the inefficient DMU for which it has been chosen. This 
will always be true in a trivial sense because every DMU is likely to have some 
unique characteristic, viz. location. In the context of LEA performance there 
appears to be some genuinely different spending patterns in rural as against urban 
(i. e. London and the Metropolitan) authorities - see table 7.4.2 (below). This is 
borne out in other studies of educational costs. Kenny (1982), for example, found 
sizeable differences between schooling costs in rural and urban areas in California. 
A second potential objection to clustering focuses on the inclusion in the 
model of background variables (to reflect for example parental occupation) which 
are already designed to capture the impact of differences in LEA catchment area. 
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Although the inclusion of background variables is widely recognised (see for example 
Mayston and Smith (1987)) there remains some dispute in the literature as to the 
effects of noncontrollable variables on efficiency and precisely how these should be 
incorporated into empirical DEA models (see e. g. Banker and Morey (1986a, b)). If 
the inclusion of background variables is not sufficient to allow for the differences in 
LEAs across the country, then the clustering of LEAs may still be required to make 
the performance comparison equitable. Notwithstanding these problems, the effects of 
clustering on efficiency remain valuable in clarifying the discriminating power of 
DEA in terms of its ability to identify meaningful targets and peer groups. 
7.3. Results on LEA efficiency after clustering 
in Chapter 3 around 55 percent of LEAs were input inefficient to varying 
degrees and hence less than half the education authorities in England were identified 
as best-practice. This result was based on a frontier comparison of 96 LEAs. Table 
7.3.1 contains a summary of the numbers of LEAs identified as inefficient in the 3 
separate administrative analyses of performance undertaken for this Chapter. It is 
immediately clear that far fewer LEAs are identified as inefficient in the smaller 
administrative clusters. The most notable change is for the London boroughs where 
only 6 out of 21 LEAs have non-unit efficiencies. By contrast the results in 
Chapter 3 suggested 13 of the London authorities were inefficient. 
This changes the interpretation of the results regarding efficiency in the 
London boroughs. In particular it suggests that there is a greater preponderance of 
best-practice education in London than has hitherto been identified. A similar, but 
less marked, change can also be recognised in authorities outside London. In the 
Metropolitan boroughs the number of best-practice LEAs has risen from 17 to 24; 
and in the counties from 19 to 23. Across all three clusters, this adds an 
additional 18 best-practice authorities making a total of 62. 
This apparent improvement in LEA performance is reflected in a small gain in 
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the mean inefficiency score of the London boroughs and the counties. However the 
mean performance of the Metropolitan authorities has fallen slightly to an average 
of 0.916 (see table 7.3-2). 
The prima facie substance of these results belies the strength of the 
comparisons being made in the LEA clusters. In particular, it is probably the case 
that London performance improves dramatically because the comparison of London 
boroughs with themselves alone is less exacting. The same is true for the 
Metropolitan LEAs and the counties whose performance also improves in the smaller 
clustered analyses (cf Table 7.3.1). Hence it would probably be inaccurate to 
conclude that the preponderance of best-practice performance is more widespread 
among LEAs than was suggested in Chapter 3. 
Table 7.3.1 
Comparison of clustered and non-clustered results: Numbers 
of inefficient LEAs. 
London Metropolitan 
boroughs boroughs 
Engl i sh 
counties 
Al I areas 
combined 
Separate 28.6 33.3 41.0 35.4 
clusters 
Non-clustered 61.9 52.8 51.3 54.2 
(Chapter 3) 
Notes: 
(1) The table shows the ratio of inefficient to best- 
practice LEAs. 
(2) The efficiency scores underlying this table can be 
found below in table 7.4.1. 
(3) The number of best-practice LEAs is simply 100 
minus the percentage of inefficient LEAs. In 
the London cluster for example, (100 - 28.6) 
71.4%; that is, over two-thirds of the London 
cluster is best-practice in the new results. 
Source: Author's calculations 
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Table 7.3.2 
Comparison of clustered and non-clustered results: 
Mean inefficiency scores. 
London Metropolitan English All areas 
boroughs boroughs counties combined 
Separate 0.935 0.916 0.961 0.941 
clusters 
Non-clustered 0.925 0.921 0.958 0.936 
(Chapter 3) 
Notes: 
The table shows the mean efficiency of LEAs with 
non-unity efficiency scores. 
Source: Author's calculations 
7.4. Aspects of the discriminating power of DEA 
Section 7.4 is divided into 3 parts, each of which explores an aspect of the 
discriminating power of Data Envelopment Analysis. Part 1 examines the ability of 
DEA to identify untied efficiency scores to reveal finer variations in performance. 
The efficiency ordering resulting from the clustering of LEA performance is 
compared with that derived from the whole-sample comparison in Chapter 3. The 
second part of section 7.4 looks at the effects of clustering on the peer group. Part 
3 then examines the stability of targets for the adjustment of performance at 
inefficient operations. 
(1) Best-practice and the efficiency ordering in LEA clusters. 
Before proceeding, it is important to define precisely what is meant by "the 
discriminating power of DEA". When DEA compares the performance of 
organisations, it divides them into two groups: the first is best-practice with 
unit-efficiency scores; the second, dominated by the first, is relatively inefficient. It 
is not possible on the basis of DEA alone to distinguish between best-practice 
performers because best-practice efficiencies are tied. This means that best-practice 
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performance cannot be ranked and by implication is equally satisfactory at all 
branches. Generally speaking, however, the performance of inefficient producers can 
be ordered completely (although there may sometimes be a small number of ties). 
The discriminating power of DEA therefore refers to the ability of the 
technique to identify untied efficiency scores. Clearly this largely depends on the 
numbers of best-practice. Tied-efficiency scores indicate that a full ranking of 
performance in the sample as a whole is not possible. In other words, the efficiency 
ordering is incomplete. 1 
Note that an untied efficiency ordering rests on the notion of efficiency 
dominance; that is, untied efficiency scores imply that the performance of one LEA 
is better than that of another in that it uses less inputs or produces more output. 
However discrimination between LEAs might also be achieved on the basis of the 
shadow prices. Zero shadow prices, for example, might be taken as indicators of 
inadequate performance in certain variables. This might be used as a further 
criterion for ordering LEAs. Nevertheless Chapter 7 concentrates on the efficiency 
score as a basis for ranking performance and leaves discrimination on the basis of 
shadow prices to future research. 
The results which have been obtained from the clustering of LEAs into smaller 
cross sections call into question the ability of DEA to identify untied efficiency 
scores. The London cluster contains 21 LEAs and found the highest proportion of 
best practice (c. f. Table 7.3.1). Compared with the London cluster, relatively fewer 
best-practice LEAs were found in the larger clusters. In the 36 Metropolitan 
boroughs, 67 per cent of LEAs were best practice as against 71 per cent in 
London. The largest cluster, the 39 English counties, had the lowest proportion of 
best-practice at 59 per cent. Larger cross sections, therefore, appear to be 
associated with relatively smaller numbers of best practice. As would be expected a 
priori, more discriminating comparisons (yielding fewer best-practice efficiencies) 
necessitate enlarging the feasible number of candidates in the cross section. From a 
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computational point of view, enlarging the number of LEA comparisons in the 
determination of the efficiency score amounts to increasing the number of constraints 
in the (fractional) DEA program. 
The number of best-practice authorities identified by the program is an 
important indicator of the discriminating power of DEA. For the higher are the 
numbers of best-practice the lower are the numbers of authorities with a unique, 
untied efficiency status. Given the widely differing conditions in which LEAS 
operate, it may be unrealistic to label large numbers of them as uniformly 
best-practice. For this implies that all authorities are operating equally satisfactorily 
on all target variables. It is unlikely that this is the case so that, in principle, a 
ranking of performance exists among best-practice LEAs. 
In Chapter 3,44 out of 96 LEAs were given identical unit-efficiency scores. 
The clustered analysis in this Chapter has added a further 18 LEAs with 
unit-efficiency scores giving 62 best-practice authorities in total. As far as active 
decision-making is concerned, DEA is only capable of suggesting adjustments to 
performance in relatively inefficient LEAs. Consequently, nothing can be said about 
performance at around two thirds of the LEAs after clustering - other than the 
implicit presumption that, in attaining best-practice, their performance is satisfactory 
and "equivalent". Since best-practice is not necessarily adequate in any absolute 
sense, it would be useful for the decision-maker to have more guidance on the 
quality of best-practice performance. This is an important point, for as the 
discriminating power of the technique falls, the coarser is the summary picture of 
the performance yielded by DEA. In situations where programme performance is 
under scrutiny (as in Chapter 5), the more ambiguous the picture for a single 
organisation, the greater is the error which is likely to be built into the aggregate 
performance picture. 
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Improving discriminating power 
The clustering of LEA performance suggests that the discriminating power of 
DEA falls in smaller cross sections. It is important in practical applications to know 
how discriminating power might be improved to give a finer breakdown of variations 
in performance. 
That the discriminating power of DEA is limited by the identification of 
best-practice broaches a more general problem of the relative merits of the CRS 
and the VRS linear programs. In particular, the number of best-practice will vary 
with the technology assumption. Chapter 5 compared the CRS and VRS efficiency of 
local prisons and remand centres. The results suggested that a CRS assumption 
identifies fewer best-Practice. It was demonstrated that this is an intuitive result 
given the nesting of empirical technologies. Clearly the technology assumption has 
implications for the ordering of efficiencies which can now be developed. 
The CRS and VRS efficiency ordering 
Both the VRS and CRS efficiency results on prison and LEA efficiency in 
Chapters 3,4 and 5 suggest best-practice units may account for a large share of 
the sample under investigation. This means that the efficiency ordering is incomplete 
in the sense that all establishments do not have an untied efficiency rating. 
It is clearly desirable to maximise discriminating power so finer variations in 
performance can be identified. The maximum theoretical discriminating power in a 
cross section of n units would define a distinct technical -efficiency score (TE) for 
each unit LEA in the sample. That is: 
TE1 > TE2 > ... > 
TEn 
where the subscript indicates rank. (7.4.1 ) is a complete ranking of efficiencies 
(without ties) of order n. 
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Practical applications of DEA are unlikely to yield a complete efficiency 
ordering unless the comparison is based on a single variable. 2 In a sample size of n 
units, the ordering resulting from a VRS technology assumption could be of the 
form: 
(7.4.2) 1= TE1 = TE1 = ... = TE1 > TE2 > ... > TEj+l > 0, 
and j+1<n. 
Assuming that non-unit efficiencies are untied, the ranking is of order j+1, where 
is the number of inefficient units. The ordering is incomplete in that j+1 is less 
than the feasible number of untied efficiencies, i. e., j+1<n. Notice that if 
efficiency is defined in relative terms, j must be less than n to permit the definition 
of at least one best-practice unit, i. e. j< (n-1). Hence, (n - j) is the number of 
best-practice. 
In (7.4.2) (n - j) best-practice organisations have a homogeneous efficiency 
status. However it is possible to increase the rank of the efficiency ordering under 
an alternative technology. In general a CRS technology yields fewer best-practice 
than VRS (see Chapter 5 or Grosskopf (1986) and Grosskopf and Njinkeu (1988)). 
The corresponding constant returns ordering is: 
(7.4.3) 1= TE1 = TE1 = ... = TEI > TE2 >... >TEk+l 
and k+I<n and k>j in (7.4.2)). Assuming that non-unit efficiencies are 
untied, the CRS ranking is of order k+1, where k is the number of inefficient 
units. The order of (7.4.3), k+1, is greater than that in (7.4.2), j+1, because 
the CRS program identifies relatively more inefficient units: i. e., k>j and so k 
+1>j+1. Equally, the number of best-practice under CRS, (n - k), is less 
than under VRS, (n - j). As a consequence, there are arguments for preferring the 
CRS assumption because it yields a finer (though still not complete) ordering of 
performance. That is, a CRS assumption generates fewer best-practice ties and 
hence has a greater discriminating power than a VRS technology. 
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Ties in non-unit efficiency scores 
The ranking of efficiencies according to the underlying technology in (7.4.2) 
and (7.4.3) made the assumption that there are only ties in best-practice 
efficiencies. However, inspection of table 7.4.1 (below) suggests that this may not be 
the case. In the clustered results there is one tie within the counties, between Avon 
and Hertford where TE = 0.922 in both cases (see table 7.4.1 (c), below). There is 
also a small number of ties across (rather than within) clusters between Oldham and 
Northants (TE = 0.986), Leeds and Kent (TE = 0.994) and between Redbridge and 
Hampshire (TE = 0.963). However all of these ties are due to rounding in table 
7.4.1. If the efficiency score is reported to 4 decimal places all of these ties can be 
broken so that the rank of the efficiency ordering is not compromised. On this 
basis, for example, Avon has TE = 0.9221 and Hertfordshire TE = 0.9215. 
In the non-clustered results in table 3.3.2 of Chapter 3 there are 9 apparent 
ties in non-unit efficiency scores. All but one of these is due to rounding - at 4 
decimal places only Northants remains indistinguishable from Hereford with TE = 
0.9726.3 This tie compromises the definition of the rank of the efficiency ordering. 
Recall that for a cross section of size n and a VRS technology assumption the 
efficiency ordering is: 
(7.4.2) 1= TE1 = TE1 = ... = TE1 > TE2 > ... > TEj+l > 
0, and j+1 
n. If j is the number of inefficient branches then the rank of the efficiency 
ordering is j+1. However this definition assumes that there are no tied non-unit 
efficiencies. Since these are possible, the ordering has rank: 
(7.4.2*) 1= TE1 = TE1 = ... = TE1 > TE2 > ... > 
TEj+l-x 
where j is the number of inefficient branches, and x is the number of tied 
non-unit efficiency scores. That is, adjusting for ties at inefficient organisations 
lowers the rank of the efficiency ordering to j+1-x. 
in principle, the adjustment (x) for ties in non-unit efficiencies could alter the 
relationship between a comparable CRS and VRS ranking. In (7.4.2) the rank of the 
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VRS technology was given as j+1; and in (7.4.3) the CRS rank is k+1 where 
in general (j + 1) < (k + 1) because CRS will identify fewer best-practice 
efficiencies. However if the number of tied non -best -practice efficiencies were 
sufficiently large under CRS then (j +1- xvrs) > (k +1- xcrs) is feasible. Le., 
the rank of the VRS technology could be greater than under CRS if the number of 
additional non-unit ties under CRS (xcrs) is sufficiently large. It has to be said 
however that this is unlikely. In the many applications (both published and 
unpublished) that I have seen, the number of ties in non-unit efficiencies under 
both CRS or VRS is relatively small. 
In the VRS results in Chapter 3j= 52 with 1 tie (between Northants and 
Hereford, TE = 0.9726). Hence the efficiency ordering has rank j+1-x= 52. 
Taking the clustered results as a whole there are 62 best-practice LEAs under VRS 
leaving j= 34 non-unit efficiencies. A small number of the latter are tied; 
however, at 4 decimal places all inefficient scores were distinct and x=0. Hence 
the rank of the efficiency ordering, j+1-x, is 35. 
It is clear that the clustered results taken as a whole yield a far less distinct 
picture of performance. Numbers of best-practice were significantly lower in Chapter 
3 (44 as against 62 in this Chapter) such that finer variations in performance in 
efficiency were identified. This suggests that the discriminating power of Data 
Envelopment Analysis improves with the size of the cross section. That is, the rank 
of the efficiency ordering, j+1-x, rises with n, the size of the cross section. 4 
Parkan (1987) has suggested that a further improvement in discriminating power 
may lie in the iterative use of the DEA program under either CRS or VRS 
technologies. The program may be computed initially over all n establishments. The 
latter may then be separated into relatively efficient and inefficient subsets. The 
program may then be re-computed on the efficient subset only. This will break 
down the units originally identified as best-practice into two smaller groups. One of 
these will still have unit-efficiency scores, but the second group (best-practice in the 
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initial run of the program) will now be relatively inefficient. Subsequent 
re-computations of the program may then be undertaken on the remaining 
best-practice units. At each run the number of best-practice units remaining will 
fall, gradually extending the efficiency ordering. It is unlikely however that this 
iterative procedure would complete the efficiency ordering. A comparison of the 
London, Metropolitan and county clusters of LEAs suggested that smaller cross 
sections are less discriminating than larger ones. Hence the addition to the ordering 
at each subsequent iteration of the program would probably fall until a "core" of 
best-practice units is reached. 
The discriminating power of DEA will also be affected by the size of variable 
set, in addition to the effects of alternative scale assumptions. Following Nunamaker 
(1985), Tompkins and Green (1988) suggested that because dominance on merely a 
single variable is sufficient to yield an efficiency score of unity, the probability of 
best-practice rises with the size of the variable set. Accordingly, it is possible to 
enhance the efficiency status of organisations by the inclusion of additional variables 
in the model. In some circumstances this could take the form of a policy of 
extreme specialisation, wherein a particular organisation becomes dominant simply 
because no other units have a presence in the chosen area of specialisation. This 
aspect of the problem of discrimination may be limited by the use of variable sets 
based on core activities alone. Ceteris paribus, to obtain the maximum distinction 
among efficiencies requires the use of a smaller number of input and output 
variables to describe the production process. 
Discriminating power could be increased still further by the introduction of a 
more exacting dominance criterion. Conventionally, dominance in only a single 
variable is sufficient for best-practice. A stronger criterion would be dominance on 
all variables. This would generally produce a much smaller number of best-practice. 
However this criterion may be so exacting in some circumstances as to reduce the 
number of best-practice to zero, i. e., no units in the sample might be dominant in 
all dimensions. In the absence of best-practice the relative efficiency measure is 
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undefined and the performance comparison breaks down. In many practical 
applications, therefore, this criterion may be too demanding. 
At this point it is possible to summarise the main influences on discriminating 
power and the efficiency ordering: (1) the size of the cross section; (2) the size of 
the variable set; and (3) the scale assumption. To maximise the discriminating power 
of DEA on all 3 criteria suggests the use of the largest feasible cross section (to 
make the comparison on each variable more exacting); the use of the smallest 
realistic variable set (to exclude dominance on obscure aspects of production) and a 
CRS technology ( which dominates all empirical alternatives, viz., varying returns 
and non-increasing returns to scale). Each of these stategies will tend to limit the 
identification of best-practice and thereby increase the discriminating power of DEA. 
(2) The choice of a peer group 
An important additional aspect of the discriminating power of DEA is its ability 
to choose a meaningful group of peer LEAs which have similar characteristics to 
those of an inefficient LEA. 5 In Chapter 3 the peer LEAs chosen were often 
counter-intuitive. For example, West Sussex and Wiltshire are contained in the peer 
groups for the London LEAs Bromley, Havering and Richmond. Inasfar as these 
LEAs bear little resemblance to the inefficient LEA, this would seem to undermine 
the regular recommendation in the literature that the attainment of targets is assisted 
by appeal to the peer group (see Bowlin (1987,1986), Thanassoulis et al (1987) 
and the discussion in Chapter 4). The potential dissimilarity of peer LEAs is an 
important justification of the clustering of LEAs into administrative groupings prior 
to computation since the peer groups then chosen by DEA can only be drawn from 
the appropriate "home" cluster. 
The difference in peer groups in the clustered and non-clustered results can be 
seen in tables 7.4.1 (a), (b) and (c). It is apparent that the peer LEAs have 
changed substantially using the smaller clustered cross sections. In the London 
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boroughs none of the peer groups are identical with the results reported in Chapter 
3. In the Metropolitan authorities only four peer groups have not changed (those for 
Oldham, Salford, Tameside and Gateshead) and in the counties only three are 
identical (for Avon, Gloucestershire and Shropshire). Often, however, the difference 
in peer groups is small (perhaps one LEA has been removed or added, as in the 
case of Haringey). 
Table 7.4.1. (a). 
DEA discriminating power and peer group comparisons in 
the London boroughs. 
LEA Efficiency Efficiency Peer Croup Peer Group 
clustered all LEAs clustered all LEAs 
1. Barking 1.000 0.961 1 25,44 
3. Bexley 1.000 0.971 3 50,59,86, 
95 
5. Bromley 1.000 0.911 5 48,78,95 
6. Croydon 0.962 0.939 718,12Y15, 2,15o5O, 
19 59 
8. Enfield 1.000 0.997 8 2,7,15, 
50,59 
9. Haringey 0.992 0.992 4,7,16 4,16,48 
11. Havering 1.000 0.891 11 10,26,82 
86,96 
13. Hounslow 1.000 0.961 13 2,7,22,50 
14. Kingston 0.980 0.965 2,12,15, 2,19,48 
19 
17. Redbridge 0.963 0.940 7)8,12,15 2,7,50,59 
19 
18. Richmond 0.907 0.853 2,3,7,12, 2,15,19,48, 
15,19 95 
20. Waltham F 1.000 0.853 20 7,16,22,48 
21. ILEA 0.805 0.788 7,15,16 4,16,48 
Number best-practice 
London : 15 8 
Notes : See table 7.4.1. (c). 
Source: Author' s calculations. 
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Table 7.4.1. (b). 
DEA discriminating power and peer group comparisons in 
the Metropolitan boroughs. 
LEA Efficiency 
clustered 
Efficiency 
all LEAs 
Peer Croup 
clustered 
Peer Croup 
all LEAs 
24. Dudley 1.000 0.979 24 19,23,50p 
64,86 
27. Walsall 0.902 0.895 28,30,46,48, 28,46P48P 
50 50 
31. St Helens 1.000 0.929 31 46,50164 
32. Sefton 1.000 0.953 32 19,50$64P 
86 
33. Wirral 1.000 0.934 33 19p5O, 64$ 
86 
34. Bolton 0.926 0.910 28,50 48$50,78p 
95 
35. Bury 0.945 0.904 26,32P40,50 19,50,95 
36. Manchester 0.874 0.872 23,25,30,46 25,30,44, 
64 
37. Oldham 0.986 0.986 44P48 44,48 
38. Rochdale 0.856 0.834 37$50 44,48,78 
39. Salford 0.881 0.881 44,46,48 44,46,48 
40. Stockport 1.000 0.951 40 48,78,95 
41. Tameside 0.952 0.952 46,48P50 46,48ý50 
42. Trafford 1.000 0.933 42 50,78,86, 
95 
43. Wigan 1.000 0.901 43 46,50,64, 
86 
47. Sheffield 0.933 0.909 26,28p46,50p 26,28P46P 
55 50759 
51. Leeds 0.944 0.987 48,50 48,50P78P 
95 
53. Cateshead 0.935 0.935 46p48$52 46,48,52 
54. Newcastle 0.804 0.856 26,46,50 22P78786 
Number best-practice 
Metropolitan : 24 17 
Notes : See table 7.4.1. (c). 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Although most of the peer groups are different in the clustered analysis, this is 
to be expected in some measure after the cross section has been re-defined. Indeed 
one of the main arguments for clustering was that the selection of peers should be 
adjusted such that they are drawn only from a comparable group of LEAs. 
Consequently, Newcastle-upon-Tyne for example, is now compared with its 
Metropolitan counterparts Solihull, Rotherham and Kirklees. In the non-clustered 
analysis the peer group included the seemingly dissimilar authorities in the Isle of 
Wight and Northumberland in addition to a more intuitive comparison with 
Birmingham (see table 7.4.1 (b)). This example apparently lends some support to 
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Table 7.4.1(c) 
DEA discriminating power and peer group comparisons in the 
English counties 
LEAs Efficiency 
clustered 
Efficiency 
all LEAs 
Peer Croup 
clustered 
Peer Croup 
all LEAs 
58. Avon 0.922 0.922 59178,86, 59,78o86, 
95 95 
63. Cheshire 0.942 0.925 78,80,86, 48,78,86, 
95 95 
67. Derbyshire 1.000 0.994 67 45,46,50, 
82,86 
68. Devon 0.961 0.958 67,70v78, 48,86,92, 
86,92,96 96 
69. Dorset 0.984 0.985 78,50,95, 50,59,86, 
96 95 
70. Durham 1.000 0.982 70 28,44,48, 
86 
71. E Sussex 0.983 0.958 78,80,95 48,78,86, 
95 
72. Essex 0.966 0.963 59,78,95 48,78,95 
73. Cloucestersh 0.969 0.969 61,81,86, 61,81,86, 
95,96 95,96 
74. Hampshire 0.963 0.963 78,95,96 50,59,86, 
95 
75. Here & Worcs 0.977 0.973 59,78,81, 48,78,86, 
86,90 90,95 
76. Hertfordsh 0.922 0.903 59P61,95 2,19,48s 
95 
79. Kent 0.994 0.969 67,78,80, 50,78,86, 
81,86,95 95 
80. Lancashire 1.000 0.992 80 65,82 
83. Norfolk 0.954 0.947 77,81,86, 48,86 
90 
85. Northamptonsh 0.986 0.973 64,78,81, 48,86,90, 
86,96 96 
87. Nottinghamsh 0.973 0.937 64,67,70, 44,46,48, 
77,81 86,96 
88. Oxfordsh 1.000 0.999 88 86,88,95, 
96 
89. Shropshire 0.929 0.929 81,86,90, 81,86,90, 
96 96 
91. Staffordsh 0.957 0.926 67,78,80 44,48,78, 
86 
Number best-practice 
Counties: 23 19 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Numbers best-practice 
All clusters : 62 44 (table 7.4.1(a), (b) & (c)) 
(1) Column 1 contains efficiency scores based on the 3 
separate administrative clusters of LEAs. 
(2) Column 2 contains the efficiency scores from Chapter 3 
based on a single frontier for all 96 LEAs. 
(3) The peer groups in column 3 originated in the clustered 
analyses of performance and those in column 4 in the 
whole-sample evaluation undertaken in Chapter 3. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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the argument in Chapter 4 that there is no clear, formal link between the peer 
group and less inefficient production. In particular the larger, "indiscriminant" 
comparison of all 96 LEAs in Chapter 3 appears to have led to the selection of 
counter-intuitive peers in many cases. However restricting the comparison to a 
smaller group of more comparable authorities seems to have defined more acceptable 
peers for inefficient authorities. In this case the widespread recommendation in the 
literature of the peer group as a blueprint for improving inefficient performance is 
more plausible. Equally, for as long as there is evidence that the performance 
comparison is too broad, the peer group loses much of its significance. 
(3) The existence of targets 
A third element in discriminating power is the ability of DEA to identify an 
accurate target. A clear definition of the target is crucial for the adjustment of 
performance at the inefficient LEA. The possibility that target performance may 
have changed with the choice of the cross section is explored in table 7.4.2 (a) and 
(b) which compares the input targets for teaching expenditure per pupil in the 
clustered and non-clustered DEA results. Note that table 7.4.2 includes only those 
LEAs with non-unit efficiency scores in both sets of results to reduce its size to 
more tractable proportions. 
In both the counties and the urban authorities, the non-clustered results from 
Chapter 3 suggest the greater adjustments in teaching expenditure. The average 
adjustment to spending in the counties is 5 per cent in the non-clustered context 
and 3.7 per cent in in the clustered results (table 7.4.2(b)). Similarly, the average 
non-clustered target for the urban authorities suggests a larger adjustment of 9.2 per 
cent in teaching expenditure, as against an average of 8.2 percent in the separate 
clusters (table 7.4.2(a)). It is noteable that in either set of results the urban 
authorities have the larger potential savings. Indeed, the average target for the 
urban authorities on a clustered basis (= L622) is very close to the actual average 
spend in the counties. 
207 
The efficiency status of some individual LEAs has changed dramatically after 
clustering. Havering, for example, had one of the ten lowest efficiencies (TE = 
0.89) in the non-clustered DEA run, on which basis it could be recommended to 
make an eleven per cent cut in teaching spend per pupil. Yet the DEA results 
estimated on the London LEAs alone suggested that Havering is best-practice such 
that no resource reductions could be recommended. 6 
Large changes in the target spend are also apparent at other authorities - for 
example Richmond, Bury, Nottinghamshire and Staffordshire. In most cases 
efficiency status has improved such that their potential savings in the clustered DEA 
runs are smaller. However, two of the rural LEAs, Dorset and Norfolk, together 
with the Metropolitan borough of Newcastle are less efficient on the clustered basis. 
A few other authorities (Oldham, Salford, Gateshead, Avon, Gloucestershire and 
Shropshire) have a consistent efficiency evaluation irrespective of the cross section in 
which their efficiencies have been evaluated. It will also be noted that these LEAs 
have identical peer groups in the clustered and the whole-sample evaluation. In this 
small kernal of inefficient authorities, the DEA efficiency ratings would appear to be 
unequivocal. With stable peer groups there is, in principle, clearer information to 
improve productive performance. 
Yet for the 18 authorities like Havering newly rated best-practice in the 
clustered runs, there remains considerable ambiguity over their performance. The 
efficiency of Waltham Forest and Havering, for example, has risen dramatically: 
from, respectively, 0.85 and 0.89 to unity using the clustered cross sections. 
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Table 7.4.2(a) 
The target level of teaching expenditure per pupil before 
and after clustering in London and the Metropolitan boroughs 
LEA Actual Target 
Clus- 
tered 
Target Saving 
Clus- 
tered 
% 
Saving 
% 
London Boroughs 
6. Croydon 664 638 623 3.9 6.2 
9. Haringey 761 755 755 0.8 0.8 
14. Kingston 644 631 621 2.0 3.6 
17. Redbridge 668 643 628 3.7 6.0 
18. Richmond 707 641 603 9.3 14.7 
21. ILEA 883 671 657 24.0 25.6 
Metropolitan Boroughs 
27. Walsall 667 602 597 9.7 10.5 
34. Bolton 641 590 582 8.0 9.2 
35. Bury 652 616 589 5.5 9.7 
36. Manchester 749 654 653 12.7 12.8 
37. Oldham 589 581 581 1.4 1.4 
38. Rochdale 686 587 572 14.4 16.6 
39. Salford 684 603 603 11.8 11.8 
41. Tameside 620 590 589 4.8 5.0 
47. Sheffield 669 624 608 6.7 9.1 
51. Leeds 588 585 580 0.5 1.4 
53. Gateshead 638 593 593 7.1 7.1 
54. Newcastle 739 594 634 19.6 14.2 
Average (London and Metropolitan) 
681 622 615 8.1 9.2 
Notes : See table 7.4.2 (b). 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Some variation in targets is to be expected in a smaller cross section because 
best-practice will have changed. However it is not encouraging that efficiency status 
has changed dramatically in some individual cases. This has two important 
implications. In the first instance it suggests the target may be subject to significant 
and unpredictable change. The scale of adjustments required to improve inefficient 
organisational performance have become unclear with substantially different 
implications for future funding. Secondly, it undermines the Pareto interpretation of 
the target which is widely found in the literature. For example in the clustered 
results Waltham Forest is best-practice and by convention Pareto efficient. However 
the broader comparison in Chapter 3 found it had a non-unit efficiency of 0.85 and 
so, by the same convention, it cannot be Pareto efficient. 
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Table 7.4.2 (b). 
The target level of teaching expenditure per pupil before 
and after clustering in the English counties. 
LEA Actual Target Target Savings Savings 
Clus- Clus- 
tered tered 
Ez%% 
58. Avon 638 588 588 7.8 7.8 
63. Cheshire 632 595 584 5.9 7.6 
68. Devon 616 592 585 3.9 5.0 
69. Dorset 604 589 595 2.5 1.5 
71. E Sussex 617 607 591 1.6 4.2 
72. Essex 602 582 579 3.3 3.8 
73. Cloucestersh 622 603 603 3.1 3.1 
74. Hampshire 618 616 595 0.3 3.7 
75. Here & Worcs 602 588 586 2.3 2.7 
76. Herts 664 612 599 7.8 9.8 
79. Kent 605 601 586 0.7 3.1 
83. Norfolk 623 594 601 4.7 3.5 
85. Northhants 609 601 592 1.3 2.8 
87. Nottinghamsh 637 620 597 2.7 6.3 
89. Shropshire 639 594 594 7.0 7.0 
91. Staffordsh 635 608 588 4.3 7.4 
Average: 623 599 591 3.7 5.0 
Notes : The target in column 3 and the savings in column 5 
originate in the non-clustered analysis in Chapter 3 
Source: Author's calc ulations. 
This difficulty with targets goes back to a general problem in relative efficiency 
measurement of comparing like with like. 7 There may be grounds in some cases for 
a smaller number of comparisons to exclude non-comparable organisations. The LEA 
data set was grouped into 3 smaller clusters in an attempt to improve the peer 
group comparison. It was argued that the peer might be more appropriately defined 
in terms of LEAs operating in similar conditions. 
It is perhaps not unreasonable to suggest that local authority management would 
argue that membership of the cross section should be restricted. London boroughs 
for example may feel that the inclusion of rural authorities in the comparison 
unfairly depresses their efficiency score. 
Nunamaker (1985) argued that organisations have incentives to manipulate their 
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efficiency score through expansion of the input-ouput variable set. This increases the 
probability that an organisation will dominate in at least one dimension. With equal 
effect organisations can protect future funding by arguing for smaller numbers of 
comparisons and hence, in effect, higher efficiency scores. 
Clearly there are several reasons for varying the size of the cross section used 
in evaluation. Some of these - for example the manipulation of efficiency scores - 
are less compelling. In other circumstances, however, restricting membership may be 
more appropriate. The clustering approach in this Chapter was an attempt to add 
meaning to the peer group comparison, so that inner city boroughs would not be 
compared with prosperous rural authorities facing quite different problems. 
However there should be limits to the extent to which the performance 
comparison is curtailed. All authorities can presumably point to some unique feature 
in their catchment area. To attempt to take account of all such factors would have 
high costs and ultimately make relative efficiency measurement meaningless. 
To bring section 7.4 to a close the following conclusions can be noted. It is 
apparent that several aspects of DEA are not invariant to the size of the cross 
section used to explore performance. The replication of the LEA results on a 
clustered basis has shown that the efficiency score and its associated target, together 
with the peer group are susceptible to substantial (and largely unpredictable) change 
as the size of the cross section is altered. Accordingly, as smaller numbers of LEAs 
were compared, the DEA-efficiency scores tended to rise (table 7.4.1) and the 
implied resource reductions (in general) fell (table 7.4.2), and the peer groups for 
inefficient LEAs were reselected (table 7.4.1). Combining the results from the three 
clusters yielded 18 additional best-practice LEAs; these significantly reduced the rank 
of the efficiency ordering vis a vis the broader comparison in Chapter 3. 
The ambiguity of best-practice performance in the results calls into question 
the pervasive Pareto interpretation of DEA-efficiency in the literature (e. g. in Lewin 
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and Morey (1981)). The results in this section are therefore consistent with the a 
priori arguments in Chapter 6 on the distinct definitions of Pareto and DEA- 
efficiency. 
7.5. Conclusion 
This Chapter has investigated spects, of the discriminating power of Data 
Envelopment Analysis. This was achieved via an examination of frontier efficiency in 
administrative clusters of LEAs. The clustering procedure was prompted by a desire 
to ensure that the performance comparison was of "like -with -like". On this basis 
three separate (and smaller) frontier comparisons were undertaken - of London 
boroughs, of Metropolitan boroughs and of the English counties. In principle, each 
of these clusters has greater internal homogeneity than the whole-sample comparison 
of rural and urban LEAs; and the peer may not be drawn from among authorities 
to which the inefficient LEA bears less resemblence. 
The clustering procedure constitutes a form of sensitivity analysis. Earlier work 
(e. g. Charnes et al (1985) and Nunamaker (1985)) concentrated on the effects of 
adding or deleting variables from the model. Clustering, by contrast, examines the 
effects of altering the size of the comparison for a given number of variables. 
The clustered results provide evidence that three aspects of DEA are not 
invariant to the size of the cross section used to evaluate performance. These are 
(1) the number of untied efficiency scores; (2) the choice of peer group; and (3) 
the existence of targets. Each of these is important in the identification and (where 
necessary) adjustment of operations for improved performance. For example, the 
ranking of outcomes (however derived) has been widely undertaken in the literature 
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on educational evaluation - see the league tables constructed by Gray and Jesson 
(1987) on the basis of exam pass rates. The definition of a peer group, meanwhile, 
broaches the general problem of comparabilty in relative efficiency measures. 
In the clustered performance, relatively larger numbers of best-practice were 
identified in each cluster. The most marked change occurred in London where 13 
authorities achieved best-practice as against only 6 in Chapter 3. Similar changes 
were noted in the other clusters. 
The increase in best-practice decreased the rank of the efficiency ordering. In 
Chapter 3,51 authorities had untied non-unit efficiencies giving the input-efficiency 
ordering rank 52; the clustered results identified an additional 18 best-practice 
authorities and so the rank of the efficiency ordering of the whole cross section 
(summing across clusters) is reduced to 35. The ability of DEA to identify finer 
variations in performance appears to be limited by the size of the cross section. 
Hence a smaller number of comparisons will in general lead to more tied efficiency 
scores as the number of best-practice rises. 
The definition of a meaningful peer group touches on the problem of 
comparing like-with-like in relative efficiency measures. "Non -comparable" units 
should be excluded in the selection of the peer group. This implies restricting 
membership of the cross section such that peers can only be drawn from the same 
family of organisations. The clustering which this suggests may lead to the selection 
of a more intuitive peer group. For example, in the non-clustered analysis the peer 
group for Newcastle-upon-Tyne included the seemingly dissimilar authorities in the 
Isle of Wight and Northumberland. After clustering, the peer group included only 
Solihull, Rotherharn and Kirklees. Likewise all other peer groups were selected only 
from the appropriate "home" cluster of authorities. This meant that in nearly all 
cases8 the peer group changed vis a vis that selected in Chapter 3. In principle the 
new peer groups are more intuitive than their predecessors and may come closer to 
fulfilling the role of operational blueprints for improved performance. Unless the 
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peer group fulfils this role, its identification in DEA is of little practical purpose 
and in this sense the discriminating power of DEA is curtailed. Clearly the 
definition of a meaningful peer group is an area for future research. 
The new targets identified from the clustered results were less satisfactory than 
the new peer group comparisons. In some individual cases (eg Waltham Forest, 
Havering and Wigan) efficiency has changed dramatically leading to the complete 
elimination of the target. Efficiency scores on the whole were higher, reducing the 
potential savings from targets. The average target in the urban authorities suggested 
potential savings of around 8.1 per cent, falling from 9.2 per cent in the 
non-clustered analysis (table 7.4.2(a)); in the counties the average savings fell from 
5 per cent to just 3.7 per cent (table 7.4.2(b)) suggesting that rural performance is 
relatively better than in the urban authorities - irrespective of the breadth of the 
comparison underlying the efficiency scores. 
The marked changes in efficiency after clustering, especially the increasing 
preponderance of best-practice calls into question the pervasive Pareto interpretation 
of DEA-efficiency in the literature. For example, can an LEA like Waltham Forest 
with an efficiency score of 0.85 be credibly considered best-practice after clustering? 
The large change in the efficiency status of LEAs like Waltham Forest is due to 
the less exacting nature of the performance comparison in the smaller clusters, 
which significantly raises an authority's probability of dominance on at least one 
variable (see table 7.3.1). Since in some circumstances the appropriate size of the 
performance comparison may be disputed (because of problems in confronting like- 
with-like) it may not be possible to pin down an unambiguous set of best-practice. 
Other things equal, the probablity of dominance in LEAs will vary according to the 
choice of cross section. This undermines the credibility of DEA-dominance as an 
evaluation criterion since it does not define clearly those levels of performance 
which might, in principle, be attainable. In this sense, the clustered results are 
consistent with the arguments in Chapter 6 on the distinct definitions of Pareto and 
DEA-efficiency - in particular that DEA best-practice may be an inferior definition 
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of dominance. 
Finally, it was noted that the proportion of best-practice was relatively higher 
in the smaller, clustered cross sections. The smaller of the LEA groups, the 21 
London boroughs, had the largest proportion of best-practice; similarly, the largest 
of the clusters, the 39 counties, had the lowest proportion of best-practice. This 
suggested that the discriminating power of DEA can be increased by broadening the 
evaluation cross section to include more DMUs. 
Various other strategies were also identified in order to reduce the sensitivity of 
DEA to the size of the cross section. For a fixed number of DMUs, a CRS 
technology will dominate VRS or MRS (non-increasing returns) alternatives so that 
in general the numbers of best-practice will be lower under constant returns. 
Secondly, a smaller number of variables is likely to reduce the set of dominant 
units (Nunamaker (1985)). Tied unit-efficiencies can therefore be limited by 
restricting the variable set to "core" activities alone. Parkan (1987) also suggested 
the iterative use of DEA to break best-practice ties. 
Footnotes. 
1. The concept of a complete ordering over states of the world is discussed at 
greater length in Sen (1973), Chapter 1. 
2. Even this unlikely circumstance could not guarentee the identification of a single 
best-practice establishment since two or more could dominate (i. e., tie) on the 
variable in question. 
3.4 is the maximum number of decimal places reported in the program to which I 
have had access. Clearly ties can be broken by reporting the efficiency score to a 
greater number of decimal places. However at some point the extra digits cease to 
have any meaning. 
4. Note that in very large cross sections the ranking would be unlikely to be 
completed. A complete efficiency ordering with no ties would require the existence 
of a single best-practice DMU and no ties in non-unit efficiencies. 
5. Formal aspects of the definition of the peer group are discussed in Fare and 
Hunsaker (1986) and Fare, Lovell and Zieschang (1983). 
6. As already indicated, table 7.4.2 includes only those LEAs with non-unit 
efficiency scores in both clustered and non-clustered results. Hence Havering is 
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excluded from table 7.4.2(a) but can alternatively be found in table 7.4.1(a). 
7. The discussion in section 6.6 of Chapter 6 gives further examples of problems in 
defining efficiency in relative terms. 
8. At some inefficient authorities the peer group was identical in both the clustered 
and non-clustered results (i. e. at Oldham, Salford, Tameside, Gateshead, Avon, 
Gloucestershire and Shropshire). The stability of these peer groups suggests that they 
are robust to changes in the breadth of the comparison and that they are drawn 
from the appropriate LEA family. In these circumstances the peer group comparison 
is a much more plausible indicator of what (and how) the inefficient authority may 
be able to achieve. 
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Chapter 8. A conclusion and appraisal 
This Chapter discusses some of the conclusions which have arisen during the 
course of the thesis and adds some suggestions for future research. 
This thesis has approached the problem of relative efficiency measurement in 
the public sector using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). It is the first 
comprehensive study of its kind outside the United States. The use of DEA is 
particularly appropriate because of the defects in traditional methodologies and the 
broader problems of public sector evaluation. 
Traditional studies of efficiency have typically scaled performance in terms of 
the average standard embodied in least squares cost or production functions. By 
definition, an average efficiency comparison cannot hope to eliminate the full extent 
of wasted potential in production. Consequently in real applications, an OLS cost 
function would tend to legitimise some degree of inefficient performance. 
An organisation producing t outputs from m inputs is able to define txm 
ratio measures of performance. A priori, however, there is nothing which guarantees 
these will give a consistent overview of production. In this context a less ambiguous 
evaluation of production suggests a total-f actor view of efficiency. 
The problems associated with average efficiency comparisons and simple ratio 
indicators can be overcome in the use of Data Envelopment Analysis. DEA 
embodies the total-factor view of efficiency and so it gives a consistent summary of 
performance in a multiple-output setting. Equally it compares outcomes with the 
best observed practice and so it accords with the more exacting principle of a 
frontier efficiency comparison. 
Early work with DEA, viz. Farrell (1957) and Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1981,1979,1978), made unnecessarily restrictive scale assumptions regarding the 
217 
shape of the underlying technology. Consequently the non-parametric approach was 
generally over-shadowed by the use of statistical frontier techniques - although these 
themselves were not without serious problems. By the mid-1980s however the Indian 
economist Rajiv Banker had developed a program which permitted a more realistic 
computation of the frontier with "varying returns to scale". 
The thesis has taken advantage of the revised Banker program to estimate the 
efficiency of production in two areas of the British public sector. The first case 
study, in Chapter 3, examined data on the performance of local authority production 
of education; and the second, in Chapter 4, the incarceration of inmates in a group 
of 33 prisons with a high remand population. 
Existing sources of performance indicators such as the supplementary volumes 
of the public expenditure white paper contain a confusing range of measures in 
these areas. The use of DEA offers an alternative source of performance "statistic" 
yielding a more consistent overview of operations than is possible with traditional 
measures. Hence in the analysis of local authority (LEA) spending, the performance 
of all 96 English LEAs was reduced to a simple scalar reflecting their total-factor 
productivity. The performance of the prisons data set was similarly simplified in a 
manner which is broadly consistent with the aims of the Government's Financial 
Management Initiative. 
Of the 96 LEAs in the cross section in Chapter 3,44 obtained a score of 
unity and thus are relatively efficient in their management of teaching expenditure 
per pupil. The remainder, 52 in all, are relatively input inefficient to varying 
degrees, attaining an efficiency score less than unity. The results suggest the total 
potential reduction in spending per pupil across all LEAs averages 3.4 per cent. The 
distribution of these savings is not equal, however. The lowest efficiency scores were 
recorded among the London and Metroploitan authorities while the rural authorities 
appeared to perform rather better. It is possible that exam pass rates are not 
covering the full range of activities (outputs) provided by the higher spending urban 
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authorities. In this sense the comparison may have been discrimating unfairly, 
especially against the ILEA which in terms of student numbers and spending is 
almost in a league of its own. Future research would benefit from access to a 
broader range of output measures which, where possible, are defined as net rather 
than gross outputs. It would be in the interests of the authorities themselves to 
attempt to provide such information given the new emphasis in the Education 
Reform Act (1980) which emphasises public over professional accountability. 
A model of production at a group of 33 prisons was developed in Chapters 4 
and 5. It was found that relative to a varying returns technology around 4.6 per 
cent of their total cost could have been saved if all of these institutions had 
reached best-practice standards. However, under a more searching constant returns 
to scale assumption, total savings rose markedly to 13.1 per cent. The increase in 
excess costs under the constant returns technology reflects the inclusion of 
divergences from scale efficency. Taking account of the scale of operations 
dramatically affected the performance of certain institutions. Brixton is a case in 
point. Under VRS it obtained a unity efficiency ratio whilst under CRS its efficiency 
score fell to almost a half (0.53). Other establishments at Bedford, Oxford and 
Wormwood Scrubs for example, also experienced a marked fall in efficiency under 
constant returns. Using the Banker (1984) scale indicator it was possible to identify 
whether the scale problem was one of increasing or decreasing returns. Thus Brixton 
appeared to have very strong decreasing returns whilst others like Latchmere House 
had increasing returns. In the sample as a whole 17 prisons had IRS and 5 DRS, 
suggesting that there is scope for a policy of reallocation of prisoners. 
It is noticeable that under varying returns to scale the average reduction in 
costs at prisons and LEAs is reasonably small (in each case under 5 per cent). The 
value of the technique in these areas has been to identify those particular units 
whose performance is clearly well out of line with the bulk of the sample. Prisons 
at Leicester and Bedford for example had technical efficiencies of, respectively, 0.78 
and 0.71 in the more sympathetic varying returns comparison. 
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Although DEA has several advantages over other methodologies for performance 
evaluation, it nevertheless suffers from a variety of weaknesses which should be the 
subject of future research. One such topic is the acceptability and implementation 
of the DEA target which is designed to raise performance to best-practice 
standards. In an input-efficiency context a non-unity target implies a reduction in 
next period's funding. That is, the efficiency score for performance in period t is 
carried forward to affect funding in t+1. For this to be at all acceptable requires 
that the efficiency score genuinely reflects underlying performance. It is not clear 
that this will always be the case since DEA is deterministic whereby the whole of 
deviations from the frontier may be noise. It is essential that future research 
develops a stochastic Data Envelopment Analysis which takes full account of the 
noise element in measured behaviour. The beginnings of a new stochastic DEA are 
indeed currently being laid by Banker (1988). Other work in this area has been 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
Further difficulties in the use of targets and peer groups were evidenced in 
Chapter 7. In certain circumstances it may be appropriate to limit membership of 
the performance comparison. For example there are around 100 prisons of one type 
or another in the U. K. However only those with a significant remand content were 
included in the comparisons in Chapters 4 and 5. Since remand inmates are 
generally more costly to keep, it would have been unfair to broaden the cross 
section to include lower cost institutions. In the same way, Chapter 7 restricted the 
comparison of LEAs to administrative clusters which in principle have greater 
internal homogeneity. This ensured more intuitive peer group comparisons. However 
it also implies that the efficiency comparison is less discriminating and creates 
ambiguity over the size of the target (if any). 
Where noise or other problems are not thought to distort the results, there is 
the additional question of quality of service and efficiency. Higher costs may be the 
result of a better quality service which may suffer from future budget restrictions. In 
the evaluation of the target itself, it will be useful for decision-makers to have well 
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defined norms and references against which to asses quality. If conventional 
standards of service delivery cannot be attained from existing resources, then a 
cutback in funding is inappropriate. As Schuller (1989, p. 193) has observed - "One 
thing is ceretain: crude and punitve use of performance indicaters will set back the 
cause of appropriate and effective measurement many years". 
This touches on a more general need for the investigation of the 
implementation of public performance measures. Chapter 4 developed arguments 
which suggest that the increased work effort involved in reaching a target may be 
rejected by employees who have lower, preferred effort levels which maximise their 
utilities. In these circumstances, improved performance would require installation of a 
system of bribes and penalties to coerce labour into offering greater effort. Hence 
although DEA may be able to measure inefficiency, it is unable in itself to say 
precisely how targets are to be achieved. Similarly, the public expenditure white 
paper has grown dramatically in size in the past ten years. Nevertheless, it is not 
clear what impact the inclusion of these additional performance measures is having 
in actual practice in the public sector. 
There are two other important areas which require investigation. One is the 
development of formal variable -selection criteria. Currently there is no systematic 
procedure within DEA for selecting the input-output variables. In this sense, the 
efficiency score is ad hoc and open to manipulation. Organisations can seek to raise 
their efficiency status by increasing the number of variables in the model and 
arguing for the inclusion of unusual items on which the efficiency comparison is 
likely to be less demanding. As it stands, the literature has little to offer on this 
point, other than suggesting that the variable set should be "broadly representative" 
of the production process. 
Secondly, it has often been argued that an advantage of DEA is its ability to 
generate a complete set of weights on inputs and outputs. However the existence of 
legislation, convention and policy-preferences suggest that in some instances 
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decision-makers will prefer to choose some of their own weights. These may be 
computed in alternative programs which constrain the weights to reflect preferences 
and which will avoid key variables being weighted zero. Work of this nature has 
been begun recently by Beasley and Wong (1989) and Dyson and Thanassoulis (1988). 
More generally, and beyond the scope of Data Envelopment Analysis entirely, 
there is a need for research on the definition of public outputs. Attitudes have 
changed in recent years and less use is being made of input measures as crude 
proxies for outcomes. Nevertheless a great deal remains to be done in the definition 
and classification of public sector production. 
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Performance indicators for prisonsl 
Between 1978/79 and 1985/86 the number of prison officers increased by nearly 
19 per cent, while the average inmate population rose by less than 12 per cent. 
Over the same period expenditure on the prison service rose by 36 per cent in real 
terms and further increases over the next three years were announced in the latest 
Public Expenditure White Paper. 
A recent report by management consultants identifying widespread inefficiency 
in the prison service substantiates Government concern. Complementing in the 
service has been inflexible and overtime -driven; this has been combined with a 
divisive managerial structure. The objective of the Government's "Fresh Start" 
proposals - still the object of negotiation, though they were due to start being 
implemented in April 1987 - has been to introduce new working arrangements 
which would achieve greater efficiency in the use of manpower. A new system of 
delegated budgeting is part of the response. In April 1986 prison establishments were 
delegated full financial responsibility for the management of manpower resources. 
new costing system is being used by prison governors in the development of 
performance indicators to help allocate those resources in the most cost-effective 
manner. 
The sources of poor productivity in prisons can now be identified using a new 
input-output technique known as data envelope analysis (DEA). This technique has 
surpassed traditional efficiency measures such as the rate of return on capital and 
output per head which, insofar as they indicate the returns to only a single input, 
are no more than partial indicators of efficiency. Moreover, a spending Department 
may be in control of many establishments, each implementing such a range of 
policies that they require a comprehensive, summary performance indicator. 
Data envelope analysis provides an efficiency index which can be used to 
summarise the performance of establishments. The index is a single unambiguous 
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number which gives a less equivocal summary of performance than will a collection 
of productivity ratios, such as output per head. Central management can use the 
index to set poor performers targets for improving their output or reducing their 
costs. 
Naturally the outputs and inputs chosen to calculate the index should relate to 
the main objectives of the service. Published sources such as the annual prison 
department report give reasonably clear statements of Home Office objectives for 
the prison service. These seem directed at: 
(1) Secure containment of offenders; 
(2) The quality and rehabilitative effect of prison life; and 
(3) Efficient use of resources. 
Published sources contain no systematic information on the quality of prison 
life; they do, however, provide us with enough data to say something about the first 
and second objectives. 
Secure containment 
Though the term "data envelope analysis" may be unfamiliar, the technique is 
really no more than an - albeit sophisticated - extension of traditional ratio 
analysis. Suppose that the output of a prison is custody: this can be measured by 
the number of prisoner/days. One of the several inputs into prisoner/days is 
man/hours. Thus, a traditional productivity ratio describing the efficiency of a prison 
would be: 
prisoner/days 
man/hours 
Production, however, is seldom the result of applying labour alone; it is 
generally the result of applying labour in combination with power, equipment and 
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materials. That ratio, therefore, is really measuring the efficiency not of labour as 
such but of a combination of production factors that together make up a whole 
establishment. 
To see the difference between traditional analysis and data envelope analysis, 
take a prison with two outputs, 4,000 prisoner/days and 80 units of security, defined 
as the number of punished offences such as assaults and escapes committed by 
inmates. (Like many such intermediate outputs, that definition is ambiguous: insofar 
as it represents work done by staff done in dealing with offences, a high figure 
could indicate efficiency; but insofar as it also reflects general standards of 
behaviour and education within the prison, a low figure could denote greater 
effectiveness. ) Together with those outputs, there are three prison inputs, man/hours, 
energy consumption, and materials. 
Leads to (outputs): 
One unit of input: prisoner/day unit of security 
Man/hours 10 0.2 
Materials 20 0.4 
Energy 50 1.0 
As the table shows, the traditional approach yields six performance ratios 
measured in three different units - units of labour, materials and energy. For each 
man/hour ten prisoner days result, but only one fifth of a unit of security. 
Similarly, for each unit of energy, 50 prisoner days and one unit of security obtain. 
On the assumption that the incarceration of larger numbers (more prisoner/days) can 
only be considered of benefit if security is not jeopardised, the simple arithmetic 
underlying these figures does not tell the decision-maker how to trade off one 
against the other. 
Since public sector decision-makers are unwilling or unable to reveal their 
priorities for outcomes, that can only be done weighting the value of producing one 
output against that of another. Data envelope analysis is a specialised linear program 
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which can objectively weight outputs and inputs so that the traditional productivity 
ratios illustrated above can be summarised into a single measure of efficiency. The 
program would, on the basis of data fed into it, choose the weights (w) appropriate 
to each input and output in such a way as to form an overall productivity ratio: 
wl(prisoner/days) + w2(security) 
w3(man/hours) + w4(materials) + w5(energy) 
In this way, the details of traditional productivity ratios can be combined into a 
comprehensive summary ratio, which is simply a weighted average of the prison's 
outputs relative to a weighted average of its inputs. These weights are carefully 
chosen by the program so that the resulting efficiency index lies somewhere between 
nought and one. 
Efficient use of resources 
According to the DEA index if a local prison is not wasting resources in 
comparison with the others then it will score 1.0 and is said to be relatively 
efficient or "best -practice". A result of less than 1.0 means a prison has a peer 
group of similar prisons which are performing better than itself. In this case, the 
prison is said to be relatively inefficient vis-a-vis this peer group. 
In order to illustrate this, we have looked at 25 local English prisons, 15 of 
which score achieve a score of 1.0 on the index. These are the best-practice 
prisons. The remainder, ten in all, are relatively inefficient to varying degrees, with 
scores below 1.0; for these, the program has chosen a peer group of comparable 
best-practice prisons. Thus the line managers in Birmingham, for example, can be 
asked to get their performance up to the relatively better managerial and work 
practices at Leeds and Oxford prisons. 
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Table 1: Efficiency scores and peer groups 
Prison Efficiency Best-practice peer group 
Bedford 0.72 Leeds, Oxford 
Birmingham 0.82 Leeds, Oxford 
Bristol 1.00 
Brixton 1.00 
Canterbury 0.79 Gloucester, Leeds, Shrewsbury 
Cardiff 0.90 Gloucester, Leeds 
Dorchester 1.00 
Durham 0.97 Gloucester, Leeds, Liverpool, 
Manchester 
Exeter 0.81 Gloucester, Leeds, Oxford, 
Shrewsbury 
Gloucester 1.00 
Leeds 1.00 
Leicester 1.00 
Lewes 0.81 Leeds, Oxford 
Lincoln 1.00 
Liverpool 1.00 
Manchester 1.00 
Norwich 0.84 Leeds, Oxford 
Oxford 1.00 
Pentonville 1.00 
Reading 1.00 
Shrewsbury 1.00 
Swansea 1.00 
Wandsworth 1.00 
Winchester 0.81 Bristol, Leeds, Ma nchester, 
Oxford 
Wormwood Scrubs 0.66 Leeds, Oxford 
Source: derived from Prison Department Report, 1984-1985; 
Prison Statistics, 1984. 
Greater efficiency should lead to lower costs. Taking account of the levels of 
security and standards of living these prisons are providing, the results suggest that 
the inefficient prisons could indeed have run on lower budgets in 1984/85. The 
point is most apparent in poor performers such as Wormwood Scrubs, for which the 
DEA index is 0.66. This means that its peer group prisons are Leeds and Oxford, 
are providing similar levels of service at two-thirds the cost. If the comparison is a 
reasonable one, targeted reductions in costs of about one-third could have been 
advised in this case, reducing expenditure for manpower and non-manpower costs 
combined from Lm16.2 to LmlO. 5, leading to savings of around Lm5.8. The 
remainder of the savings - ranging from L800,000 in Cardiff and Durham to Em2.3 
in Birmingham - are justified by making similar comparisons with prisons found in 
the peer groups (see table 2). 
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Most of the savings came, as might be expected, on the manpower side, but it 
is striking that the least inefficient prisons were actually doing quite as well as far 
as non-manpower costs are concerned. If it had not been for their inefficient 
manning, t ey would scarcely have merited an appearance in the table. All told, if 
all the prisons were to achieve their targets, they could have yielded a saving of 
over 8 per cent in manpower costs, and nearly 10 per cent in non-manpower costs. 
Total savings would amount to EmO. 
In principle, these savings can be thought of as minimal, because additional 
targets might also be set for the so-called best-practice establishments. After all, 
these are not themselves necessarily efficient in an absolute sense, but only in 
comparison with others. They are, in other words, the best of a poor bunch, and 
consequently the prison department may wish to set them additional targets. 
This could be done on the basis of extra information obtained from further 
detailed scrutiny, such as was undertaken for the joint Prison Department/PA 
Management Consultants report on complementing in the service. The study team 
visited 33 representative penal establishments, and concluded that better manpower 
utilisation was possible if the restrictions inherent in the present shift and pay 
systems were removed. Across the service as a whole - which includes other types 
of establishment in addition to local prisons - this could translate into savings of 15 
to 20 per cent of total costs. 
How, in practice, could those targets be set and the savings achieved? 
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Table 2: Targets and savings 
Prison Actual Target 
costs spending spending Potential savings 
Lm % 
All 203 185 17 8.6 
manpower 157 144 13 8.2 
non-manpower 46 42 5 9.9 
Bedford 5.0 3.6 1.4 28 
manpower 3.8 2.8 1.1 28 
non-manpower 1.1 0.8 0.3 29 
Birmingham 11.3 9.0 2.3 20 
manpower 8.6 7.1 1.6 18 
non-manpower 2.6 1.9 0.7 27 
Canterbury 4.8 3.8 1.0 21 
manpower 3.9 3.1 0.8 21 
non-manpower 0.9 0.7 0.2 21 
Cardiff 5.7 4.8 0.8 15 
manpower 4.7 4.0 0.8 16 
non-manpower 1.0 0.9 0.1 10 
Durham 10.7 9.9 0.8 7 
manpower 8.3 7.6 0.7 8 
non-manpower 2.4 2.3 0.1 3 
Exeter 5.6 4.5 1.1 20 
manpower 4.5 3.7 0.8 19 
non-manpower 1.2 0.9 0.3 23 
Lewes 6.3 5.0 1.3 21 
manpower 4.8 3.9 0.9 19 
non-manpower 1.5 1.1 0.4 27 
Norwich 7.3 5.8 1.5 20 
manpower 5.4 4.6 0.9 16 
non-manpower 1.9 1.3 0.6 33 
Winchester 7.7 6.2 1.5 19 
manpower 6.0 4.9 1.1 19 
non-manpower 1.7 1.4 0.3 19 
Wormwood Scrubs 16.2 10.5 5.8 36 
manpower 12.5 8.2 4.2 34 
non-manpower 3.7 2.2 1.5 41 
Source: as for table 1. 
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Information and objectives 
At the heart of both the Government's "Fresh Start" proposals and their 
broader financial management initiative lie the new delegated budgeting procedures. 
Line managers have new powers and incentives to control budgets defined around 
cost centres. The spread of financial responsibility has brought with it the necessity 
for managerial accountability, which must be secured, in part, by the collection of 
apposite performance measures. Regular screening of prison establishments using 
DEA could assist in the development of an effective costing system for the service. 
As a complementary management-tool in these resource allocation decisions, data 
envelope analysis can provide decision-makers with: 
(1) An index which surnmarises the performance of establishments in a single 
unambiguous number; 
(2) The ability to set precise, quantifiable, spending targets for more efficient service; 
(3) Leverage on underperforming line managers through the identification of a 
comparable peer group of prisons with better managerial and working practices; 
(4) The basis for a "top-down" system of resource allocation - for example, the 
prison department may delegate funds to establishments on the basis of pre-set 
formulae, convention and performance information, like the DEA efficiency index; 
(5) Using information over time, the ability to monitor establishments so as to 
gauge trends in performance. 
Lastly, the aggregate targets set by data envelope analysis could be used to 
strengthen the picture of the prison department in the Public Expenditure White 
Paper. In its latest form (Cm 56-ii), the White Paper leaves objectives rather hazy, 
viz. "... Sustain the rule of law" (see also the article by Rodney Lord in the last 
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issue of Public Money). It would be preferable, and in accordance with the stated 
aims of the financial management initiative, to provide a crisper statement of 
objectives and their attainment, based perhaps on the target and savings illustrated 
in table 2. 
Footnote 
1. Public Money, 7,57 - 59,1987. Co-authored with J. S. Cubbin. 
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Competition and efficiency in refuse collection: A critical commentl, 2 
I. Introduction 
In a recent article in Fiscal Studies, Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson 
(1986, hereafter DMT) examined the privatisation of refuse collection by local 
authorities. Their results indicated that competitive tendering of these services could 
give substantial cost reductions. A follow-up piece by Cubbin, Domberger and 
Meadowcroft (1987, hereafter CDM) examined the same sample using Farrell frontier 
techniques rather than the regression analysis used by DMT. Increases in physical 
productivity were estimated which were held to account in large measure for the 
cost reductions reported by DMT. 
Here we make a critical appraisal of the DMT article. We suggest that DMT 
have overestimated the cost reductions because their cost equation is misspecified, 
that they have measured the gains from privatisation while ignoring important losses, 
and that there is evidence of reductions in service quality. We further suggest that 
the results of the CDM follow-up study are just as compatible with a rise in labour 
intensity as with improved technical efficiency. 
II. How big is the contract/tender effect? 
The DMT study measures the cost reductions from privatisation by estimated 
coefficients on two dummy variables which indicate whether an authority has 
contracted out or tendered while subsequently retaining any substantial part of its 
refuse disposal service in-house. This procedure means that the contract and tender 
effects (which do not differ significantly) are measured 
by the average reduction in 
costs for the authorities concerned relative to those otherwise 
implied by the overall 
cost function. 
Among the privatisers there are three authorities with costs around 50 per cent 
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lower than otherwise expected, 2 cases with costs about 45 percent lower, and 1 
case about 40 per cent lower. The cost reductions in 19 other cases are each 
considerably smaller - 10 around 10 per cent, 5 around 18 per cent and 2 each 
around 26 per cent and 33 per cent. There are 4 cases of privatisers with costs 
above what would otherwise be expected. Thus, while there is little doubt about the 
sign of the contract/tender effect, its average estimated magnitude depends on 6 to 
8 highly atypical points. 
Among about 300 authorities that have not been privatised, DMT do not find 
one with costs more than about 33 per cent below predicted levels. Thus this 
treatment of the data does not simply show the privatisers as being among the most 
effective authorities; it shows 6 to 8 of them (the "superstars") as being in a league 
of their own with costs substantially below even the most efficient of the 300 public 
sector operations. 
The relative cost performance reported by DMT is contradicted by two other 
studies of the same problem. The Audit Commission (1984) found a very different 
distribution. According to the Commission's report, there is a tail of high-cost 
public sector operations, but no difference between low-cost services in the public 
and private sectors. The Audit Commission's production function is prescriptive 
rather than statistical, but it does give a fuller representation of input and output 
variables - for example, it distinguishes between 17 basic variants of collection 
method, against DMTIs 5. Quite independently of the Audit Commission, the CDM 
follow-up study finds exactly the same pattern. Once again, although there are 
many cases of high-cost public sector operations, those that have been privatised are 
among the lowest-cost, not in a league of their own. This study does not have 
more explanatory variables, but it does combine them in a more flexible way. What 
may explain this repeated contradiction of DMT's results is that both the other 
studies have a more complex specification of the cost function than that used by 
DMT. There must therefore be serious doubt as to whether DMT have specified the 
cost function with sufficient precision to obtain accurate estimates of the 
246 
contract/tender effect. Further, the completely different distributions of efficiency 
ratings in the DMT and CDM studies call into question the compatability between 
the two sets of results, which is simply assumed by CDM. To accept both sets of 
results at face value would imply very great variability in the source of cost 
reductions - most privatisers would save by using fewer inputs, while the superstars 
could only have done so well by buying inputs more cheaply. 
An obvious question is whether DMT's superstars - those producers with 
exceptionally low ratios of actual to predicted costs - have anything in common 
with each other. The descriptions of local government areas in the Municipal Year 
Book indicate that all the superstars are in the rural areas. 
For the financial years 1979/80 and 1984/85 we have ranked authorities by unit 
costs. In both cases, and almost without exception, rural and urban authorities are 
ranked in distinct groups. DMT used a density variable to capture rural/urban 
differences. This is equivalent to allowing the intercept of the cost function to vary 
with the degree of rurality while the coefficients of other explanatory variables are 
constrained to be the same in both environments. It would be more appropriate to 
treat urban and rural authorities as separate data sets because rural "rounds" are 
profoundly different qualitatively, although an accurate demarcation might be very 
difficult. The pattern of DMT's results certainly suggests that there has been 
insufficient control for these geographical differences. (The Audit Commission also 
found smaller rural authorities difficult to assimilate to others. ) However, there is as 
yet an insufficient number of privatised authorities for this more sophisticated 
treatment to be feasible. 
As a final check on DMT's results, we attempted to find time series 
confirmation of the contract/tender effect which they estimate on cross-section data. 
If they have measured the effect correctly, it should be detectable over time as 
authorities put their services out to tender. We were unable to fit full ptoduction 
functions for before and after the tendering process. Instead we adopted the cruder 
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procedure for measuring unit costs for each authority for 1979/80 and 1984/85. 
However, since DMT's function exhibits constant returns to scale with output as by 
far the most important determinant of total costs, this simple before and after 
comparison may still be useful. 
Between 1978/79 (before privatisation) and 1984/85 (the second year of DMT's 
sample) nominal unit costs for 319 authorities rose by 22.2 per cent. For the 
contracting or tendering authorities where data were available for both years, the 
average nominal increase was 10.0 per cent. This implies savings through 
privatisation of slightly less than 10 per cent. This again indicates a contract/tender 
effect well below that measured by DMT. 
DMT's procedure requires that the propensity of authorities to privatise should 
be independent of their level of costs. If the privatisers had worst cost performance, 
then DMT's results are strengthened. Our time series results suggest that this 
"endogeneity" bias actually works the other way - that the privatisers already had 
lower than average costs. 2 
III. Is the contract/tender effect due to competition 
We now turn from DMT's results to their interpretation. DMT suggest that 
thecost reductions they measure are attributable to increased efficiency brought about 
by competition. But the imminence of privatisation could already induce competitive 
effects in authorities that had not yet concluded a tendering exercise and, since 
competition is a very diffuse process, the general climate might be expected to alter 
behaviour even where there are no plans for privatisation. Furthermore, the 
existence of a contract or a tendering process in two authorities does not imply that 
there is the same pressure of competition in each. DMT treat authorities that have 
privatised as little as 10 per cent of their refuse disposal service in the same way 
as those that have privatised all of it, when there has been considerable variation in 
the terms of the contracts offered out to tender: in Gloucester, clauses were 
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included that tended to shield the direct labour organisation (DLO) from certain 
types of cost-cutting by their competitors (NUPE/IWC (1984)). 
According to DMT 's interpretation, a contract is formalised when competitive 
bidding reveals the least-cost supplier. There is considerable evidence that this 
rationale for tendering does not pertain in the case of refuse collection. It appears 
that improvements in local costs have been realised through pressures in labour 
markets rather than through competition in the market for refuse services themselves. 
The 20 contracts awarded up to November 1983 were distributed among only 5 
companies. These are close to being regional monopolists offering the only tender in 
several local authorities (see Municipal Journal, 2 December 1983, p. 1844). 
Some contracts may have been won through loss-leading behaviour. Exclusive 
Cleansing won the contract for refuse collection in South Kesteven, but before work 
began the firm applied for a 2.5 per cent increase in the value of the contract 
(The Guardian, 30 April 1984). In Taunton Deane, Waste Management applied for 
a 13.2 per cent revaluation of its contract within its first year (Somerset County 
Gazette, 29 June 1984 and Express and Echo (Exeter and Devon), 28 August 
1984). Opportunistic loss-leading may be acting as a barrier to new competition, by 
prohibiting the entry of firms offering sustainable prices. 
The contractor may incur no major sunk costs in setting up the operation 
because he may inherit DLO facilities at a cost that permits a price below long-run 
equilibrium. Thus contractors' bids will be distorted downwards in the short run such 
that the competition they represent discriminates unfairly against publicly provided 
services. The authorities concerned have an interest in expediting privatisation which 
may well conflict with obtaining full value for the assets they sell. 
DMT argue that the similarity in performance of authorities that contracted out 
services and those that tendered but then kept in-house provision indicates that the 
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key factor is competition in product supply. It should be stressed , therefore, that 
the CDM study does not confirm this similarity but finds completely different cost 
performance by the two groups. Galbraith (1987) has assessed the general record of 
tendering in a way which further undermines DMT's simple interpretation in terms 
of competition. Complex supervision during and af ter the tendering process is 
necessary, Galbraith suggests, in order to derive sustained benefits from the changes. 
This interpretation runs far more in terms of managerial expertise and administrative 
reform than in terms of the immediate competition invoked by DMT. 
Doubts about competition in the output market suggest that cost improvements 
originate in pressures in input markets. A limited survey of the local press and the 
municipal literature largely confined to the superstars supports this hypothesis. For 
example, approaching half the direct labour organisation was made redundant in 
South Kesteven and Taunton Deane. In South Kesteven, Exclusive Cleansing 
employed 57 to undertake work formerly done by 90 (The Grantham Journal, 15 
June 1984). Waste Management Company in Taunton Deane re-employed 22 from a 
DLO of 43 (Public Services Action, no. 6, p. 65). 
Working conditions have deteriorated after contracting out. The premises used 
by staff in Taunton Deane have no toilets or canteen, vehicles have become 
unroadworthy, and the working day is two hours longer (Public Services Action, no. 
6, p. 5). In the Wirral, the largest contract moved to the private sector, 84 per 
cent of the company's vehicles were unroadworthy (Liverpool Daily Post, 13 
February 1985). 
These experiences highlight the existence of gainers and losers after contracting 
out. DMT measure only the gains, not the associated losses. Yet the distinction 
between competition in labour and product markets bears upon their results. If the 
tendering process exposes workers to labour market competition, it will certainly be 
possible to intensify work norms, degrade working conditions, etc. Thus, pecuniary 
savings arising from improvements in microeconomic efficiency have to be weighed 
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against the possibility of losses arising from a poorer quality service and worsened 
employment conditions. 
In response to our criticisms of DMT, the follow-up study at least recognises 
the possibility of losses from privatisation. The discussion, however, is hardly 
adequate. CDM argue that there is little evidence of straightforward wage-cutting. 
But this would be unrepresentative of present trends in the British economy - what 
one would expect, and what is quite consistent with CDM's results, is large-scale 
labour-shedding combined with a tightening of production norms. CDM say that 
"Flexible working practices do not necessarily imply a deterioration in working 
conditions". This is surely true, but new working practices that benefit employees 
can presumbably be negotiated with them and do not require the threat of dismissal 
central, in our view, to the privatisation exercise. CDM also now qualify the initial 
interpretation of monetary savings as pure welfare gain with the phrase "To the 
extent that the resources thereby released are allocated to the supply of goods and 
services ... ". This amounts to the major concession that 
large-scale unemployment 
and labour market disequilibrium compromise the potential benefits of cost-cutting 
operations. 
Because sophisticated monitoring systems yielding regular data do not appear to 
exist, it is difficult to evaluate the general state of services contracted out. 
Nonetheless, the evidence so far suggests that in some instances levels of service 
have fallen such that cost improvements are devalued somewhat. 
Penalties totalling L45,000 were levied on Pritchard Services in Wandsworth in 
1983 for poor performance (Sunday Telegraph, 7 August 1983). Financial penalties 
have also been levied on contractors in the Wirral and Vale of White Horse. 
Complaints have been recorded at a level of 200 per week in Bath (Sunday Times, 
31 July 1983), whilst in the first 15 months of private contracting in the Wirral 
30,000 complaints were received (Liverpool Daily Post, 16 October 1983 and Public 
Services Action, no. 12, p. 3). These standards of performance are encouraging a 
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more careful appraisal of privatisation, with some authorities, such as Eastbourne 
(incidentally, one of DMT's superstars), returning their refuse services to the public 
sector (The Times, 6 March 1987). Without a survey of quality and labour 
conditions in the public sector, such evidence may not be conclusive - but it points 
to the need for more systematic investigation of these issues. 
IV. Conclusion 
DMT (1986) seemed to offer strong, decisive evidence in favour of a policy 
when the first experiments with that policy were just beginning. Our aim in this 
critique has been to show that the evidence has not been as strong as was 
suggested. To the extent that DMT have identified genuine cost reductions, these 
may be traced to "losers" among the workforce and are devalued by worries about 
loss-leading and the level of service. Thus the econometric results results presented 
by DMT must be thought of as provisional until there is much more experience of 
contracting out services such as refuse disposal. Further analysis will then be 
necessary. 
Footnotes 
1. Fiscal Studies, 9,1988,80-85. Co-authored with John Grahl. 
2. The authors of the article being criticised have been most open and generous in 
their assistance to us. We have also been greatly helped by the research staff of the 
National Union of Public Employees. Joe Ganley would like to thank the Economic 
and Social Research Council for financial support. None of the above necessarily 
agrees with the views expressed in this article. 
3. This point was suggested to us by an anonymous referee. 
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